CORPORATE LAW · BY DR ADRIAN ADAMS

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ORIGINAL PUBLISHED INTERIOR · 26 OCTOBER 2026

Chapter 4 — Directors and Management

Preservation note. The material below is a readable text extraction from the existing original book, kept in the same page order without editorial rewriting. Its complete, original approved page layout and link annotations are preserved in the PDFs. Open the complete reading edition.

Original book page 149

CORPORATE LAW CHAPTER 4 — DIRECTORS AND MANAGEMENT Corporate Governance and the Division of Corporate Powers A shareholder is an investor in a company, but does not automatically possess authority to manage its daily operations. Equally, a person need not have been validly appointed to the board before the statutory definition of director can become relevant. The lawyer’s task is therefore to identify the correct legal person, the decision-maker, the source of power, and the evidence of how that power was exercised. Under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 124 concerns the company’s capacity, while s 198A (as a replaceable rule subject to the constitution) addresses the directors’ power to manage its business. Section 203D assigns members of a public company a particular director-removal power. Sections 9AC and 9AD identify directors and officers by statutory tests, including functions that a person performs in fact. These provisions answer different legal questions; they must not be substituted for one another. The text that follows examines those provisions, the leading judgments, how boards make decisions, and the legal consequences of appointments, removal, resignation and delegation. Its examples show students how to identify missing evidence, evaluate both sides of an argument, and provide clear client advice. 1. The corporate triangle: entity, board and members A lawyer should never use the expression “the company wants” without considering how that desire was legally formed. The company, its board and its members are different things. The company is the continuing legal person. Directors are natural persons who exercise decision-making authority through properly constituted board processes or authorised delegates. Members have financial, informational, voting and other statutory rights associated with their shares. Legal questions are misanswered when those categories are collapsed. For instance, the shareholders of a large listed retailer may be unhappy with an automation strategy, but their dissatisfaction is not itself a corporate instruction. They require a power that allows the general meeting to produce the legal consequence they want. 148 | CORPORATE LAW

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To identify the source of a power, work down a hierarchy. First, identify mandatory statutory requirements: an example is the public-company director removal provision in s 203D, which overrides inconsistent constitutional and contractual terms. Secondly, identify the company's constitution and the replaceable rules applicable by operation of ss 134–135. Thirdly, identify the particular procedure by which a corporate organ can exercise its power. Fourthly, distinguish an internal-authority question from the different issue whether an outsider can rely on an officer's representation or statutory assumptions. That fourth question can involve ss 128–129 and agency principles, which are relevant to corporate transactions but not required to decide whether HBC can instruct FreshFoods to staff its checkouts. Section 124 must be read in its proper setting. Its concern is corporate capacity and powers, including the broad legal capacity of an individual and particular corporate powers. It is not a grant to every shareholder to direct every transaction. Section 125 is a useful contrasting provision: restrictions or prohibitions in a constitution may affect internal authority without automatically invalidating the exercise of corporate powers. This distinction between corporate capacity and internal corporate power is a recurring transactional question. When advising a client, specify whether the complaint is that the corporation lacked legal capacity, that the wrong person decided, that a required procedure was not followed, or that an outsider had reason to rely on an apparently authorised representative. They require different legal analysis and potentially different remedies. Practise with a hypothetical. If FreshFoods has capacity under s 124 to purchase automation software but the constitution requires board approval for contracts above $20 million, the question is not whether the company is legally capable of buying the software. It is whether the relevant constitutional approval occurred. If 110 shareholders voted to instruct the procurement director to sign the contract, another question arises: does the general meeting have the power to give that direction? The same facts can involve company capacity, internal management authority and external contractual enforceability. Good lawyers isolate each before applying an authority. Why the lecturer describes a “tug of war”: a corporation can have a legally recognised power to do something but it must exercise that power through a human organ. Section 124 concerns the company’s legal capacity to own assets, contract, sue and issue shares. It does not answer whether one shareholder, the directors collectively or the members in general meeting decide to undertake the transaction. Section 198A allocates management; CORPORATE LAW 149 | CORPORATE LAW

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s 203D separately allocates a public-company removal power to members. The rights are not an undifferentiated pool from which whichever side is louder can draw. In a client problem, identify the legal person first. Ask whether it is a public company or proprietary company; whether the replaceable rules apply; whether a tailored constitution reallocates any power; and whether the proposed decision is operational policy, appointment/removal, amendment of constitution, a meeting procedure or a transaction specifically reserved to members by the Act or other regulation. This is a sequence of legal questions, not an instinctive referendum on fairness. An incorporated company is a separate legal person. It can own property, enter contracts and incur obligations. But it has no natural body or mind. It acts through human decision- makers and through legal rules attributing conduct to it. Corporate law therefore asks two separate questions: what can the company do, and who is authorised to decide that it will do it? The first question concerns the powers of the corporation; the second concerns allocation of those powers among directors, shareholders and other agents. This distinction is particularly important because being a shareholder is not the same as owning the company’s supermarket buildings, stock, bank accounts or contracts. Members have rights attached to their shares and specific statutory or constitutional powers. Directors manage or direct the company’s business. A shareholder who owns only two shares still possesses the rights attaching to those shares; a group of 110 such holders may have statutory participatory rights but not an entitlement to become management. The core legal rule is the replaceable rule in Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 198A(1): the business of a company is managed by or under the direction of the directors. Section 198A(2) permits directors to exercise the company’s powers other than powers the Act or constitution reserves for exercise in general meeting. Section 198A is a replaceable rule; always inspect s 134, s 135 and the constitution rather than declaring s 198A universally unalterable. Compare s 124, which concerns the legal capacity of the company itself; do not use s 124 to answer who within the company may order staffing or automation. A good corporate lawyer does not begin by asking, “Does the shareholder proposal sound desirable?” That is a commercial or moral question, and it may be important, but it is not the legal issue. The lawyer begins by identifying whose legal decision is at stake. FreshFoods itself is the incorporated person; the directors are the organ ordinarily entrusted with managing its business; the members are holders of shares who exercise rights given by statute, constitution and the terms of their securities. These relationships CORPORATE LAW 150 | CORPORATE LAW

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operate at different legal levels. A company's capacity is not a licence for any particular member to act on its behalf. Equally, a board's ordinary authority to manage does not permit it to ignore the express statutory powers of members to select or remove directors. Imagine FreshFoods enters a ten-year agreement with a technology supplier. Section 124 establishes that a company has the legal capacity of an individual and certain corporate powers, subject to applicable law. But a contract can still raise separate questions: did the board approve the commitment under the constitution; did an officer have actual authority; did the supplier rely on statutory assumptions concerning corporate dealings; did a conflicted director participate improperly; and was the contract executed in a legally effective way? The same commercial transaction therefore invites a sequence of analyses rather than one broad statement that “the company has power.” Students who identify these layers can give precise client advice even when the facts are complex. The statute does not equate share ownership with title to the company's individual assets. HBC's 110 members purchase a total of 220 shares; they acquire whatever member and voting rights attach to those shares, but not ownership of FreshFoods' physical supermarket property or control over each checkout. If HBC has 220 votes out of, for example, ten million votes entitled to be cast, its voting position would be 220 ÷ 10,000,000 × 100 = 0.0022%. That ten-million denominator is purely a classroom illustration: the tutorial does not provide the actual shares on issue or class voting terms, so students must not state an actual voting percentage. This is the difference between practising the arithmetic and inventing a legal fact. The most useful question to ask each time a power dispute appears is: “What is the source of this power, and does anything displace it?” Begin with the Act. Next examine the constitution and replaceable rules under ss 134–135. Then ask whether an express statute reserves the decision to members. Only then select a case to interpret the power allocation. This prevents a common error: beginning and ending with s 198A when the matter involves a public-company member right under s 203D, or beginning and ending with s 203D when the proposal is actually an attempted direction about operational staffing. 2. Why directors exist: long-term strategy, external accountability and control Directors are not simply prestigious officeholders. They constitute the organ through which the company must set strategy, supervise management and make decisions that belong to the board. The board may appoint managers and use specialists, but delegation of tasks must be distinguished from the allocation of ultimate management authority. Section 198D, a replaceable rule, permits directors to delegate powers to specified persons CORPORATE LAW 151 | CORPORATE LAW

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and requires the delegate to exercise the power in accordance with any directions of the directors. The existence and scope of a delegation become decisive in a director-status problem: a consultant who merely exercises a defined delegated function may be different from a consultant who independently determines matters ordinarily reserved to the board. At the client-advice stage, inspect records rather than infer control from a job title. Ask for board agendas, minutes, written resolutions, management authorisations, consulting agreements and correspondence with lenders. Compare each person's power on paper with what occurred. If the board honestly evaluates proposals, requests revisions and sometimes rejects recommendations, this supports continued board supervision. If proposals are rubber-stamped, the evidence may support a different inference. That inference can matter to the de facto and shadow tests even though the two statutory limbs address different conduct. The lecturer separated board functions into accountability (financial statements, monitoring compliance and reports to members), strategic thinking (setting long-term direction and evaluating strategic choices), supervision (scrutinising the performance of executives and controls) and corporate policy (budgets, senior pay and company culture). These categories are interlocking: a director who never reviews the financial information cannot sensibly set a restructuring strategy; a board that formulates strategy but refuses to supervise its execution has not completed its governance function. “Managed BY or UNDER THE DIRECTION of the directors” in s 198A(1) is deliberate. The directors are not expected to buy every packet of office supplies, negotiate every grocery supplier contract or personally oversee every checkout. They may employ managers and delegate appropriate decisions, subject to the company constitution and the statutory delegation framework in s 198D. Yet delegation does not transmute an ordinary store manager into a director automatically: s 9AC requires a more exact functional inquiry. The Week 4 slides distinguish four dimensions of board function. “Accountability” covers reports to shareholders, audit scrutiny and legal/regulatory compliance. “Strategic thinking” covers setting direction and reviewing major opportunities and threats. “Supervision” covers performance and budget oversight. “Corporate policy” covers approving major budgets, senior remuneration policies and corporate culture. Boards are not simply a collection of people who attend meetings. They have a continuing governance responsibility to decide, monitor and, where appropriate, delegate. CORPORATE LAW 152 | CORPORATE LAW

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Applied to FreshFoods: replacing checkout staff with automation is a business strategy, labour-allocation policy, budget and long-term competitiveness decision. Even a policy with substantial social effects ordinarily remains a matter for the board if management powers have been allocated to directors. Members might disagree strongly, mobilise support, ask questions, publish arguments or vote on matters properly reserved to them; none of those facts automatically grants them the power to issue legally binding management instructions. The reason we study directors is that incorporation separates the provision of risk capital from everyday authority to run the enterprise. A supermarket may be owned through a dispersed share register: thousands of investors can buy and sell small amounts of equity without becoming managers. The company still needs coherent decisions on capital expenditure, staff, technology, supply contracts, regulatory compliance and long-term strategy. A board creates an identifiable governing organ that can make those decisions and be answerable for its stewardship. It is tempting to describe the board as “the boss,” but that obscures an equally important proposition: directors are subject to duties, constitutionally structured powers and member accountability rather than possessing personal dominion over company property. Take the automation strategy through each of the four functions in the lecturer's slide. At the strategic stage, directors consider whether automated technology creates sustainable value and what it does to service quality, employment and reputation. At the policy stage, they determine an investment budget and objectives: pilot stores, implementation dates, customer safeguards and metrics. At the supervisory stage, they demand reports comparing expected and actual savings, complaint rates and system failures. At the accountability stage, they must ensure the organisation reports and complies with applicable law. The point is not that corporate law dictates a particular balance between efficiency and jobs. It dictates the legal architecture within which an appropriately informed decision is to be taken. Management by delegation is not abandonment of management. A lawful delegation under s 198D can place certain decisions with an executive or expert, and s 190 deals with the responsibility of directors in respect of delegated acts. A lawyer must examine the terms and existence of a delegation and the conditions for any statutory defence instead of assuming either that every delegated decision is invalid or that the board is automatically absolved. The practical record matters: board delegations and limits, management authority schedules, minutes, decision papers and reporting lines. In the BlueWave facts, CORPORATE LAW 153 | CORPORATE LAW

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consulting status and delegated tasks are real counterarguments to director classification; they must be evaluated, not dismissed because Leah was influential. A useful governance comparison is the difference between a direction and a recommendation. “We recommend adopting a three-month pilot, subject to board approval” presents options for a governing organ to decide. “We have closed the Queensland plant; the board will ratify the paperwork” suggests the person giving the instruction may already be exercising substantive corporate authority. The same individual can perform both kinds of work on different occasions. A lawyer investigates what happened, not only what the engagement agreement said was meant to happen. 3. Who counts as a director? Labels cannot defeat substance The structure of s 9AC(1) should be analysed element by element. Paragraph (a) captures persons appointed to the director position and alternate directors while acting as alternates, regardless of the title attached to the position. Paragraph (b) extends the definition, unless the contrary intention appears, to persons not validly appointed. Subparagraph (b)(i) concerns action in the position of director; subparagraph (b)(ii) concerns the directors' habitual compliance with another's instructions or wishes. The reference to persons not validly appointed is essential: the extended definition is designed to prevent a formal defect, absence of appointment, or strategically chosen label from concealing the actual exercise of corporate power. The two functional limbs may coexist, but they require distinct proof. It is not enough to say that Leah ‘controlled BlueWave’ and therefore tick both boxes. For de facto status, identify decisions she made, whether she represented herself as authorised to make them, what the board allowed her to do and whether the functions were appropriate for a director of this particular manufacturer. For shadow status, identify directions or wishes, the actual members of the board who followed them, the regularity and causal influence of that pattern, and whether the professional/business advice exclusion applies. One limb is primarily about Leah acting; the other is primarily about the board following. There is also a methodological qualification: the extended definition does not apply identically to every provision merely because s 9AC(1)(b) is established. Its opening words ‘unless the contrary intention appears’ and the section's examples require the lawyer to identify the particular obligation or statutory power in question. Treat status as an entry point to the next question—what statute and duty applies—not as a conclusion that every conceivable director power or liability automatically follows. CORPORATE LAW 154 | CORPORATE LAW

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Read the structure of s 9AC(1), not only the label “director”. Paragraph (a)(i) deals with appointment to the position, while (a)(ii) adds an appointed alternate actually acting as such. Paragraph (b), unless contrary intention appears, extends director status to a person not validly appointed, first where that person ACTS IN THE POSITION (subparagraph (i)), and second where the directors are ACCUSTOMED TO ACT according to the person’s instructions or wishes (subparagraph (ii)). Those are distinct proofs. A consultant can give influential advice without being either category; a person can also satisfy more than one category on strong facts. This is a liability-and-accountability rule, not a reward for seniority. Its purpose is to prevent functional company controllers evading relevant director duties because their papers say “consultant”, “major shareholder”, “founder” or “adviser”. Conversely, do not equate all powerful creditors, employed CEOs or professional advisers with shadow directors. The professional-capacity and ordinary-business-relationship wording at the end of s 9AC(1)(b)(ii) must be applied, not ignored. Section 9AC(1)(a)(i) covers a person appointed to the position of director, whatever the title used. Section 9AC(1)(a)(ii) additionally includes an alternate director appointed and acting in that capacity. Section 9AC(1)(b)(i) includes, subject to context, a person not validly appointed who actually acts in the position of director: the de facto director. Section 9AC(1)(b)(ii) concerns the shadow director: a person on whose instructions or wishes the directors are accustomed to act, excluding advice properly given in a professional capacity or business relationship. The statutory distinctions are not mere vocabulary; they identify the facts the litigant must prove. A de facto director is recognised because the person functions as a director in reality. Typical indicators may include participation in major negotiations, making decisions ordinarily reserved to directors, controlling significant corporate policy, acting for the company at the highest level and being permitted to do so by the board. No single indicator is conclusive. A consultant who advises but does not take over board functions may remain a consultant; a former director whose conduct shows real governing authority may be a de facto director notwithstanding the end of a formal appointment. A shadow director is different. Their status rests on the board’s habitual compliance with their instructions or wishes. The person may remain offstage. Ask: whose instructions were given, to whom, concerning which decisions, how often and with what causal effect? The board or governing majority must be accustomed to follow, not merely sometimes accept useful advice. A bank or major supplier may drive a hard commercial bargain CORPORATE LAW 155 | CORPORATE LAW

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without becoming a shadow director. The professional/business relationship exclusion must be analysed rather than assumed. A key skill is to read a statutory definition grammatically. Section 9AC(1)(a) deals with a person appointed to the position of director and an alternate appointed and acting in that capacity. Paragraph (b) extends the definition, unless the contrary intention appears, to persons who were not validly appointed but whose conduct satisfies one of two different descriptions. Subparagraph (b)(i) turns on acting in the position of director; subparagraph (b)(ii) turns on the formal directors being accustomed to act in accordance with a person's instructions or wishes. The words doing the work are different because the mischief is different. The first prevents evasion through defective appointment or informal control of functions; the second prevents evasion through control of an ostensibly independent board. Consider three contrasting people at BlueWave. Its formally appointed chair signs a board resolution and acts as a director: classification under s 9AC(1)(a) is usually straightforward. Its external accountant supplies cash-flow forecasts and points out that a bank covenant will be breached: that ordinarily remains professional advice, not director status. But a restructuring adviser who determines which business lines will shut, negotiates the company's survival financing as the person in charge, instructs executives directly and presents decisions to a compliant board may fall within s 9AC(1)(b)(i), even where the consultancy agreement says the adviser has no governance power. Whether the external accountant becomes a shadow director, by contrast, requires proof about the board's habitual obedience, not simply that the advice was excellent or influential. Evidence analysis must track the statutory words. To assess “acts in the position,” request the formal organisational chart, executive delegations, signatory limits, board papers, emails, minutes, financial commitments, documents describing how the person held themselves out, and testimony identifying who made major decisions. To assess “accustomed to act,” build a chronology of the alleged instructions or wishes and what the directors subsequently did; identify who was involved and whether a governing majority followed the pattern. One approval, one urgent decision or merely asking an expert for guidance should not be turned into a conclusive finding of habitual compliance. Do not treat de facto and shadow classifications as mutually exclusive legal labels. A person may exercise director functions directly and also cause a board habitually to follow their wishes. But neither conclusion should be reached by repeating the other: each needs a distinct finding supported by the facts required by its subsection. A law student's answer becomes professional-grade when it states the factual evidence needed to resolve CORPORATE LAW 156 | CORPORATE LAW

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uncertainty and recognises that lawyers do not have to produce a categorical answer on incomplete instructions. 4. Director versus officer: a vital alternative analysis A student needs to read s 9AD(1) as several alternatives, not as one vague definition. Paragraph (a) includes directors and secretaries. Paragraph (b)(i) addresses a person who makes, or participates in making, decisions affecting the whole or a substantial part of the company's business. Paragraph (b)(ii) addresses capacity significantly to affect its financial standing. Paragraph (b)(iii) addresses habitual director compliance with the person's wishes or instructions, subject to the specified advice exclusion. Other limbs include particular officeholders and persons administering corporate property. For Leah, the model's elimination of a boat line and proposed closure of a facility raise (b)(i), while restructuring financial facilities and negotiating with the bank point to (b)(ii). Do not mis- cite the officer definition as ‘s 9AC’; that is the wording of the original tutorial prompt, not the location of the current statutory definition. Distinguish capacity from successful action. Under s 9AD(1)(b)(ii), the question is whether the person has the capacity significantly to affect financial standing; a specific loss or an actual change in financial statements is not necessarily required to meet the definition. Yet an ordinary employee may affect revenue or expenses within a narrow portfolio without becoming an officer. The legal evaluation must examine the company's size, financial structure, the person's real authority, and the significance of the decisions. This functional assessment is reinforced by ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4: the definition is not confined to people who hold a named office or have a conventional corporate title. The spoken lecture emphasises that liability may attach because the person is an “officer” even if difficult evidentiary issues defeat a director allegation. In current legislation that definition belongs to s 9AD(1), whereas the historical Grimaldi judgment discusses the previous s 9 terminology. Section 9AD(1)(b)(i) reaches participation in decisions affecting the whole or a substantial part of the business; s 9AD(1)(b)(ii) concerns capacity significantly to affect financial standing; s 9AD(1)(b)(iii) concerns directors being accustomed to follow instructions, subject to the professional/business relationship exclusion. Test each limb on separate factual evidence. For BlueWave, negotiating for survival financing, directing the cessation of one of three product lines and overseeing the closure of a manufacturing facility may be enough to examine officer status under both (b)(i) and (ii) even if Leah’s actual board-like status remains disputed. However, officer status is NOT a reason to skip the expressly requested CORPORATE LAW 157 | CORPORATE LAW

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director classification. State it after the director answer as a subsidiary risk supported by the precise limbs. The current Corporations Act places the definition of “officer” in s 9AD, not s 9AC. Under s 9AD(1)(a), a director or secretary is an officer; under s 9AD(1)(b)(i), an individual participating in decisions affecting the whole or a substantial part of the corporation’s business can also qualify; paragraph (b)(ii) covers capacity significantly to affect its financial standing; and paragraph (b)(iii) addresses a person whose instructions or wishes directors customarily follow, with the same type of proper professional/business- relationship exclusion. Read the actual statutory paragraph applicable to the specific fact, not merely a bare reference to “s 9”. Why have this wider category? A commercially influential person may escape the narrow de facto-director test but still have real power over fundamental strategic and financial decisions. In Grimaldi the Full Court observed at [143] that officer status provided a more straightforward alternative. ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4 illustrates that a person need not occupy a formal named office of the particular company to be an officer where the functional statutory test is satisfied. Determining status does not itself establish misconduct: an additional breach, causation and applicable remedy must be proved. Why does the Act define both a director and an officer? Because some powerful corporate decision-makers may not occupy or control the board, yet their functions place them within the class to whom statutory duties can attach. The officer definition in s 9AD(1) is therefore a separate entry point into responsibility. It includes, among others, a director or secretary and a person who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole or a substantial part of the business; a person with capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing; and a person whose instructions or wishes the directors are accustomed to act upon, with the statutory professional/business- relationship qualification. Distinguish these alternatives and apply the one that fits the evidence. The phrase “participates in making” is particularly important. It need not be confined to the person who signs the final resolution. Suppose the board formally approves Leah's proposal, but all commercially meaningful options were eliminated by Leah before the meeting, and the board merely records the outcome. Her contribution may be substantial even though the minutes show a director's signature. Conversely, if Leah merely provides a report and a genuinely independent board evaluates competing choices, she may have contributed advice rather than participated in determining the company's business. The level of responsibility and scope of the decisions are therefore central facts. CORPORATE LAW 158 | CORPORATE LAW

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The High Court's reasoning in ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4 warns against an overly formal account of corporate power. Officer status under the financial-standing limb is concerned with actual capacity significantly to affect the company's position and is not confined to people holding particular office titles. Students should identify the specific limb of s 9AD(1)(b) relied upon rather than writing loosely that an influential person is “like an officer.” In Leah's case the banking, product-line and plant-closure decisions provide different bases for examining each limb, without proving that any statutory duty was necessarily breached. 5. De facto director authorities: Drysdale and Grimaldi The correct way to use Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale is as an illustration that a person who persists in performing director functions after formal office has lapsed can be treated as occupying that position for statutory purposes. Do not reduce the case to the false proposition that doing any act connected to a company makes one a director. Ask what the person actually did in a position of governance and the statutory problem the court addressed. The lesson for Leah is to avoid relying exclusively on her statement of resignation when actual corporate conduct points the other way. In Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6, the Full Federal Court at [133]–[143] rejected any rigid single test. Its analysis was sensitive to the circumstances of a particular company and the types of functions its directors actually performed. At [141] the Court reasoned that Grimaldi had been given, or had assumed with the acquiescence of executive directors, significant functions that would properly be expected of a director in that company's circumstances. Paragraph [142] shows the relevance of acts taken on his own initiative as well as acts authorised by others. A legal answer should identify those findings, then compare the candidate's significant functions, autonomy and apparent integration with governance. Do not misapply Grimaldi by requiring that the de facto director attend every board meeting or purport to hold every formal power. The law accommodates corporate reality, including informal governance structures and overlapping consultancy and director functions. Equally, do not conclude that a professional who negotiates a loan is necessarily a director. A restructuring consultant can lawfully carry out negotiations within authority conferred by the board. The differentiating question is whether the work was, in context, the assumption of a director's position rather than performance of the functions of a specialist adviser. In a client interview, ask who actually chose the outcome, who could reject it, and whether the consultant proceeded without board authorisation. CORPORATE LAW 159 | CORPORATE LAW

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Drysdale is pedagogically simple: the purported director previously held the position, the formal entitlement became defective/expired, yet he continued participating as a director. The law looks beyond the defect to continuing performance. The lecturer’s practical “shut the door” advice follows: document an actual resignation, cease acting as a director, stop signing board resolutions and clarify authority. Merely telling friends or business colleagues that one has left does not settle how one functioned afterwards. Grimaldi requires closer analysis than “he made important decisions”. In [133] the Full Court rejected the proposition that a functioning formally appointed board necessarily rules out a de facto director. At [141], the scale, significance and director-character of functions assumed with executive-director acquiescence were central. At [142], some acts were authorised and some done independently. At [143], officer status was an alternative basis. The proper question is whether, in the context of THIS company and its actual governance arrangements, the person was doing the things that directors of that company would ordinarily be expected to do. A senior employee’s routine delegated duties are insufficient by themselves. Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale [1978] HCA 52; (1978) 141 CLR 236 involved a person acting as a director despite defects in formal status. The High Court rejected a reading of directors’ obligations that could be evaded merely by an invalid appointment. The underlying policy is to attach responsibility to persons who actually occupy and exercise director functions. Use Drysdale to explain why historical formal defects do not automatically exempt a controlling person from directors’ legal duties. Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6 [133]–[143] is the central assigned modern authority. Grimaldi was not formally appointed as a director of Chameleon, but undertook extensive and significant company affairs, including commercial activity ordinarily performed by directors; some activities were authorised by the board and others were initiated by him. At [141] the Full Court considered the extent and significance of his functions sufficient to treat him as acting in the director’s position. At [142] it considered the mix of authorised and independent conduct; at [143] it highlighted the independent importance of officer status. Use this reasoning to compare what the alleged director actually DID, rather than the wording of their consulting contract. Legal history matters here because cases decided under an earlier statutory definition must be translated into the current language, not cited as though Parliament has never changed the section number. Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale (1978) 141 CLR 236 was concerned with a person performing director functions despite the lack of a valid CORPORATE LAW 160 | CORPORATE LAW

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formal appointment. The High Court treated the de facto status as sufficient for application of the relevant directors' obligations under the predecessor legislation. The enduring idea is accountability through functions actually performed. The specific older statutory duty was not current s 180 or s 181; a careful student explains the historical context and then uses s 9AC(1)(b)(i) as the operative present definition. In Grimaldi, the Full Federal Court's reasoning is more subtle than the shorthand “high- level influence makes a director.” The judgment surveyed authority on de facto directors, recognised that modern corporate functions vary with the company, and resisted a rigid universal list of activities that only a formally appointed board member can undertake. It examined both the kind of work Grimaldi performed and the way Chameleon allowed him to perform it. His activities involved matters of real corporate significance, including fundraising, major transactions and negotiating on the company's behalf. At [141] the Court concluded that the nature and extent of the functions, some exercised with substantial independence, justified treating him as acting in the position of a director. At [142] the judgment addressed the relevance of how the formal officers treated the arrangement. The inquiry is functional and contextual. Now connect the authority to BlueWave without silently equating the facts. Leah's bank and supplier negotiations could be perfectly consistent with consultancy. Their significance rises when combined with the statement that she decided which boat model would cease production and oversaw the factory-closure strategy. Those are decisions materially affecting BlueWave's business direction. Her relationship with the formal board is also relevant: it habitually adopted her recommendations and allowed her to carry them out. Whether these facts cross the legal boundary depends on the real allocation of decision-making power. A professional answer would compare the functions undertaken in Grimaldi and then ask how much independent authority BlueWave actually entrusted to Leah. 6. Shadow director authorities: Buzzle and Antico Buzzle is particularly valuable because it warns against equating creditor pressure with governance control. Apple had a powerful commercial relationship with the Buzzle business. The Court examined whether Apple's requirements and negotiating stance amounted to instructions which Buzzle's directors were accustomed to follow as members of a board. It was not sufficient that Buzzle was heavily dependent on Apple or that Apple's terms were economically difficult to refuse. The evidence must establish the director-level pattern and the required connection between the instructions or wishes and CORPORATE LAW 161 | CORPORATE LAW

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the directors' actions. In your answer, separate a supplier saying ‘these are our contractual terms’ from an outsider effectively instructing the board ‘make this governance decision’ and the board habitually doing so. The common-law formulation examined in Buzzle also requires attention to the board's collective action or governing majority. It is not always enough to show that one individual director listens to the supposed controller, or that isolated recommendations happen to be accepted. The court looks at the way decisions are actually made and the evidence of an established practice. Relevant material would include minutes recording decisions made without independent deliberation, repeated emails containing detailed directions, contemporaneous evidence that board members treated those directions as binding, and examples where the board departed from or rejected the advice. Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 38 NSWLR 290 is often used as an illustration of effective influence associated with a corporate group and substantial shareholding. The lesson is not that a specified percentage of shares creates automatic shadow status. It is that a substantial shareholder or parent may, on detailed evidence, cross from protecting an investment into directing the subsidiary's board. Compare the level of influence, the overlap of appointments, the substance of board proceedings and the capacity of the subsidiary's board to act independently. For Leah, her prior board role and intimate financial knowledge can explain her influence, but do not replace proof of habitual compliance. The lecturer’s “puppet master” image captures an evidentiary pattern: A instructs, B is the formal board, and the board habitually follows A. The court must look at a pattern of governance conduct, not one instance when A gave correct advice or the board yielded to commercial pressure. Ask which directors followed the wishes, whether that group constituted the board or its governing majority, which decisions they followed, how often, and whether their compliance was attributable to A’s directions rather than independent analysis. Buzzle [228]–[250] provides the limiting principle. Apple’s relationship with the Buzzle business gave it bargaining leverage and influence. White J distinguished that kind of arm’s-length commercial pressure or advice from habitual directors’ governance compliance with Apple’s instructions. The company’s own directors retained their own legal decision-making. Contrast a hypothetical lender sending a loan covenant requiring expense controls (commercial condition) with a controlling investor effectively issuing repeated instructions on board decisions that are accepted without independent thought (potential shadow direction). CORPORATE LAW 162 | CORPORATE LAW

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Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 38 NSWLR 290 supplies a more affirmative illustration: substantial shareholding, nomination/control of the board and actual influence over board conduct supported shadow-director analysis in its factual setting. The precise percentage of ownership is not a magic threshold. The case illustrates actual domination, not a rule that a parent automatically becomes shadow director whenever it owns a subsidiary. The lecturer recounted an experience from US practice involving a mortgage business, restructuring, bankruptcy and individuals allegedly exercising shadow-level control, with a substantial financial settlement. That is a teaching anecdote rather than a verified Australian authority. The transcription does not establish an identifiable case citation; this edition does not invent one. The legal lesson is why claimant lawyers investigate functional control: directors’ duties, potential personal liability and insurance coverage can have serious financial consequences, but policy coverage must be checked rather than presumed. Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233 [228]–[250] is the assigned analysis of the shadow-director limb. Apple had commercially powerful dealings with Buzzle, but the court rejected the proposition that Apple was a shadow director merely because Buzzle faced compelling commercial incentives to meet Apple's terms. Critical distinctions are between negotiating an arm’s-length trading relationship and actually directing board decisions; between a company accepting conditions for obtaining commercial benefits and the board becoming accustomed to obeying an outside decision-maker. Look for a proven pattern of causal instruction and compliance by the board or governing majority. Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 38 NSWLR 290 demonstrates the contrasting danger of profound control by an influential corporate shareholder or financier, depending on the actual pattern of control exercised. It does not create a rule that every parent company or lender is automatically a shadow director. Use the contrast with Buzzle: participation in the machinery of management and routine compliance is more probative than mere financial pressure or a contractual veto. The shadow-director problem asks a different, relational question: did the person's wishes or instructions become the pattern by which the appointed directors governed? In Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 38 NSWLR 290, the evidence concerned substantial control exercised by a major corporate shareholder and financier over another company's affairs. The case demonstrates that a corporation, not only a natural person, can fall within the shadow-director concept when the statutory facts are CORPORATE LAW 163 | CORPORATE LAW

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made out. It does not mean that a 42% shareholder or large creditor automatically becomes a director. The shareholding, financing arrangements, appointment of nominee directors, involvement in major policy and board response must be considered together. Buzzle offers a useful contrast. Apple's position as a commercially powerful supplier and financier gave it strong leverage over the restructuring and future of a reseller business. Yet White J did not find the necessary habitual director-level compliance with Apple's wishes or instructions. In the specified teaching passage, the judgment addresses the need for directors (or their governing majority) to be accustomed to act, the causal link to instructions or wishes and the limitations of treating arm's-length commercial constraints as board commands. The holding matters because otherwise almost any demanding bank, franchisor or major customer might acquire board duties simply by imposing conditions in a negotiated commercial relationship. Imagine BlueWave's bank tells Leah and the board that new finance will be conditional on closing an unprofitable factory. This does not, by itself, show the bank is a shadow director. It may simply be bargaining over the bank's willingness to lend. Now change the facts: the bank's officers regularly direct what BlueWave's board must vote on, the directors habitually vote as instructed and there is documentary evidence of a standing practice of obedience on governance matters. That begins to raise the shadow inquiry. The difference is not how harsh the lender's terms are; it is whether the board is habitually acting according to the person's governance instructions or wishes. Leah occupies an intermediate and factually difficult position. She is embedded inside BlueWave's restructuring process, and the directors regularly seek her wishes before making major decisions. That is stronger evidence of a shadow relationship than a stranger's one-off commercial condition. Yet the words “consultant,” “recommendations” and “formal board approval” cannot be ignored. The statutory professional/business advice qualification asks whether the conduct was properly advice within that relationship. Board papers explaining an independent choice would support her defence. Repeated minutes documenting automatic adoption of her instructions, with evidence she was effectively directing the votes, would support a finding against her. 7. Division of powers and shareholder activism: the leading line of cases The distinction between an ordinary management instruction and an exercise of a power reserved to shareholders is best taught by focusing on legal competence. Automatic Self- Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 established that, where the company's governance arrangements assigned management to directors, a general CORPORATE LAW 164 | CORPORATE LAW

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meeting could not simply override that allocation through an ordinary resolution directing a transaction. The case did not deny the members' legitimate rights; it required them to use the powers the law and governance documents actually confer. In contemporary Australian advice the statutory gateway is s 198A, read with ss 134–135 and the particular constitution. In National Roads & Motorists' Association v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517, the court addressed the legal competence of proposed resolutions in the light of powers vested elsewhere under the association's constitutional structure. This assists the distinction between having a procedure for asking that a resolution be considered and having a substantive power to pass it. A lawyer should not use a procedural section to create a management power that no substantive rule grants. In FreshFoods, the fact that 110 people have purchased shares is not enough to turn checkout staffing into member business. Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 is essential because it deals with the tempting alternative argument that shareholders should at least be able to pass a non-binding opinion resolution. In that case, activists wished to place climate-related resolutions before the bank's shareholders. The Full Court rejected the proposition that a shareholder general meeting has a free-standing power to pass resolutions expressing an opinion on management without a statutory or constitutional source of power. It explained, particularly at [22] and [25], that a resolution of members as an act of the company requires authority. At [32]–[35], the court declined to find an implied power. This is a more exact proposition than merely stating that such a resolution would not bind the directors. The ACCR decision must not be overextended. Shareholders can still communicate views, campaign, ask questions and make comments in settings contemplated by law. Section 250S requires a reasonable opportunity at an AGM to ask questions about or comment on management. It is conceptually different from compelling a formal resolution to be put and voted on. The court did not rule that directors may never solicit shareholder views. It held that these members could not demand a formal resolution where they lacked the necessary power. Distinguish the right to be heard from the right to require a corporate act. Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34: company constitutional rules committed management to directors. A majority of members wanted a sale the directors refused. The court respected the allocation in the articles, so the members could not force the board to carry out the management decision merely by CORPORATE LAW 165 | CORPORATE LAW

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ordinary resolution. The case is not about whether selling would have been economically wise. It is about WHO was authorised to decide. NRMA v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517: members sought a meeting to impose their preferred voting procedure upon an election/returns officer who had authority under internal rules. The court treated the proposed intervention as beyond members’ competence and accepted that a meeting need not be called solely to put an ineffectual resolution. This supplies the “meeting cannot cure an invalid object” step in the FreshFoods analysis. Stanham v National Trust of Australia (New South Wales) (1989) 15 ACLR 87: members sought resolutions concerning management of Trust property and a change in board composition. A proposed resolution that trespassed on management authority was incompetent, but a separately proper director election/removal purpose could not be rejected simply because some other part of the requisition was improper. This is a close analogy to HBC’s two proposals; it explains why the board may reject Proposal 1 but not assert a blanket substantive veto over Proposal 2. ACCR v CBA [2016] FCAFC 80: shareholder activists sought climate-related disclosure/action by proposing management-focused resolutions, including purportedly advisory wording. The Federal Court Full Court rejected the assertion of an independent shareholder right to put non-binding advisory motions to a general meeting. An advisory label alone does not overcome lack of substantive competence. The live forum recording cuts off before the instructor finishes the outcome, and the JUNI summary mistakenly says shareholders COULD hold the advisory vote. That summary claim is corrected here using the actual reported holding and reliable case reporting. How to use the cases as an argument chain: begin with the company’s constitution and s 198A (the source of management allocation); prove that staffing and automation are business management; cite Cuninghame for the allocation principle; use NRMA/Stanham to explain meeting/requisition consequences and the separation of mixed valid and invalid requests; use ACCR to defeat the suggestion that softening Proposal 1 into a non- binding advisory vote necessarily makes it competent. Contrast s 203D for Proposal 2. The cases are connected, not interchangeable. Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 is a foundational statement: when the constitution places business management in directors, members cannot ordinarily order the directors to perform a particular management act simply by ordinary resolution. The case concerned members seeking to force a sale that directors opposed; the me ide the constitutional CORPORATE LAW 166 | CORPORATE LAW

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management allocation. The case teaches that the company’s constitutional division of responsibilities has legal effect. NRMA v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517 illustrates that directors need not convene a meeting solely to consider resolutions on matters outside members’ decision-making competence. Stanham v National Trust of Australia (NSW) (as identified in the lecture) is used for the narrower situation in which valid and invalid proposed resolutions are mixed: an otherwise proper meeting may proceed while the improper resolutions need not be included. The reported citation (1989) 15 ACLR 87 is corroborated by a published barrister case list, but the full original judgment has not been compared line-by-line against the course extract. Apply the lecturer’s teaching point with that qualification. Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 is particularly close to FreshFoods. A shareholder advocacy group proposed motions pressing for corporate climate-risk reporting and argued for the right to place advisory expressions of opinion before members. The Full Court held that shareholder resolution-making still required a statutory or constitutional foundation: an expression of opinion about management was not itself an unrestricted general-meeting power. The lesson is that obtaining enough signatures to trigger a procedural notice mechanism does not turn an ultra vires/incompetent proposed resolution into a substantively valid one. There are exceptions. Powers expressly reserved to general meetings by the Act or constitution remain exercisable by members: for example removal of a public-company director under s 203D, certain constitutional changes under s 136 and, subject to applicable internal rules, appointment under s 201G. Some statutory schemes expressly require member approval and a particular board conflict can bring special provisions into play. The answer must first classify the decision before selecting a procedure. The historical background should not be collapsed into a slogan. Automatic Self- Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 considered a corporate allocation of management authority and the attempt of shareholders to require a contrary transaction by ordinary resolution. The court respected the division of powers created by the articles: the authority committed to directors could not simply be overridden by a member majority operating outside the constitution's allocation. The modern Australian analysis asks how the Corporations Act and applicable constitution distribute the relevant power. It is not a claim that members are powerless in every circumstance, but that an ordinary meeting vote cannot seize authority reserved elsewhere. CORPORATE LAW 167 | CORPORATE LAW

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NRMA v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517 is especially useful for advising whether a board needs to put a proposed resolution to a meeting. The substance of the proposed resolution concerned management arrangements vested in the directors. The decision illustrates why a requisition for a meeting does not create a valid purpose merely because the requisite number of members signs it. A lawyer separates the statutory right to requisition a meeting or resolution from the legal competence of the thing proposed. A meeting to pass an incompetent direction does not become effective through proper paperwork. That is why the FreshFoods handout expressly tells students to assume procedural compliance for Proposal 1 and focus on whether the resolution is substantively within members' power. ACCR v CBA adds the modern activist dimension. A group of CBA shareholders sought member resolutions concerning environmental risk disclosure. The Full Federal Court considered whether members had the power to move ordinary resolutions expressing opinions on a matter of company management. The appeal was dismissed: a statutory right to give notice of a proposed resolution did not, without more, supply the power to put an incompetent motion. The fact that some proposals were non-binding advisory motions did not rescue them. Importantly, the case also recognises distinctions between shareholder statements, genuine constitutional changes and an attempt to direct the board; those are different legal mechanisms. It would be incorrect to teach the case as establishing a general right to force any advisory ESG resolution onto the AGM agenda. Suppose HBC changes its proposal from “the board must maintain 50% staffed checkout lanes” to “shareholders express concern about job losses.” The modification may change the political character but does not automatically confer a legal power to insist on a non- binding resolution. ACCR asks about the source of authority for that resolution. On the other hand, a properly framed proposal to amend the company's constitution or exercise an express statutory member right raises a different question. Whether a particular proposed constitutional amendment is valid is a further question, not an automatic solution that students should assert without examining s 136 and the limits of constitutional power. The conclusion should be as precise as the facts. FreshFoods has strong grounds to refuse to include an ordinary motion compelling a staffing policy where management authority remains with its directors. HBC is nevertheless free to advocate, engage other members and pursue lawful accountability mechanisms. Proposal 2—removal and appointment— does not pretend to exercise the board's operational authority; it invokes an express member governance power. That is why a seemingly small difference in drafting can be CORPORATE LAW 168 | CORPORATE LAW

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the difference between an invalid resolution and a legitimate exercise of corporate democracy. 8. The board makes decisions through legally constituted procedures Consider three ways a director might appear to approve a transaction: a formal board resolution, a circulating resolution and a conversation at lunch. These may not have the same legal consequences. Section 248A sets the conditions for circulating resolutions in companies with more than one director, including the required approval process under the replaceable rule. Sections 248C–248G address who may call board meetings, notice, technology, quorum and votes. Section 248G includes the ordinary majority rule and, subject to the constitution and the statutory rule, the chair's casting vote. Section 251A concerns the keeping of minutes. Every practitioner should request the relevant notice, agenda, meeting record, attendance and vote details, not simply accept an officer's assertion that ‘the board agreed’. An example connects these rules to Leah. Suppose BlueWave's consultant proposes closing its principal factory. The directors formally vote at a properly constituted meeting after receiving financial modelling and taking independent advice. That makes it easier to characterise Leah as an adviser. Suppose instead Leah announces the closure to employees before any meeting and afterwards sends a single-line email requiring the directors to endorse her decision. The subsequent board minutes then become important evidence both of her actual conduct and of whether the directors were accustomed to follow her instructions. Proper corporate process is therefore simultaneously a governance requirement and a source of evidence for legal status. A directors’ meeting and a general meeting are different organs. Sections 248A–248G mainly provide replaceable/default procedures for directors: circulating resolutions for proprietary companies, the calling and conduct of directors’ meetings, technology, chair and votes. Section 248A is the default unanimous written-circulation route for proprietary-company directors, not a licence to treat every email as an approved public- company board resolution. Section 248G generally gives one vote per director and a majority of votes cast; its replaceable casting-vote arrangement can empower the chair subject to applicable modifications. For a proof problem, inspect quorum, proper notice, conflicts/entitlement to vote, written resolution requirements, constitution and minutes under s 251A. The absence of careful minute taking may matter when the court asks whether an alleged consultant truly CORPORATE LAW 169 | CORPORATE LAW

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determined strategy while the formal directors simply rubber-stamped it. This links board procedures directly to the factual evidence in Leah’s problem. Sections 248A–248G set default structures for meetings and resolutions, with several expressly operating as replaceable rules. Under s 248A(1), a multi-director board can pass a circulating resolution without a meeting if all directors entitled to vote sign; s 248A(3) fixes passage when the last director signs. Under s 248B(1), a sole director of a proprietary company may record and sign a decision. Section 248C permits a director to call a meeting on reasonable individual notice; s 248D permits appropriate technology. Under s 248F the default quorum is two, unless the directors determine otherwise. Section 248G(1) uses a majority of votes cast by directors entitled to vote, and s 248G(2) gives the chair a casting vote, subject to applicable restrictions. Minutes must be maintained under s 251A. The important exam contrast is that a board resolution concerns directors’ internal exercise of management power; a members’ resolution concerns a matter within the general meeting’s authority. Do not confuse the two votes. The source slides also name committees, delegation under s 198D and remuneration. Delegation can enable management teams to operate the business, but it does not turn shareholders into line managers. A decision may be commercially sensible and still be invalidly adopted if corporate procedures are disregarded. The Act contains replaceable rules for directors' meetings and resolutions, supplemented by the constitution and any valid rules made by directors. Section 248A deals with circulating resolutions for multi-director companies where each director entitled to vote signs the document and the statutory requirements are met; this is not the same as a simple majority of informal email replies. Sections 248C–248G govern calling meetings, the use of technology, chairing, quorum and voting. The chair does not have a free-standing power to impose a decision just because they preside over the meeting; the applicable voting and casting-vote provisions and constitution matter. Suppose FreshFoods' directors exchange messages about purchasing automated equipment, but one director entitled to vote never approves the circulating resolution. Before pronouncing the purchase authorised, a lawyer must examine whether the board instead held a valid meeting, whether s 248A's requirements were satisfied, and whether delegated management authority was available. Minutes under s 251A are evidence of corporate action and must comply with the relevant record requirements. The connection to director status is practical: formal board records may show genuine scrutiny of Leah's proposals—or may reveal repeated ratification without critical examination, relevant to the question of whether she was exercising board functions. CORPORATE LAW 170 | CORPORATE LAW

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Students should avoid treating a company meeting as theatre. Quorum, notice, participation, proper agenda and recorded decisions exist partly to make corporate power traceable. In litigation, they help identify who decided, when the decision was made, what information was available, what conflicts existed and whether the required decision- makers participated. Those details often determine both whether a corporate act was authorised and whether an individual may be exposed to duties or liability. 9. Types, appointment and validity of directors Section 201A is not an abstract examination number. For a public company it establishes the minimum of three directors, including at least two ordinarily resident in Australia. For a proprietary company it ordinarily requires at least one director ordinarily resident in Australia. These requirements matter directly when HBC proposes to remove all three named directors from an ASX-listed company. A prudent adviser must know how many other directors FreshFoods has, who will remain or be validly appointed, and whether residence requirements will remain satisfied. Never infer from the hypothetical that Priya, Marcus and Daniel are the company's only directors, although the facts allow that possibility. Section 201B(1) provides the basic individual age and natural-person requirements. Section 201D requires a person to consent in writing before appointment and addresses retention of the consent. Section 201G is the replaceable rule by which a company may appoint a director through a resolution in general meeting; a special constitutional appointment regime may affect how the mechanism operates. Section 201H concerns appointments by the existing board and, under subsection (3), the required confirmation at the next AGM for a public company. These provisions need to be taught together because a person cannot become an effective replacement simply by being named in a campaign leaflet. Section 201E is a particularly important protection against forced slate voting. For a public company, separate appointment resolutions are required unless the relevant unanimous decision permits appointment of two or more people together. Therefore, in HBC's problem, propose an individual appointment resolution for each nominee, not one omnibus resolution to appoint all three. The reason is institutional: members should be able to assess and vote on each individual's suitability, rather than having to accept or reject an entire slate. Section 201M provides an important but limited validity rule: acts done by a director can remain effective despite a defective appointment or the invalid continuation of the CORPORATE LAW 171 | CORPORATE LAW

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appointment resulting from noncompliance with the constitution or the Act. Do not misstate the section as a rule that the individual therefore owes no duties, is unquestionably validly appointed, or has authority to bind outsiders in every situation. Section 201M distinguishes effectiveness of acts from the separate questions of whether a dealing binds the company or makes it liable to someone else. That distinction is why the lawyer should check s 201M while separately considering internal authority and the statutory assumptions in ss 128–129 when external contractual relations are at issue. The lecturer distinguished executive and non-executive directors (both owe relevant duties; their roles and knowledge may affect application of the objective care standard); a managing director appointed under s 201J and given powers under s 198C; alternate directors under s 201K; the chair under s 248E; and nominee directors representing a constituency. A managing director may have broad delegated management authority, but it is inaccurate to say every CEO automatically has unrestricted power to bind a company and all other directors categorically lack authority. Actual delegated and apparent authority still need proper legal analysis. Nominee directors are central to an interesting lecturer example: an investor may bargain to have a nominated person appointed to a company board, but the nominee is still a director with obligations to the company, not a puppet who can lawfully disregard those duties. Under the final sentence of s 203D(1), removal of a public-company director appointed to represent particular shareholders or debenture holders does not take effect until a replacement to represent those interests has been appointed. In a question, identify the source of the nominee entitlement, then test this statutory protection and any shadow- director risk for a nominating controller who dictates the nominee’s or board’s actions. The lecturer also explained defective appointments: s 201M prevents acts from being invalid merely because a director’s appointment was defective, and s 204E similarly deals with secretaries. Do not confuse validating an ACT with automatically resolving whether someone was validly APPOINTED, or whether duties attach under s 9AC. Formal governance and functional accountability are separate questions. Director identification numbers (DINs) are a practical anti-identity-fraud requirement. For corporations-law directors, ABRS requires an intending director to apply before appointment. Crucially, the 2026 position differs from the JUNI summary: ASIC advises that director IDs are not currently entered on the ASIC companies register, nor ordinarily provided in present appointment-change lodgments; a later reporting requirement begins 1 July 2027. Distinguish the director’s ABRS application obligation from the company’s CORPORATE LAW 172 | CORPORATE LAW

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ASIC notice of appointment or cessation. Authority: ASIC “Director identification numbers”, ABRS “Who needs to apply and when” (both official). Executive directors also perform senior operational work; non-executive directors typically focus on oversight; a managing director has particular authority granted by the board, with s 201J governing appointment under the replaceable rule. A chair presides over meetings (s 248E), and an alternate director may be appointed within s 201K. Nominee directors represent particular interests but still must respect duties owed to the company. These labels do not negate statutory duties. For every appointment, ask first whether the company is public or proprietary. Under s 201A(2) a public company requires at least three directors and at least two ordinarily resident in Australia. Section 201B(1) requires an individual aged at least 18. Section 201D requires written consent and appropriate company records; director identification requirements also apply. Section 201G (replaceable rule) permits appointment at a general meeting; s 201H (replaceable rule) permits board appointment subject, for a public company, to confirmation at the next AGM under s 201H(3). Check the constitution and whether a candidate satisfies any other applicable limits. Section 201M protects the effectiveness of certain acts despite defects in appointment, but does not automatically decide whether an act binds the company. “Executive”, “non-executive”, “managing”, “nominee”, “alternate” and “chair” describe different practical functions or appointment arrangements, but not different species of person entirely outside company law. An executive director often combines employment management with board office. A non-executive participates in governing and supervising but may not run daily operations. A managing director has delegated management authority as permitted by the governing rules. A nominee director may have been put forward by a significant shareholder or another stakeholder. None of these labels, without statutory or constitutional support, erases applicable statutory duties to the company. A nominee may legitimately understand the appointor's commercial interests, but must still act within their own duties. The appointment provisions are not interchangeable. Under s 201A(2), a public company must satisfy the minimum number of directors and ordinary Australian residence requirements. Section 201B deals with eligibility, including the requirement that a director be a natural person aged at least 18. Section 201D requires the prospective director's signed consent before appointment. Section 201G contains a replaceable rule for appointment by members; s 201H allows additional board appointments under the replaceable rule, subject to the particular public-company confirmation requirements. CORPORATE LAW 173 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 201E is particularly important for FreshFoods: subject to its statutory exceptions, a public company cannot validly combine the appointment of several directors in one motion without the separate, unanimously supported procedural decision required by that section. Why insist on individual appointments? Because the members should be able to accept one candidate while rejecting another rather than being forced to approve a bundled slate. In the HBC tutorial, the safest ordinary drafting is three separate appointment resolutions, naming each nominee and ensuring each has consented and is eligible. If HBC instead proposes one resolution to appoint all three, the lawyer must analyse s 201E before discussing political support. Likewise, if HBC proposes to remove all existing directors, the sequence and effective time of removal and appointment must be managed so the public company does not end up below the statutory minimum even briefly. These are not unimportant drafting details; they affect the validity and lawfulness of a board transition. Defective appointments raise another distinct issue. Section 201M contains statutory provisions supporting the effectiveness of acts by directors despite certain defects in appointment or disqualification. Do not turn that protection into a claim that all appointments are valid or directors are immune from responsibility. The section addresses the efficacy of corporate acts in specified circumstances. An internal defect in appointment, the legal capacity of the company to contract and the liability of a person acting as director are three distinct questions requiring separate analysis. 10. Removing a director: public-company protection and procedural fairness The structure of s 203D should be explained as a sequence, not memorised as one general rule. Subsection (1) confers the removal power on the company acting by member resolution and overrides specified inconsistent contractual or constitutional provisions. It also contains a qualification for a director appointed to represent particular securityholders. Subsection (2) sets the special notice period: notice of intention must ordinarily reach the company at least two months before the meeting, with an exception for certain company-called meetings following receipt of that notice. Subsection (3) makes the company responsible for promptly forwarding the notice to the affected director. These are different duties performed by different participants. Subsections 203D(4)–(6) provide the affected director's participation and written- representation protections, together with limits on circulation and reading of representations. These are not favours conferred by a sympathetic chairman; they are procedural protections embedded in statute. Subsection (7) addresses timing relevant to CORPORATE LAW 174 | CORPORATE LAW

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certain directors whose appointment or reappointment interacts with the removal process; subsection (8) identifies strict-liability offences for specified contraventions. The full statutory language must be checked before a lawyer claims an actual criminal consequence or states that a particular representation must be distributed. In the tutorial, explain the framework and identify the facts needed without guessing what the company has actually done. Four dates must be separated in the 18 November problem. (1) The relevant members' notice of intention to move a removal resolution under s 203D(2) ordinarily needed to be received no later than 18 September 2026, two calendar months before the AGM. (2) The company must provide that notice to each director as soon as practicable; the Act does not substitute a fictional fixed date. (3) As a listed company, FreshFoods ordinarily owes its members at least 28 days' meeting notice under s 249HA: 21 October 2026 is the 28-day backward calculation. (4) Any additional rights to give notice of a proposed member resolution under ss 249N–249O are a separate statutory question. Importantly, the tutorial directs you to focus on Week 4 and director removal, not to pretend procedural sections yet to be taught answer whether Proposal 1 is substantively competent. A two-month interval is not always interchangeable with 60 days, and 28 days is not two calendar months. A lawyer should place the two requirements on an actual calendar and obtain evidence that the appropriate notice was RECEIVED on time, rather than merely drafted or mailed. Also establish when FreshFoods actually called the AGM. The narrow exception in s 203D(2) may affect the outcome if the company called the meeting after receiving the proposed removal notice. That calling date is not stated. It is a genuine legal uncertainty, not a gap the writer should fill with invented facts. For listed/public companies, s 203D overrides inconsistent director contracts and constitutions. Section 203E invalidates attempted removal by other directors. For proprietary companies, s 203C is a replaceable rule allowing members to remove and replace a director, but a constitution can displace that default; s 203CA protects against removal leaving the company without any directors. These rules matter precisely because the lecturer told client-interview students to ask “public or proprietary?” before they announce a statute. Section 203D must be read in sequence. Subsection (1) creates the substantive member power. Subsection (2) requires notice of intention to the company at least two calendar months before the meeting, except where the company calls a meeting after the notice. Subsection (3) requires forwarding it to the targeted director promptly. Subsection (4) gives the director both a written-statement right and the right to speak. Subsection (5) CORPORATE LAW 175 | CORPORATE LAW

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explains circulation or distribution-and-reading. Subsection (6) limits that circulation duty for statements over 1,000 words or defamatory statements. Subsection (7) deals with the substituted director’s retirement timing. Subsection (8) marks strict-liability offences for particular company defaults. A High Distinction answer applies every relevant stage to each of Priya, Marcus and Daniel. The distinction between s 203C and s 203D is fundamental. Section 203C is a replaceable rule for proprietary companies. Section 203D(1) provides the compulsory public-company rule: members may remove a director by resolution despite contrary constitutional provisions and contractual protections. Under s 203E, other directors cannot remove a public-company director merely by board action. This makes appointment and removal a significant shareholder accountability mechanism, though shareholders still have to win a vote. Section 203D(2) requires notice of intention to move a removal resolution to be given to the company at least two calendar months before the meeting. An exception permits a meeting called by the company AFTER the company receives the removal notice to pass the resolution even where the meeting occurs within two months. This is not the same as saying that a meeting already called can automatically dispense with the normal two- month requirement. Section 203D(3) then requires the company to notify the affected director as soon as practicable. Sections 203D(4)–(6) give the affected director a written- statement and oral speaking right; the statement need not be circulated if longer than 1,000 words or defamatory. The appointment of a replacement and the director’s retirement cycle also require consideration under s 203D(7). For the 18 November 2026 AGM, the normal two-month notice date was 18 September 2026. If HBC only decides to act after Week 4 in October, the ordinary window for that AGM has closed. A lawyer must obtain the actual notice of meeting and the date FreshFoods formally CALLED the AGM: the statutory exception is sensitive to that fact. A publicly listed company also has member meeting notice rules, but the tutorial directs the removal question primarily to s 203D. Membership proposal rights under ss 249N–249O are explored in the next tutorial and must not be conflated with the separate s 203D removal-notice requirement. Director removal is a useful lesson in reading every subsection of a statutory provision rather than only the first sentence. Section 203D(1) is the substantive source of members' power in a public company. Its “despite” language protects that power against inconsistent terms in the constitution or relevant agreements. But the power exists within a process intended to protect both corporate democracy and the affected director's CORPORATE LAW 176 | CORPORATE LAW

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opportunity to respond. A removal resolution is therefore not simply “50% plus one and the director leaves”: the proper notice, meeting, voting and procedural rights must be respected, and the special position of any director appointed to represent particular security holders must be considered. The first key question is what document HBC must send and when. Under s 203D(2) a notice of intention to move the resolution ordinarily needs to reach the company at least two months before the meeting. For 18 November 2026, counting backwards two calendar months produces 18 September 2026. A notice delivered on 12 October would miss that ordinary deadline. But the same subsection contains an exception where a meeting is called by the company after the notice. It is therefore professionally careless to stop at “too late” without asking when the AGM was formally called, and whether the company called it after receiving the relevant notice. Merely telling the class that the AGM has been “scheduled” does not answer that issue. The second question is what FreshFoods must do after receiving the intention notice. Section 203D(3) requires it to give the affected director a copy as soon as practicable. Section 203D(4) provides an opportunity to put the director's position to members in writing and to speak to the motion; the associated provisions address circulation or reading of the statement, the time for communication and relevant limits. This fairness does not give the director a veto. Nor should a student infer that failure to observe any single rule necessarily voids every company action without examining statutory consequences and applicable general provisions. Identify the particular subsection, identify the particular failure and research the specified consequence. The third question is meeting notice. A listed public company ordinarily must provide at least 28 days' notice under s 249HA, separate from the director-removal intention notice. Counting 28 days back from 18 November produces 21 October. That does NOT turn 21 October into HBC's s 203D deadline: different provisions govern different persons, documents and purposes. The calculation for an ordinary 21-day public-company notice floor under s 249H is 28 October, but FreshFoods is listed, so the 28-day rule is the relevant ordinary floor. Questions of delivery, constitution, public-company removal restrictions and the date the meeting was called still require checking. The legal drafting lesson is to prepare a chronology with columns for event, responsible person, governing subsection, necessary proof and legal consequence. For HBC it would include notice of intention (HBC to company, s 203D(2)), copies to directors (company, s 203D(3)), response opportunity (each affected director, s 203D(4)–(6)), meeting notice (company, s 249HA and other meeting provisions) and member votes on separate named CORPORATE LAW 177 | CORPORATE LAW

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removal and appointment motions. A client can then see what can still be done and what evidence is needed before anyone promises a successful board replacement. 11. Resignation: why the ASIC filing matters in Leah’s problem When someone announces ‘I resigned last month’, begin with documents. Section 203A is a replaceable rule allowing resignation by written notice to the company at its registered office. Whether Leah complied with the applicable constitution and rule must be established before applying the later ASIC timing rule. Section 203AA(1)(a) provides for effectiveness from the cessation date when ASIC is properly notified within 28 days. Section 203AA(1)(b) provides a different effective date if that period is not met: the day written notice is lodged with ASIC. An administrative failure is therefore not safely dismissed as an insignificant paperwork error. Section 203AA(2) provides a mechanism to seek fixing of an earlier resignation day when the statutory conditions are established. Subsection (3) directs the Court to consider whether backdating is just and equitable. Subsection (4) governs ASIC's consideration of the applicant's conduct and reasons for delay. Subsection (5)(a) concerns an application to ASIC within 56 days of the cessation day, in the prescribed form; subsection (5)(b) concerns an application to the Court within 12 months, or a longer period allowed by the Court. Subsections (6)–(7) concern lodging a court order and strict liability for a specified failure. These are distinct procedural routes, not an automatic right to backdate merely because the person insists that the resignation was genuine. Section 203AB adds a separate safeguard, including restrictions affecting resignations that would leave the company with no director. Because BlueWave has several board members in the stated facts, the last-director issue may ultimately be immaterial, but it should be checked rather than assumed. Most importantly, if Leah remained formally appointed when she acted as consultant, she may already be a director under s 9AC(1)(a)(i), before one reaches de facto or shadow status. A complete answer addresses the formal route first and only then explains the alternatives if resignation was effective. Section 203A (replaceable rule) permits resignation by written notice to the company at its registered office. Section 203AA(1)(a) provides that if ASIC is notified within 28 days of the person stopping being a director, the resignation takes effect on the day they stopped; otherwise s 203AA(1)(b) makes it effective on the day written notice of cessation is lodged with ASIC, subject to the corrective mechanism in ss 203AA(2)–(5). Section 203AB generally prevents a resignation taking effect if the company would be left with no directors, subject to an exception related to winding up. An administrative record left CORPORATE LAW 178 | CORPORATE LAW

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unchanged at ASIC therefore can matter to FORMAL status; it does not by itself answer whether a person later acts as a de facto director. This issue is deliberately placed in Leah’s facts. “She informed the company” does not establish that she delivered the legally required written notice to the registered office, and the dates of cessation and ASIC notification are not specified. Do not invent them. Analyse, first, whether Leah ever stopped being a formally appointed director and, second, if she did, whether her later conduct creates an independent statutory basis for director or officer status. Resignation is a distinct legal issue from whether somebody later behaves as a director. Before applying de facto or shadow doctrine to Leah, ask whether she ceased being a formally appointed director at all. The scenario says she “informed” the company of her intention to resign; it does not say whether she served the written notice required by the applicable replaceable rule, whether BlueWave's constitution changes the process, exactly when the ASIC notification was made or whether Leah was the last remaining director. A lawyer cannot fill those gaps by imagination. The status timeline must be established first. The statutory focus is ss 203A, 203AA and 203AB. Section 203A is the replaceable written- resignation rule. Section 203AA contains effective-date and late-notification provisions linked to the ASIC reporting process. Under the general design, timely ASIC notification can mean the resignation takes effect on the cessation day, while late notification can cause the effective date to be the later filing date unless the statutory correction procedure is properly invoked and succeeds. Section 203AB addresses attempted departures that would leave a company without directors, subject to statutory qualifications. Leah's belief that she was no longer a director is relevant to her state of mind, but cannot itself conclusively determine the legal effect of the resignation. Suppose, hypothetically, Leah delivered a compliant written notice on 1 August 2026 and ASIC received the required notification within 28 days: that supports the earlier cessation date under s 203AA's relevant pathway. If the notification was not made until 15 September and no correction was granted, her formal status might extend into the consultant period. The exact result depends on the correct statutory preconditions, so the example illustrates the issue rather than proving anything about the tutorial's incomplete facts. The lawyer's first requests should be the resignation notice, registered-office service evidence, company secretary correspondence, ASIC form and lodgment receipt, register extracts, board composition and any ASIC/court rectification documents. CORPORATE LAW 179 | CORPORATE LAW

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12. Other parts of the slides and their exam weighting The lecturer's distinction between assessable doctrine and wider professional context does not mean the latter can be misstated. Director ID requirements are administered through the Australian Business Registry Services, and a new director generally needs a director ID before appointment. A director ID is distinct from the company's ordinary ASIC officeholder notice. Do not turn a statement in an automated summary about 2026 filing into the proposition that every director ID must already appear on the ASIC companies register. For statutory details outside the Week 4 tutorial, explain the proposition as an administrative context topic and refer students to ABRS and ASIC guidance for the up-to- date process. The Week 8 client interview is more than a performance of speaking confidently. The student must elicit the facts necessary to determine legal elements. A good consultation separates identity and authority, then timeline, documents, commercial purpose and potential harm. For Leah, that means the precise resignation notice, lodgement, consultancy contract, board minutes and decision chronology. For HBC, that means the constitution, shareholder entitlements, the exact resolution wording, notice receipts and meeting-calling date. Ask open questions first, test particulars second, summarise the client's instructions and identify the documents that must be obtained before final advice. Professional duty questions such as conflicts and cost disclosure must be addressed according to the exercise instructions, but cannot substitute for substantive legal reasoning. “N/E” in the lecture slides means the subject is NOT EXAMINABLE in the client interview or final written assessment according to this forum: company secretary functions; some director disqualification and remuneration rules; details of two-strikes remuneration voting. The lecturer nonetheless gave their broad context, so the chapter records them without treating them as the primary study priority. The core assessed matter is the division of powers, director identification and related director removal. Do not spend scarce revision time memorising non-assessed administrative detail ahead of s 9AC, s 198A, s 203D and the leading cases. For completeness: public companies generally require a company secretary (s 204A), which may act as a principal administrative officer; directors’ eligibility and disqualification are addressed by ss 201B, 206B–206G; default director remuneration is addressed by s 202A; listed company reporting can engage s 300A and other provisions; resignation engages ss 203A, 203AA and 203AB. Record these links because they matter in professional work, but distinguish the course’s expressly stated assessment weighting. CORPORATE LAW 180 | CORPORATE LAW

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The lecture’s informal speaking statements about insurance, management power and director IDs are illustrative, not substitutes for the current statutory wording. The slides also introduce: company secretaries (s 204A and related rules); director disqualification under ss 206B–206G; remuneration under s 202A, member remuneration- information rights under s 202B and later oppression issues under s 232; listed-company remuneration reports under s 300A and “two strikes” mechanisms; and the forthcoming Week 8 client interview assessment. The lecturer marked some of these items “N/E” (not examinable or not emphasised in this week's slides); this edition records them without replacing the four central examinable themes: statutory director definitions, allocation of power, public-company removal, and the substantive Tutorial 4 cases. The Week 8 client interview accounts for 30% of the final mark according to the Week 4 slides. The slides state that it covers both interviewing skill and the law through Week 6, so tomorrow’s tutorial is foundational. Preparation should involve explaining the law to a lay client with practical recommendations, not reciting case names without analysis. The lecturer deliberately distinguishes examinable doctrine from the slides that broaden professional awareness. That distinction should guide study priorities without leading the textbook to silently omit what was taught. The company secretary's statutory and practical role, appointment disqualification regimes, remuneration and the two-strikes rule are not all equally central to this particular tutorial, but they belong on the student's conceptual map. It is enough to treat them here as orientation if the lecturer marked them non-examinable; they should not be presented as the primary solution to FreshFoods or BlueWave. The lecturer also connects substantive company law with the Week 8 client interview. An assessment interview is not simply a spoken law exam: a future lawyer must establish who the client is, the business objective, the facts and instructions, the identity of potential conflicts, and what documents are needed. Instead of announcing an outcome at the beginning, ask targeted questions, explain what the law does in words a client can understand, identify uncertainty and specify the next step. For HBC the first question could be, “Are you trying to secure a binding employment policy or change the board?” For Leah it could be, “Please show me the written resignation, ASIC notification and board minutes from the weeks when you advised BlueWave.” Each question is justified by a specific statutory element. Before any simulated interview, review the course's instructions and legal-professionalism requirements. Do not invent a universal cost-agreement process simply from the forum's CORPORATE LAW 181 | CORPORATE LAW

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assessment briefing; distinguish the lecturer's described simulation checklist from legal obligations that may vary with the retainer and jurisdiction. For the actual classroom exercise, the strongest candidate is conversational, evidence-conscious and clear about what is known, what remains to be established and how the client should proceed. CORPORATE LAW 182 | CORPORATE LAW

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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND PINPOINT PROVISION GUIDE ss 124; 134–135; 198A(1)–(2) WHY THESE PRECISE SECTIONS ARE LINKED. Section 124 gives a registered company broad legal capacity, but does not distribute decision-making among corporate organs. Section 134 explains how a company's internal management can be governed by replaceable rules, a constitution or a combination. Section 135 explains the statutory status and application of replaceable rules and the ability to displace them through a constitution where legally permitted. Section 198A(1) allocates business management to or under the direction of the directors; subsection (2) permits exercise of company powers except those reserved to members by the Act or constitution. The correct chain is therefore capacity → internal governance source → identity of the empowered organ → lawful procedure. Use it when a purported shareholder resolution tells the board to operate the business in a specific way. PRECISION NOTE: s 124 establishes legal capacity of the company; ss 134–135 allow the replaceable rules to interact with constitution; s 198A(1) allocates the business to directors’ management or direction; s 198A(2) confers exercise of corporate powers except those reserved to general meeting. Why apply them in this order? Because a dispute over WHO makes a company decision cannot be solved just by proving that the company has capacity to do it. Company legal capacity is not identical to authority within the company. Section 124 concerns the company itself. Sections 134–135 let you determine the internal governance rules. Section 198A, where operative, assigns management to the board. Trigger: members wish to command an operational business decision. READ THE STATUTES AS A SYSTEM. Section 124 gives company capacity and powers; it deals with the corporate legal person. Section 134 states how replaceable rules and a constitution can govern internal management. Section 135 explains replaceable rules and their capacity to be displaced as permitted; it also involves the special position of a company with a sole director/shareholder. Section 198A is a replaceable management rule with the critical distinction between managing the business by or under directors' direction in subs (1), and the directors' capacity to exercise corporate powers not otherwise reserved to a general meeting in subs (2). In a worked answer, apply these in that order. First establish that a company can act; then identify the organ legally entitled to decide. CORPORATE LAW 183 | CORPORATE LAW

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WHY THE CASES ARE USED. Automatic Self-Cleansing explains the constitutional allocation of management. NRMA v Parker applies that allocation to a proposed member meeting purpose. ACCR v CBA applies it to modern member resolution proposals, including advisory resolutions. Together they interpret the significance of the statutory and constitutional structure; they do not replace it. The correct examiner-facing sentence is: “Because this is a substantive operational direction and, on the assumptions, management authority is vested in the board under s 198A and the constitution, the proposed ordinary member resolution is outside the general meeting's competence.” s 9AC(1)(a)(i)–(ii); (1)(b)(i)–(ii) WHY EACH LIMB MATTERS. A valid director appointment belongs in s 9AC(1)(a)(i); an alternate director appointed and acting in that capacity is addressed by s 9AC(1)(a)(ii). For a person without valid appointment, s 9AC(1)(b)(i) asks whether that person acted in a director's position: prove functions and conduct. Section 9AC(1)(b)(ii) asks whether the directors were accustomed to follow that person's instructions or wishes: prove habitual direction and board response. In that latter limb the statute expressly excludes advice properly given in the relevant professional or business relationship. Do not apply the exclusion as a blanket immunity from de facto status, where the separate acting-in- position test remains the question. PINPOINT TEST: s 9AC(1)(a)(i) = formal appointed director; (a)(ii) = appointed alternate acting in that capacity; (b)(i) = no valid appointment but acting in the position (de facto); (b)(ii) = board accustomed to act per instructions or wishes (shadow), subject to the proper professional/business advice exclusion. The lecturer explicitly said that de facto/shadow are teaching labels rather than words appearing in the statute. Each fact must be placed against its own limb; never cite merely “s 9AC” without explaining the limb. Formal and alternate directors; de facto directors; shadow directors; professional/business advice exception. Trigger: a person calls themselves a consultant or adviser but may really control governance. HOW TO APPLY EACH LIMB. Under s 9AC(1)(a)(i), find the appointment document. Under para (a)(ii), identify the alternate appointment and whether the alternate was acting in that capacity at the relevant time. Under para (b)(i), identify actual functions and ask whether they amount to occupying the position of director in this company: use Drysdale and Grimaldi. Under para (b)(ii), identify the instructions or wishes, the affected appointed directors, evidence of habitual compliance, causal connection and the express CORPORATE LAW 184 | CORPORATE LAW

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professional/business relationship exclusion: use Buzzle and, where relevant, Antico. You must not prove para (b)(ii) by citing only evidence of the alleged controller's own activities or para (b)(i) by citing only the board's willingness to listen. THE LEAH SEQUENCE. The facts say Leah was appointed, purportedly resigned, then worked as consultant. Start with formal appointment. Next determine statutory resignation effectiveness. If formal status truly ended, examine de facto and shadow director positions independently. If formal status did not end, record that conclusion rather than mechanically applying de facto labels to someone who may still be a de jure director. The law is a conditional decision tree; demonstrating that tree is what makes an answer convincing. s 9AD(1)(a); (1)(b)(i)–(iii) A USEFUL COUNTEREXAMPLE. A company's finance controller could have substantial independent authority to negotiate refinancing and might therefore be an officer within s 9AD(1)(b)(ii), even if there is insufficient proof that the person acted as a director under s 9AC(1)(b)(i). Conversely, a formally appointed director is an officer through s 9AD(1)(a) even when they do not manage daily finances. The tests overlap in some situations but are not identical. A well-written opinion states the conclusion under each relevant subsection and resists the unsupported assumption that officer status automatically resolves the directorship question. SOURCE CORRECTION: The original tutorial preamble says officer is in s 9AC. That was not silently rewritten in the quoted question. In the legislation applicable as at October 2026, s 9AD defines officer; earlier judgments will often refer to s 9 because the definitions were formerly located there. Include this temporal citation reconciliation when using Grimaldi or ASIC v King. Independent officer definition. Trigger: a person affects decisions for a substantial part of the company or its financial standing, even without clear board membership. WHY THE DEFINITION MATTERS. The wider officer definition addresses influential individuals who may not be classified as directors. Under s 9AD(1)(b)(i) ask what decisions the person makes or participates in and whether those decisions concern the whole or a substantial part of the corporation's business. Under (b)(ii) ask whether their actual capacity significantly affects its financial standing. Under (b)(iii) ask about habitual following of instructions or wishes and the relevant statutory advice qualification. These are alternative paths and should not be combined into an imprecise claim that the person was “important.” ASIC v King is a leading authority for a functional understanding of the CORPORATE LAW 185 | CORPORATE LAW

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financial-standing limb; Grimaldi reinforces the need to understand real organisational functions. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE. If status is established, consider which specific director/officer duties apply; do not assume every possible breach is already proved. For example, s 180 concerns care and diligence, whereas ss 181–183 address different standards and forms of misuse. Solvency and debt-incurrence provisions are separate issues. A textbook must explain this sequence or it will teach readers to confuse who owes a duty with whether they have violated it. ss 201A(1)–(2); 201B(1); 201D APPLY THE REQUIREMENTS TO PEOPLE, NOT TO ABSTRACT HEADCOUNTS. FreshFoods is a public listed company. Before recommending the dismissal of three board members, identify how many directors the company will have at the time the removal becomes effective, whether at least two remaining directors are ordinarily resident in Australia, and whether replacement nominees are natural persons at least 18 years old who have provided the necessary written consent. If the exercise does not reveal the total board, describe these checks as conditions rather than declare the post-removal board legally defective. Minimum director complement and residence, adult individual qualification, written consent. Trigger: replace the entire board of a public company. WHY THE NUMBERS MATTER. A proprietary company generally needs at least one director ordinarily resident in Australia under s 201A(1). A public company needs at least three directors (other than alternates), at least two ordinarily resident in Australia, under s 201A(2). If FreshFoods removes all three currently named directors, the statutory minimum is a crucial practical consideration for drafting and sequencing their replacement. Section 201B concerns eligibility, including the age and individual-person requirements; s 201D requires written consent before appointment. Check disqualification provisions as a separate issue. A proposed replacement is not automatically an effective director merely because HBC endorses them. WHY THIS ADDS TO THE TUTORIAL. A strong corporate lawyer does not say merely “pass the removal resolution.” They ask for signed candidate consents, age and identity confirmation, director IDs under applicable registry law, the company's director register, the residence position and the constitution. If candidate qualifications are absent, state that the legality of a final replacement cannot yet be assured. The voting procedure and threshold are different from the substantive validity of candidate appointments. CORPORATE LAW 186 | CORPORATE LAW

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ss 201G; 201H(1) and (3) APPOINTMENT MECHANICS MUST BE SEPARATE FROM REMOVAL. A proposed resolution removing Priya from office under s 203D addresses the status of the incumbent. A different resolution appointing nominee A under s 201G addresses who will occupy the position. An appointment proposed by other directors under s 201H has its own statutory operation and confirmation mechanism, so it cannot be silently assumed to be the same as an appointment made by shareholders. For a public company the confirmation requirement in s 201H(3) is at the next AGM. A lawyer maps both vacancy and succession, not one or the other. IMPORTANT ADDITION FOR FRESHFOODS — s 201E(1): where a public company proposes a single resolution to appoint or confirm two or more directors, that resolution is void unless members first resolve that the appointments may be voted on together and NO VOTES are cast against that procedural resolution. Abstentions do not themselves constitute votes against. Section 201E(2) deals with defined exceptions, including a ballot/poll enabling independent choice between candidates. Thus the safest normal approach for HBC is THREE SEPARATE appointment resolutions, one for each candidate, rather than a bundled slate. Section 201G is a replaceable rule: first inspect FreshFoods’ constitution. The 201E safeguard is statutory for public companies, not simply a replaceable rule. CLARIFY s 201A(2) and 201D(1)–(2): FreshFoods is a public company and must maintain at least three directors other than alternates, at least two ordinarily resident in Australia. Each candidate must be a natural person at least 18 and not disqualified (s 201B). A signed consent must be received BEFORE appointment and retained by the company; check director ID obligations separately. These are practical requirements before the removal/appointment package can safely take effect. Member appointment by general-meeting resolution; board appointments and public- company ratification at next AGM (replaceable rules). Trigger: HBC nominates replacement directors. SEPARATE APPOINTMENT POWERS. Section 201G is a replaceable rule through which members may appoint directors. Section 201H supports appointment by directors as an additional board member in the conditions stated, with subsequent public-company confirmation rules. A lawyer must not assume the members' and directors' routes operate identically or that a board can simply install a permanently self-selected director in a CORPORATE LAW 187 | CORPORATE LAW

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public company without regard to subsequent statutory/constitutional controls. Always look at the company's actual constitution and the number of board vacancies. WHY s 201E IS ADJACENT. The special public-company rule about bundled appointment resolutions is a useful trap. Where the section applies, members should have a real opportunity to vote separately on each candidate unless the stated procedural permission and exceptions apply. HBC's three proposed directors must not automatically be treated as one inseparable team for voting. An exam answer can demonstrate commercial awareness by saying what the resolutions would look like: remove Priya, remove Marcus, remove Daniel; appoint nominee A, appoint nominee B, appoint nominee C—each clearly named and subject to lawful appointment conditions and the meeting notice. ss 203C; 203CA; 203D(1)–(8); 203E HOW TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE REMOVAL PROVISIONS. Start with the company's public/proprietary classification. Section 203C is a replaceable rule for proprietary companies, whereas s 203D is the mandatory public-company route. Section 203CA adds a protective proprietary-company rule against leaving the company without a director in specified circumstances. Section 203E addresses a different problem: directors of a public company cannot remove one of their fellow directors merely by board resolution or notice. FreshFoods is listed and therefore public, so start with s 203D, not s 203C. An answer that cites s 203C because it says ‘removal’ applies the wrong legal branch. DETAILED STATUTORY WALK-THROUGH — s 203D(1): members of a PUBLIC company may remove a director by resolution despite the constitution, company–director contract, or members–director contract. A director appointed to represent specified shareholders or debenture holders is subject to the express replacement qualification in the final sentence of subsection (1). That exception must be checked before saying that every director is instantly removed. s 203D(2): notice of intention to move a removal resolution must normally REACH THE COMPANY at least TWO CALENDAR MONTHS before the meeting. For 18 November 2026 the ordinary last date is 18 September 2026. This is a special notice of intention, distinct from the formal notice by the listed company convening the meeting. Exception: if the COMPANY CALLS A MEETING AFTER receipt of the removal intention, the resolution can be passed at that company-called meeting even less than two months later. We need the actual date on which the company called the AGM; a calendar booking alone does not establish that fact. CORPORATE LAW 188 | CORPORATE LAW

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ss 203D(3)–(6): FreshFoods must transmit each removal notice promptly to the affected director [sub (3)]. The director can circulate a statement and speak at the meeting [sub (4) (a)–(b)]. The company must send the statement with meeting notice if time permits, or provide it to those attending and read it before voting [sub (5)(a)–(b)]; a statement longer than 1,000 words or defamatory does not need to be circulated [sub (6)]. These are procedural protections, not veto powers. ss 203D(7)–(8): when a person replaces a removed director, calculate the replacement’s retirement timing as if that replacement became director when the replaced director was last appointed [sub (7)(a)–(b)]. An offence based on noncompliance with sub (3) or sub (5) is an offence of STRICT LIABILITY [sub (8)], not a strict-liability offence applying to every subsection of s 203D. ADDITIONAL MEETING NOTICE DISTINCTION — ss 249H(3) and 249HA(1)–(3): although public-company director removal/replacement resolutions cannot use shorter- than-21-day notice under s 249H(3), FreshFoods is LISTED, and s 249HA requires at least 28 days’ meeting notice, overriding s 249H. For the AGM on 18 November 2026, 28 days earlier is 21 October 2026. Neither the 21 October date nor the ordinary s 249N member agenda procedure replaces the special s 203D(2) 18 September date. Whether meeting- notice requirements were actually complied with cannot be decided from the hypothetical. REMOVAL VOTING: ordinary resolutions are normally determined by a majority of votes cast unless the statute or constitution imposes a different rule. The 110 HBC members possess 220 shares between them (110 × 2), not 110% of the voting entitlement or automatic control of the AGM. You cannot calculate the percentage of votes that HBC holds without the total eligible voting share capital and relevant voting rights. The tutorial Q1(1) expressly instructs you to ASSUME procedural requirements and instead assess substantive competence. Distinguish proprietary removal (replaceable) from public removal (mandatory), no removal by fellow directors and fairness/deadline safeguards. Trigger: Proposal 2 and the date problem. STEP-BY-STEP LEGISLATIVE READING. First identify the kind of company. Section 203C is a replaceable removal rule for proprietary companies; s 203CA addresses a proprietary-company no-director problem. FreshFoods is ASX-listed and hence a public company, so s 203D—not s 203C—is the operative removal source. The opening rule in s 203D(1) authorises member removal notwithstanding contrary constitutional or CORPORATE LAW 189 | CORPORATE LAW

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contractual arrangements, subject to express statutory qualifications. It is paired with s 203E: in a public company fellow directors ordinarily cannot remove a director by a board resolution. These sections together distinguish the board's management powers from a member governance power that the board cannot simply confiscate. Then examine the process one limb at a time: s 203D(2) (two-month notice of intention, plus the company-called meeting exception); s 203D(3) (company transmits notice to the affected director as soon as practicable); s 203D(4)–(6) (director's opportunity to make a statement and speak, circulation/reading and specified limits); s 203D(7) (replacement director retirement timing); and s 203D(8) (strict liability for the specified offences). A law student's citation to s 203D in general misses the key point if the alleged error is, for example, failure to give a director the relevant notice under subs (3). Pinpoint citation shows which legal duty and factual event are engaged. ss 203A; 203AA(1)–(5); 203AB HOW TO ADDRESS THE MISSING DATE IN LEAH'S QUESTION. Write a chronology with five blank entries: purported resignation delivered; first day Leah actually ceased director functions; ASIC notification received; consulting agreement signed; first significant restructuring decision. The first three dates determine the statutory resignation issue. The later entries help assess de facto and shadow status even if the original resignation succeeded. This avoids treating the legal effective date as the end of the analysis: a genuinely former director can subsequently act in a director's position or control the board. RESIGNATION RULE IN FULL — s 203A is a replaceable rule allowing resignation by WRITTEN notice to the registered office. Under s 203AA(1)(a), where ASIC is notified under s 205A(1) or s 205B(5) within 28 days after a person stopped being a director, the resignation takes effect on that earlier cessation day. Otherwise under s 203AA(1)(b), its effective date is ordinarily the date written notice is lodged with ASIC. Therefore a late administrative filing can change the effective period of formal directorship. RECTIFICATION — s 203AA(2) allows ASIC or the Court to fix the earlier resignation date if the prescribed application and proof are satisfied. Subsection (3) requires the Court to be satisfied this is just and equitable. Subsection (4)(a)–(b) requires ASIC to consider the applicant’s conduct and reasons for delay. s 203AA(5)(a)(i)–(ii): ASIC application within 56 days of cessation and in prescribed form. Subsection (5)(b)(i)–(ii): Court application within 12 months, or longer if allowed. Section 203AB(1) normally prevents a resignation taking effect if it leaves a company without directors (subject to stated exceptions). For CORPORATE LAW 190 | CORPORATE LAW

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Leah, request the resignation letter, delivery proof, ASIC lodgment, any correction application, current register and constitution before concluding she had ceased to be a formal director. Resignation method and effective dates, late ASIC notification and sole-director prohibition. Trigger: Leah believes she resigned but ASIC records were not updated. RESIGNATION IS NOT AN INFORMAL ASSUMPTION. Check whether s 203A's replaceable rule governs and whether compliant written notice was given. Under s 203AA, the date on which the departure takes effect can depend on the timing of notification to ASIC and the statutory correction procedure for late notification. Distinguish the existence of the resignation decision from the formal effective-date rule. Section 203AB protects against specified situations where a company would otherwise have no directors. Because the facts say only that BlueWave records were not properly updated, neither an effective departure nor an ineffective one can responsibly be stated as certain without records. A CAREFUL CLIENT QUESTIONNAIRE. Ask Leah: Did you sign and date a resignation notice? To which address or officer did you send it? What does the company's constitution say? Was there at least one remaining director? When did the company notify ASIC and was the notice accepted? Was an application made to ASIC or the Court to fix an earlier date? When did you commence consultancy? These facts determine whether the correct opening issue is formal director status under s 9AC(1)(a), not only de facto status under s 9AC(1)(b)(i). ss 248A(1)–(3); 248B(1); 248C–248G; 251A EVIDENCE IS THE BRIDGE BETWEEN RULE AND ADVICE. Obtain the company's rules on circulating resolutions, whether all directors entitled to vote agreed where the rule requires it, proper meeting notice, quorum and a vote record. Section 251A requires appropriate recording and maintenance of minutes. The same documents are especially informative where a consultant alleges that the board independently made every major decision. Evidence of actual deliberation supports independence; standardised approval without discussion, combined with a regular pattern of consultant direction, may support a contrary inference. One must not assume, merely from a written resolution, that the board did or did not exercise independent judgment. BOARD DELEGATION AND LIABILITY — s 198D(1) permits delegation (unless constitution restricts) to a directors’ committee, director, employee or any other person; a delegation is recorded in the company minute book. Section 190 deals with directors’ CORPORATE LAW 191 | CORPORATE LAW

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responsibility for exercises of delegated power, with relief only if the requirements of s 190(2) are met. Do not infer from s 198D that delegation automatically eliminates director obligations. In Leah’s case, the board’s ability to employ a restructuring consultant is legally plausible; the decisive issue is whether her real conduct moved beyond merely exercising delegated advisory tasks into occupying the director’s position or controlling the board. Board meeting quorum, majority, circulating resolutions, recording and signing of decisions. Trigger: how a board validly makes and proves decisions. THE LOGIC OF BOARD PROCESS. Directors ordinarily decide by properly constituted board action. The circulating-resolution mechanism in s 248A is more demanding than an informal majority text conversation; meeting provisions then regulate calling meetings, participation, quorum, chairing and voting, subject to their replaceable-rule status and company constitution. Minutes under s 251A create a record of decisions. These details protect governance certainty and provide evidence of who truly governed. APPLICATION TO LEAH. A board minute may say “the directors resolved to discontinue Model C”; that does not necessarily end the inquiry. A lawyer asks what material the directors examined, whether Leah was instructed to report or had already committed the company, whether directors tested alternatives and who communicated the final decision externally. Section 248G explains formal voting outcomes; s 9AC tests what the substantive arrangement reveals about status. Formal corporate procedure and functional corporate reality must be read together. ss 249N–249O (next week’s procedure) A CAUTION ABOUT THE 110 MEMBERS. The original Question 1(1) expressly assumes that procedural requirements are satisfied, so avoid writing two pages about s 249N instead of addressing legal competence. Later procedural analysis may ask whether the proponents satisfy the members' resolution thresholds and what notice the company must give under s 249O. The number 110 is obviously designed to draw attention to potential member-number thresholds, but meeting rights never convert a substantively incompetent management instruction into a valid exercise of power. On the facts, total HBC shares = 110 × 2 = 220; their percentage of votes cannot be calculated without the company's total voting rights and class structure. Members’ notice-right and timetable distinct from substantive power and from the s 203D removal notice. Trigger: asked to get a resolution onto an already-scheduled AGM; CORPORATE LAW 192 | CORPORATE LAW

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excluded from Tutorial 4 Q1(a)–(b), but useful to distinguish and will be covered in Tutorial 5. THE LEGAL DISTINCTION IS BETWEEN PROCEDURE AND POWER. Sections 249N and 249O regulate aspects of members' proposed resolutions and notice, and other Chapter 2G provisions govern meeting calls and communication. They do not silently create an unlimited right of shareholders to run business operations. ACCR v CBA shows why the legal competence of a proposed motion must be assessed before the statutory meeting machinery can do meaningful work. For Tutorial Question 1(1), the handout expressly directs the student to assume procedural compliance and analyse substance, so an answer that spends two pages counting requisition signatures while overlooking the staffing mandate misses the assessed issue. For Questions 1(2)–(3), procedure becomes relevant because removal is substantively within member power. But even then the special notice of intention in s 203D(2) is a different event from the listed-company meeting notice under s 249HA. This distinction is the core of the date calculation for 18 November. You can know one deadline precisely without knowing whether HBC actually met it; do not mistake legal arithmetic for evidence of actual service. ss 180–184; 588G (future topics) Illustrative duty and insolvent-trading provisions; not proven merely by establishing statutory director status. Trigger: a later problem asks whether conduct actually breached a duty and what civil/criminal consequences follow. STATUS BEFORE BREACH. Director and officer classification matters partly because statutory duties can attach to persons falling within those definitions. But a person becoming a director by operation of s 9AC does not automatically mean their decisions were negligent, dishonest or insolvent trading. Section 180 concerns care and diligence; ss 181–183 concern good faith/proper purpose and misuse of position or information; s 184 contains criminal offences requiring proof of its particular mental and conduct elements. Section 588G is associated with the company's incurring debts when insolvent and imposes its own distinct conditions and defences. These topics are developed in later weeks; they are signposted here so students understand why classification matters without prematurely deciding liability. A PROPER REMEDIES ANSWER. If later facts establish a breach, ask who may pursue statutory civil penalty consequences or compensation, what the breach caused, whether ASIC or the company seeks relief, whether an injunction or director disqualification may CORPORATE LAW 193 | CORPORATE LAW

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be relevant, and whether other equitable or common-law remedies apply. The specific statutory provisions and available relief must be checked for the particular claim. In Leah's scenario we have no proved debt date, solvency status, quantified loss or identified misuse. Therefore the responsible answer is to preserve and investigate evidence, not to invent a penalty or damages figure. CORPORATE LAW 194 | CORPORATE LAW

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THE AUTHORITIES IN DEPTH — LEGAL REASONING, NOT JUST CASE NAMES Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 DEEPER LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE. The company had constitutional arrangements giving managerial authority to directors. A majority of shareholders sought to procure a sale of assets, while directors resisted the instruction. The judicial issue was not whether the shareholders had a commercial reason for preferring the sale, but whether an ordinary resolution could require directors to exercise a constitutionally allocated management power as directed. The Court of Appeal held that it could not. For a modern Australian problem, use the case as a foundational statement of corporate organ competence, then connect the principle to the Australian statutory management rule in s 198A and to the constitution under ss 134–135. Do not mechanically treat an English decision from 1906 as replacing the current Australian Act. A member group favoured a transaction resisted by directors, while management was constitutionally assigned to the board. The majority could not simply command the sale by ordinary resolution. Use for separation of shareholder voting power from management authority; apply to staffing rules in FreshFoods. FACTUAL SETTING. Members of the company sought to compel a transaction through an ordinary resolution despite articles that committed management to the directors. The directors did not agree with the proposed action. This produced the foundational question: where governing rules give directors the relevant power to manage, can an ordinary majority of shareholders simply instruct them to pursue a contrary course? This is why the authority is indispensable in an examination about board/shareholder disagreement. The case is not about whether the directors' chosen transaction was economically superior; it is about how the company's constitutional allocation of authority operates. LEGAL REASONING AND OUTCOME. The court treated the management allocation in the articles as legally meaningful. The general meeting could not override the directors' authority merely by an ordinary resolution inconsistent with that allocation. Shareholder power remains important, but must be exercised through the legal routes provided by the constitution and law rather than assuming general-meeting omnipotence. It is especially important to state that this is an older English corporate-articles case. When advising on a 2026 Australian company, its proposition should be connected expressly to the present CORPORATE LAW 195 | CORPORATE LAW

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Corporations Act ss 134–135 and 198A and the actual constitution, instead of being treated as a free-standing replacement for those provisions. HOW TO USE IT. In FreshFoods Proposal 1, the controlling issue is management of checkout staffing and investment in automated technology. The case supports the proposition that an ordinary resolution cannot displace the powers validly committed to the board. Immediately pair the authority with s 198A and explain the qualification: a valid constitution or statutory reservation of member powers could change the analysis. Do not cite the case to suggest shareholders cannot remove directors; the express public- company statutory removal right in s 203D is the opposite example of a specific power that members may exercise. NRMA v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517 EVIDENTIAL USE. The important methodological idea from the decision is that a proposed vote must be capable of creating an authorised corporate act. The court examined how the association's governance arrangements allocated decision-making authority, rather than finding that a sufficient group of members could force the organisation to act outside those powers. In an exam answer, use this case when the facts show that a requisitioned resolution directs an officer or board to perform a function entrusted elsewhere; follow it with ACCR to address the non-binding opinion argument. Avoid confusing the court's power to restrain the putting of an incompetent resolution with a blanket principle that the chair can exclude any topic on which directors disagree. A requisition sought to put a matter reserved for directors before members. The case is taught as allowing rejection of a meeting sought only to pass a resolution beyond member competence. Use for whether FreshFoods must even submit Proposal 1 to a vote. FACTUAL SETTING. The dispute arose from member attempts to use the meeting machinery to change administrative arrangements concerning the NRMA's election process. The management of the relevant arrangements was allocated to directors under the organisation's governance rules. Although members sought a general meeting, the proposed purpose was a management direction outside what the members could decide by that method. The issue was therefore not simply whether the members were sufficiently numerous or sincerely concerned about an electoral process, but whether their proposed resolution was one the meeting had the legal competence to pass. HOLDING AND RATIONALE. The court treated the company's allocation of management powers as significant when assessing the propriety of requiring a general meeting for the proposed purpose. Where a resolution is outside the members' power, CORPORATE LAW 196 | CORPORATE LAW

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compliance with meeting-requisition formalities cannot make that substantive resolution effective. This provides the bridge between the abstract division of corporate powers and the concrete question “Must the company put the proposal to a vote?” The case should not be over-generalised: the precise wording of the governance rules and the precise resolution matter. APPLICATION METHOD. Use this authority after identifying the source of the board's management powers. First quote or paraphrase FreshFoods' proposed staffing mandate. Second explain that it purports to command staffing levels and prescribe a six-month implementation timetable. Third identify s 198A and the assumed governance allocation. Fourth cite NRMA v Parker to explain why a member-initiated meeting process cannot compel consideration of an otherwise incompetent management instruction. Finally address the different status of a removal resolution under s 203D. In legal advice, that distinction is more valuable than memorising the facts without their relationship to statutory power. Stanham v National Trust of Australia (NSW), as cited in supplied slides The lecture uses this case for mixed valid/invalid resolutions: a company need not put an incompetent resolution on the agenda even where proper resolutions remain. Full authoritative citation not independently confirmed; do not invent it. CASE AND STATUS. Stanham v National Trust of Australia (NSW) (1989) 15 ACLR 87 is identified in the lecturer's materials as part of the board-versus-members line of authorities. It involved disputes about the governance and members' rights of the National Trust. Its appropriate educational use here is contextual: it is one of the Australian authorities informing whether corporate meeting procedures can be used for decisions that the constitutional structure allocates elsewhere. It should not be presented as standing for a novel mandatory outcome in the FreshFoods facts without a close comparison of the resolutions and governance rules. LIMIT OF VERIFIED DETAIL. The previous version of this chapter lacked a checked full judgment extract for Stanham. Accordingly this expanded edition will not invent judicial quotations, exact factual detail or pinpoint passages. What we can safely teach is the methodology. Obtain the authoritative decision; identify its actual members' proposal, the constitutional provisions and what the court decided about the scope of the meeting power; then compare those facts with HBC. Until that full comparison is complete, give primary analytic weight to s 198A, Automatic Self-Cleansing, NRMA v Parker and the Full Federal Court judgment in ACCR v CBA, whose relevant propositions are available CORPORATE LAW 197 | CORPORATE LAW

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and independently corroborated. This limitation is a model of careful legal research, not an excuse to omit the case. Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 THE ACTUAL HOLDING AND WHY IT MATTERS. An activist group acting for more than 100 members tried to compel the bank to put climate-related resolutions to its AGM. Their argument included that the resolutions could be advisory and were a means for shareholders to express views. The Full Federal Court nevertheless held that the company need not submit a resolution absent a statutory or constitutional power vested in the members to pass it. The reasoning expressly distinguishes the individual and collective freedom of shareholders to express opinions from the powers of the members in general meeting as a corporate organ. The court rejected a general implied opinion-resolution power. The case supplies a direct answer to the common but incomplete suggestion that Proposal 1 would become valid if HBC merely changed ‘must retain’ to ‘the shareholders recommend retaining’. EXAM APPLICATION. First, quote or paraphrase the exact mandatory language of HBC's motion. Secondly, identify that staffing, checkout configuration and implementation are management decisions. Thirdly, ask whether the constitution reserves that decision to members. Fourthly, state that the 110-person threshold, even if procedural conditions are assumed satisfied, is not a substantive grant of authority. Finally, recognise that HBC may still communicate policy concerns and use a lawful removal-and-appointment mechanism. The outcome is conditional on the constitution and any other specific grant of power, but the Act's ordinary management allocation makes HBC's stated Proposal 1 incompetent. The Full Federal Court refused to recognise a general shareholder power to submit advisory management resolutions simply to express an opinion. A procedural requisition under s 249N does not create an unrestricted substantive power. Use especially for HBC’s attempted staffing mandate. FACTS AND CONTEXT. Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility represented more than 100 members of Commonwealth Bank and invoked the statutory machinery for proposed members' resolutions at the Bank's AGM. The proposed measures concerned disclosure and management of environmental risks associated with the Bank's activities. The controversy was not that members lacked opinions on climate or that boards have a right to disregard ethical issues. It was whether a general meeting had the legal CORPORATE LAW 198 | CORPORATE LAW

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competence to pass the proposed motions, including resolutions framed as non-binding expressions of opinion about matters of management. The Act's meeting provisions had to be interpreted against the company's separate legal personality and the allocation of management functions. LEGAL ISSUE. The Full Federal Court asked whether the statutory ability to give notice of a proposed resolution under s 249N amounted to a substantive right to propose and have voted on any motion members wished to express, even where the subject matter was vested in the board. That is a fundamentally different question from whether a shareholder is entitled to communicate with fellow shareholders, ask questions or make public representations. An advisory resolution without coercive effect still purports to be an act of the corporate meeting. Its legal competence must be assessed. DECISION AND REASONING. The Full Court dismissed ACCR's appeal. It did not accept the proposition that the statutory notice mechanism converted a general meeting into a forum entitled to pass any non-binding statement of opinion about management. A proposed resolution must be capable of validly being moved; ss 249N and related machinery do not supply the missing substantive power. The decision's treatment of company personality and managerial powers is why it should be taught with s 198A, rather than as a narrow rule about environmental campaigns. Students must not repeat a misleading summary suggesting the Full Court upheld a general right to put any advisory resolution. That would reverse the important result. APPLICATION TO FRESHFOODS. HBC has deliberately assembled more than 100 shareholders, mirroring the activism structure that makes ACCR especially relevant. But 110 signatures or 220 shares do not answer Proposal 1. Its mandatory wording makes it even clearer than the non-binding motions in ACCR that HBC is trying to direct an aspect of business management. The resolution therefore faces a strong substantive objection. If HBC proposed a constitutional amendment or genuine member-governance motion instead, a fresh legal inquiry would be required. The lawyer should explain the limits of the current resolution without incorrectly telling the client that campaigning, meeting statements or director elections are prohibited. Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale [1978] HCA 52; (1978) 141 CLR 236 The High Court treated the actual performance of director functions as important despite an invalid formal appointment. Use for why Leah cannot rely solely on termination paperwork. CORPORATE LAW 199 | CORPORATE LAW

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FACTUAL AND LEGAL SETTING. Drysdale involved a person functioning as a director despite the absence of a legally effective appointment, in a statutory setting that imposed obligations on directors under the then-applicable company law. The litigation tested whether a person who had assumed director functions could avoid statutory accountability simply because of the formal deficiency. The High Court's approach recognised that the relevant definition and duties could extend to a de facto director. Historical context must be respected: the legislation considered in 1978 was not the currently numbered Corporations Act, so a teaching book must connect the underlying reasoning to the present Act rather than misquote present-day subsections as though they appeared in the original judgment. WHY THE CASE MATTERS. Formal appointment is an obvious path to being a director, but an exclusive focus on valid paperwork would let a person perform board functions while denying the consequences associated with those functions. Drysdale explains why the law may recognise governance conduct despite formal defects. It is not a blanket rule that anyone described by co-workers as “a director” automatically becomes one. The evidence still has to establish occupancy of the relevant position in the circumstances, and the relevant present statutory provision remains s 9AC(1)(b)(i). HOW TO USE IT IN PRACTICE. Start with the actual appointment and resignation documentation. If Leah was never effectively removed, she may remain a formal director, and no de facto analysis is needed to establish that status. If her formal office genuinely ended, ask whether the company nevertheless permitted her to resume director-like functions. Drysdale is the foundation for why a de facto status theory is legally possible; Grimaldi supplies a more contemporary, contextual method for examining the functions she actually performed. Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6 [133]–[143] PINPOINT THE COURT'S LOGIC. At [133]–[143], the Full Federal Court asked whether Grimaldi was acting in the director's position in that corporation rather than searching for one mechanically decisive badge of office. Paragraph [141] is central because functions that would be expected of a director were entrusted to, or assumed by, Grimaldi with the executive directors' acquiescence; their nature and significance justified treating him as a director. Paragraph [142] is important because some actions occurred on his own initiative and some with approval. For Leah, analyse decisions to discontinue a model or close a production facility, her implementation authority and the board's acquiescence. Those CORPORATE LAW 200 | CORPORATE LAW

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facts are stronger than a bare statement that she negotiated with a bank, a task many external professionals can perform lawfully. A person lacking valid director appointment exercised major corporate functions, partly with board acquiescence, and was found a de facto director; officer status was also available. At [141] discuss substantial, significant director-like functions; [142] note initiative versus authority; [143] use the fallback officer limb. FACTUAL SETTING. Chameleon Mining's business and financing transactions involved Grimaldi, a person who was not formally appointed to the company's board but exercised extensive and important functions. The evidence included involvement in capital raising, company transactions, instructions to professional advisers and dealings materially affecting the company's business and finances. A major issue was whether his real role in Chameleon attracted statutory director or officer responsibility. The outcome required the Court to look beyond his formal title and examine the corporate reality. Because the same proceedings also involved fiduciary and statutory misconduct issues, students must distinguish a finding that he was acting as a director from separate allegations of breach and remedies. RELEVANT PRINCIPLE. The Full Federal Court stressed that the assessment is contextual. Companies differ in size, activities, management practices and internal organisation; therefore a universal catalogue of “tasks only directors perform” can be misleading. The question is whether, evaluated in the setting of the actual company, the person was acting in the position of director. The court recognised overlap between de facto and shadow concepts without collapsing them into one test. In its conclusion at [141], the Court gave weight to the importance, scope and sometimes independent performance of the functions entrusted to Grimaldi. The tutorial's [133]–[143] pinpoint range should be read in that wider framework. LAWYER'S FACTUAL INQUIRY. Students should ask what decisions were made, whether Grimaldi or the board actually made them, the nature and importance of the authority assumed, how executives and directors treated the person, and whether that authority was exercised on an ongoing basis. A consultant's attendance at meetings is not enough. A series of significant independent governance decisions may be. Corporate emails using “we” language, appointment letters and signature authority can be evidence, but their value depends on how they fit the overall conduct. Do not substitute an itemised checklist for a holistic evaluation. CORPORATE LAW 201 | CORPORATE LAW

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APPLICATION TO LEAH. Leah's bank negotiations and investor presentations resemble functions consultants commonly perform, so those facts cannot establish de facto status alone. But a determination that one of BlueWave's three boat models would cease production, coupled with developing and controlling implementation of a plant closure, is closer to the strategic authority examined in Grimaldi. The habitual board rubber- stamping strengthens the inference she was carrying out substantive director functions. The right conclusion is that de facto status is a substantial risk on the stated facts, not that every restructuring consultant is necessarily a director. The defence remains that the board retained real ultimate responsibility and Leah was an adviser or delegate rather than occupying the governing position. Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233 [228]–[250] PRECISE ANALYTICAL USE. Buzzle did not hold that a powerful commercial counterparty is immune from shadow-director status. Rather, the claim failed on its evidence. The court distinguished arm's-length contractual pressure from instructions and wishes that the directors became accustomed to follow in carrying out governance functions. It considered the directors' collective decision-making, the regularity of any alleged compliance, and the necessary factual link between the supposed controller and the directors' acts. Use the case as a discipline: identify exactly which director decisions were supposedly caused by which outsider instructions and whether a pattern existed. In Leah's problem, compare the routine endorsement of her major restructuring proposals with the directors' retained discretion in ordinary expenditure. Both facts matter; neither may be discarded to force a categorical answer. Apple’s powerful commercial bargaining position was insufficient to make it a shadow director of Buzzle. An external party’s conditions and pressure are not the same as board members being habitually accustomed to obey its corporate directions. Use for Leah’s defence that her inputs were advice rather than governance commands. FACTUAL SETTING. Buzzle was formed in a retail consolidation involving Apple resellers. Apple Computer Australia was a powerful supplier and commercial counterparty whose commercial approval and bargaining position mattered to Buzzle's plans. The business later suffered financial failure and litigation raised whether Apple had acquired the legal responsibilities associated with corporate control, including whether it was a shadow director. The specific reading passage asks students to understand how to distinguish commercial pressure from habitual board compliance with instructions or CORPORATE LAW 202 | CORPORATE LAW

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wishes. Unlike an artificially simple example, the real case involved complicated financing and commercial negotiations. STATUTORY PROBLEM. The shadow-director definition focuses on whether the company's directors were accustomed to act on the alleged controller's instructions or wishes. This is a pattern of conduct by the directors. Evidence that a counterparty imposes difficult terms, has veto rights under contract, or is economically indispensable does not itself establish that the board has surrendered its decision-making role. The causal relationship matters: are the directors taking governance action because the outsider directs them, or are they independently choosing among unattractive commercial options? The statutory professional and business-relationship exclusion also protects advice properly given in those capacities; its precise application still depends on the actual nature of the conduct. HOLDING AND REASONING. White J rejected the shadow-director contention against Apple. The evidence did not establish the required customary board compliance with Apple's governance instructions. A commercial entity can apply substantial pressure without becoming the company's shadow board. The ratio should not be paraphrased as “outsiders can never be shadow directors” or “a trading relationship automatically excludes liability.” Instead, the case identifies the necessary proof and explains why the particular commercial influence shown was insufficient. APPLICATION TO LEAH. Leah's case is not exactly Buzzle: she is not merely an arm's- length supplier asserting its own contractual interests; she is engaged to advise BlueWave and closely involved in restructuring. Her board routinely seeks her views and approves her substantive proposals without debate. That is affirmative evidence of a potentially habitual following of her wishes. Yet the pattern still may reflect trust in competent expert advice rather than deference to an outsider's governance instructions. A strong answer identifies minutes where the board critically evaluated advice, occasions when it rejected her recommendations, documents evidencing autonomy and the precise communications by which Leah sought to direct decisions. Conclude that the shadow-director allegation is arguable but more fact-sensitive than her de facto classification. Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 38 NSWLR 290 Evidence of profound influence and control by a major investor provides the contrasting example of potential shadow directorship. Use carefully: ordinary shareholding or financial support is insufficient on its own. CORPORATE LAW 203 | CORPORATE LAW

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FACTS. The litigation arose in the context of a company whose finances and board were subject to substantial influence by a major corporate shareholder and financier. Pioneer International held a significant stake in Giant Resources and was deeply involved in financial and operational arrangements; it also had links to board appointments. The case addressed statutory director and management responsibility in a financial-distress setting. Students should avoid teaching it as though a large shareholding alone creates a shadow director or that the later Corporations Act text was already in force when the judgment was delivered. RATIONALE. The significance of the authority is its willingness to examine the substance of an entity's actual control and the appointed directors' response. It shows why a person or body corporate can be considered for shadow-director responsibility where the board has in reality become accustomed to acting under that entity's directions. Mere influence or the right to negotiate funding conditions is not the complete analysis. When the alleged controller is also a major shareholder, it is easy to confuse shareholder rights with shadow governance; the court requires evidence of the role actually played. HOW TO USE IT. Compare it with Buzzle. Antico shows why a corporate shareholder/financier may be exposed when its influence is exercised through the board in the requisite way. Buzzle shows why even strong leverage is not necessarily enough. Apply the comparison to BlueWave by asking whether Leah merely offered expert recommendations or whether her wishes effectively directed the appointed board's major restructuring votes. The case does not establish that Leah breached any duty, and it is not the main assigned pinpoint authority for Question 2; keep Buzzle [228]–[250] as the tutorial's primary shadow case. ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4 High Court held that officer status concerning significant financial capacity cannot be restricted to formally named officeholders. Use as supporting current authority for s 9AD, but identify that the historical judgment cited the definition then located in s 9. FACTUAL CONTEXT. The High Court considered whether a person with significant corporate influence, but without a conventional formal office title at the relevant company, could be an officer under the definition concerned with capacity to affect a corporation's financial standing. The litigation arose from the collapse and administration of parts of the MFS group and the movement of substantial funds. The central interpretive issue was not whether the person had the exact job title the Act might ordinarily suggest, but whether the statutory functional description was satisfied. CORPORATE LAW 204 | CORPORATE LAW

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THE LEGAL LESSON. The officer definition can reach a person whose real position gives them capacity to affect financial standing materially; it is not confined to board members or a narrow class of persons with a formal named office. This is the reason s 9AD(1)(b)(ii) needs independent treatment alongside s 9AC. A lawyer must still prove the particular capacity and its relation to the corporation, rather than inferring officer status from any evidence of influence. The High Court's interpretation is useful when a person has authority over financial resources, capital decisions or material transactions. APPLICATION. Leah is negotiating survival financing and substantially shaping BlueWave's restructuring. Even if the court concludes she was a consultant rather than de facto or shadow director, her role may raise a substantial question under s 9AD(1)(b)(i) (participating in decisions affecting a substantial part of the business) and s 9AD(1)(b)(ii) (capacity materially to affect financial standing). Do not state she is an officer solely because she negotiated with a bank: evaluate her actual decisional and financial capacity. And do not use King to avoid answering the director-specific issues required by Tutorial Question 3. Forge v ASIC — supplementary authority referred to in the slides (citation requires confirmation) The Week 4 material refers to shareholder ratification and director accountability. The specific Forge pinpoint has not been independently verified against the reported judgment; do not rely on the earlier numerical pinpoint as an authenticated citation. This authority is contextual and not necessary to resolve the supplied tutorial questions. An editor should check the actual assigned extract before publication. RESEARCH LIMIT. The lecturer's material refers to “Forge v ASIC”, but the title alone has not been matched to a sufficiently reliable, relevant full judgment and pinpoint for this chapter. It would be irresponsible to invent a citation or say that the case decided a proposition we have not verified. For this Week 4 tutorial, the assigned director cases are Grimaldi and Buzzle, supplemented by the recognised leading line including Drysdale and Antico. Those provide ample supported law to answer the questions correctly. A final publication proof should compare the lecturer's slide, prescribed case list or edited extract to identify the exact Forge reference before adding a substantive authority note. CORPORATE LAW 205 | CORPORATE LAW

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NEW TEACHING INTEGRATION — THE WEEK 5 LIVE TUTORIAL, EDITED JUDGMENTS AND REQUIRED READINGS This part integrates the new first-hand teaching sources after the Week 4 forum: the complete Week 5 tutorial transcript, its JUNI summary, the lecturer’s edited Buzzle and Grimaldi judgments, Pieter Oomens’ four-page article, the Governance Institute/McGuirk remuneration survey, and the supplied company-secretary article. The university question text remains unchanged later in this chapter. The discussion below teaches students how these additions alter the meaning, application and evidentiary support of the answers. Where the machine transcript incorrectly records a section number or case name, the controlling statutory text and supplied judgment extract are separately identified. A. First learn the lawyer’s question: what kind of power is being exercised? The live tutorial began not with a case citation but with the exact words of FreshFoods Proposal 1. The lecturer drew particular attention to the conjunction “and”: FreshFoods would keep human staff in at least 50% of operating checkout lanes AND its board “must implement” that policy within six months. Why does that wording matter? Because it makes a decision about staffing and technological deployment, then directs the organ ordinarily responsible for business operations to perform it. The proposal is not simply the expression of an investor concern. It attempts to exercise the board’s business- management power. The first legal enquiry is the distinction between a company’s capacity and the organ authorised to exercise a particular power. Section 124(1) gives a company the legal capacity and powers of an individual and the powers of a body corporate. That does not answer who within the company can decide how those powers are used. Sections 134 and 135 explain the governance significance of a constitution and replaceable rules. Subject to the company’s actual constitution, s 198A(1) places management of the business with or under the direction of the directors, while s 198A(2) allocates other corporate powers to the directors except those reserved to the company in general meeting. Section 198A is a replaceable rule; do not say that every company is bound by its text in identical terms without examining its governing constitution. The tutor’s “puppies and kittens” metaphor is a memory device for the division of power, not a replacement for legal analysis. A lawyer must move from the metaphor to the precise legal instrument: identify FreshFoods as a public listed company; locate the governance rule; determine whether the relevant proposal falls within board management CORPORATE LAW 206 | CORPORATE LAW

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or member power; compare the proposed form of resolution with the controlling authorities; then advise whether a vote is legally required. The fact that HBC obtained 110 members does not confer a substantive management power. Voting eligibility and the threshold to propose resolutions are procedural matters considered separately. B. Four cases, four links in one continuous argument about shareholder powers Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 is a constitutional allocation case. A general meeting purported to direct the directors about company property, but the constitution vested the relevant management authority in the board. The shareholders could not supersede that allocation by ordinary resolution. Use this case after s 198A and the constitution: it explains why a majority’s preference cannot automatically substitute for the board’s valid decision. It does not mean a board is above the statute or can resist every valid member resolution. National Roads & Motorists’ Association v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517 extends the analysis to the competence of the proposed resolution and the purpose of convening a meeting. Where the proposed business is beyond members’ power, procedural meeting provisions do not create an entitlement to force an incompetent resolution to a vote. The tutor distinguished a meeting demanded only for an invalid purpose from FreshFoods’ AGM, which already has other lawful business; the company cannot simply cancel its AGM because one proposed item is incompetent. Stanham v National Trust of Australia (NSW) (1989) 15 ACLR 87 was singled out in the live tutorial as especially apt to a mixed-agenda AGM. Its practical role is to show why an invalid management-related item may be excluded without invalidating an otherwise properly convened meeting containing valid member business. Accordingly, in FreshFoods, the board could omit Proposal 1 while still considering competent director- removal and appointment resolutions, provided the independent procedural requirements for those resolutions are satisfied. Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 establishes the further limit that admitting a proposed opinion resolution is non-binding does not, on its own, supply the statutory or constitutional power needed to move it as a company resolution. The Full Federal Court rejected the unrestricted advisory-resolution argument. The lecturer’s narrated follow-on slides expressly correct the incomplete recording and explain the outcome. The separate JUNI summary of the earlier forum that suggested advisory votes could be required was mistaken and must not be carried into the textbook. Application: HBC cannot cure an CORPORATE LAW 207 | CORPORATE LAW

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otherwise incompetent management resolution merely by changing “must implement” into “shareholders advise” without identifying an independently available member power. C. Why Proposal 2 is a different question, not a contradiction Proposal 2 changes the legal object. It does not order the directors to employ staff; it seeks to remove members of the board and appoint new members. The source of substantive shareholder authority is s 203D(1), which permits members of a public company to remove a director by resolution despite contrary constitutional or contractual arrangements, subject to the special representative-director proviso. Section 203E prevents the existing board from itself removing a director of a public company. These rules do not guarantee the activists enough votes; they establish the legal competency of the proposed resolution. For new appointments, s 201G is the replaceable rule permitting appointment by the company in general meeting, while s 201H permits director appointments subject to its own restrictions and confirmation rules. For a public company, s 201E(1) prevents appointment of two or more directors by a single resolution unless the meeting first passes a resolution without any votes cast against it approving the multiple appointment resolution. That is why the lecturer’s practical answer identified three separate removals and three separate appointments: six individual resolutions is the safe, clearly specified structure on the stated facts. Check the constitution and eligibility of each candidate, including s 201A(2) (at least three directors, two ordinarily resident in Australia), s 201B, s 201D and director-ID requirements as applicable. A company lawyer must distinguish legal capacity to propose director removal from the procedural ability to place that motion before the scheduled meeting. The tutorial instruction for Question 1(1) expressly brackets the procedural rules, but Question 1(3) unambiguously asks for the s 203D removal procedure and dates. Different subquestions therefore require different degrees of procedural discussion. A High Distinction answer obeys those instructions instead of flooding every paragraph with unrelated meeting law. D. Notice, the calendar and procedural fairness: teach every limb of s 203D Section 203D(2) places the notice of intention to move a removal resolution on the proposing members: the company must receive notice at least two months before the meeting, ordinarily 18 September 2026 for a meeting on 18 November 2026. The subsection contains an exception: if the company calls a meeting after the notice has been CORPORATE LAW 208 | CORPORATE LAW

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given, that company-called meeting may vote on removal even if fewer than two months pass. The problem identifies the AGM date but not necessarily the formal date the company called it. Ask for the meeting-call documents before assuming the exception does or does not apply. Section 203D(3) separately obliges the company—not HBC—to give the affected director a copy of the notice as soon as practicable after the company receives it. Section 203D(4)(a) entitles that director to give the company a written case for circulation; s 203D(4)(b) also allows the director to speak to the motion, whether or not the director is a member. Section 203D(5)(a) ordinarily requires circulation with the meeting notice if time permits, while paragraph (5)(b) deals with distribution and reading out when there is insufficient time. Subsection (6) provides that the company need not circulate a statement exceeding 1,000 words or containing defamatory matter. The 1,000-word limit belongs to s 203D(6), not s 252B, which concerns managed investment schemes. Section 203D(7) addresses the retirement timing of an appointed replacement in the specified circumstances; s 203D(8) concerns strict-liability offences for contraventions of specified procedural obligations. A lawyer does not treat those provisions as empty footnotes. Explain who owes each obligation and what can go wrong. A further, conceptually distinct, listed-company meeting notice provision appears in s 249HA (generally 28 days), but that is not interchangeable with the two-month members’ notice of removal under s 203D(2). For precise real-world deadlines, cross-check the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and calendar computation; the tutor accepted 18 September for the class problem but rightly warned that practising lawyers should check the calculation rather than rely on guesswork. E. Directors may delegate powers: ss 198C–198D; directors do not thereby escape responsibilities The narrated slide distinguishes ordinary board committees from the board itself. Under s 198C(1), directors may confer powers they can exercise on a managing director; subsection (2) permits them to vary or revoke that conferral. The title “managing director” is not a free-standing authority to do anything: the relevant act must be authorised by the statutory/constitutional allocation, board conferral and applicable external contracting rules. A proposed routine purchase and a proposed major factory sale can require different scrutiny; a title alone answers neither question. Under s 198D(1), unless the constitution provides otherwise, directors may delegate powers to (a) a committee of directors, (b) a director, (c) an employee, or (d) another CORPORATE LAW 209 | CORPORATE LAW

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person. Under s 198D(2), the delegate must exercise those powers in accordance with directors’ directions. Under s 190(1), directors generally remain responsible for exercise of a power delegated under s 198D as though they had exercised it themselves. The specific qualification in s 190(2) requires reasonable grounds for believing the delegate would comply with the law and constitution, and an informed good-faith belief, after appropriate inquiry if needed, in the delegate’s reliability and competence. These are precise statutory conditions, not a generic slogan that directors have liability for every delegate act. Section 189 separately regulates directors’ reliance on advice or information, including who gave it, the reasonable-grounds belief in competence, good faith, independent assessment and the corporation’s circumstances. Link this to the tutorial’s hypothetical about a board taking sound legal advice: following competent professional advice is not proof the lawyer has become a shadow director. But an uncritical board cannot treat the engagement letter as permission to abdicate all judgment. In both delegation and shadow- director questions, investigate what the board understood, what it evaluated, and who made the effective decisions. The three common committees in the slide—an audit committee, a remuneration committee and a nomination committee—serve different governance functions. An audit committee scrutinises financial reporting and audit risks; a remuneration committee examines pay structures and incentives; a nomination committee considers board composition and succession. They assist and may exercise delegated powers as authorised, but directors cannot outsource their personal duties of care, good faith or proper purpose. When drafting minutes, identify whether a committee recommended an action, had delegated power to decide, or merely compiled background information. Those are legally different events. F. Company secretary: the supplied Zajicek–Sherburn article taught as governance, with legal boundaries Courtenay Zajicek and Kate Sherburn, “The What and the What Not: Key Considerations Before Becoming Company Secretary”, explains why governance administration is substantive work, not clerical decoration. A secretary coordinates board papers and meetings, reminds directors of conflicts and independence expectations, maintains official company records and records decisions and responsibility for implementation. Minutes are not a verbatim transcript: effective minutes capture deliberation, material conflicts, the resolution actually passed and assigned action items. This connects to s 251A, under CORPORATE LAW 210 | CORPORATE LAW

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which the company must record directors’ and members’ meeting proceedings and resolutions within the statutory period, and to the evidentiary significance of reliable minutes in a *Grimaldi* or *Buzzle* dispute. Under s 204A(1), a proprietary company need not have a secretary, but if it appoints one at least one must ordinarily reside in Australia. Under s 204A(2), a public company must have at least one secretary who ordinarily resides in Australia. Section 204B imposes the adult individual and disqualification requirements; s 204C requires prior signed consent and retention; s 204D provides for appointment by directors. Section 205B concerns notifications to ASIC; s 188 places responsibility on secretaries for specified corporate filing and compliance contraventions, with a reasonable-steps defence. Do not equate “the company secretary files documents” with “all filing liability always belongs solely to the secretary”: the allocation varies by company type and statutory provision. The authors identify four special watch-outs when an in-house lawyer also acts as company secretary. First, conflicts of interest may arise between governance administration and privileged legal advice. Secondly, both offices require substantial time and adequate support. Thirdly, legal professional privilege turns on the legal character and purpose of particular communications, not automatically on the recipient’s title as general counsel or secretary; record carefully when advice is legal versus commercial/administrative. Fourthly, access, indemnity and insurance arrangements should be reviewed, subject to statutory limits including ss 199A–199C. Deeds or D&O insurance do not extinguish legal duties or guarantee cover for every contravention. The article recommends training, templates, adequate preparation, understanding the directors’ working preferences, and reading the constitution before taking office. These are professional-practice recommendations, not statutory conditions of appointment. The lecture labels company-secretary material “non-examinable” for that forum. It nonetheless belongs in a serious teaching book: non-examinable is not synonymous with legally irrelevant. Students should learn both its practical governance value and the distinction between teaching scope and legal source authority. G. Oomens is a required reading: four pages connecting directors’ status to recoveries and creditor protection Pieter Oomens, “Identifying de facto and shadow directors” (Australian Insolvency Journal, October–December 2007, 11–14), asks why it matters that responsibility can reach people who are not registered at ASIC. His answer is insolvency and creditor protection. A person who functions as a director may be exposed to statutory duties and, where the CORPORATE LAW 211 | CORPORATE LAW

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separate elements are proved, insolvent-trading or recovery claims. Oomens refers to ss 588G, 588FDA, 588FE(4) and 588FC as examples. These are avenues requiring proof of their own conditions; the article does not support an automatic order against every informal adviser. His de facto illustration, Mistmorn Pty Ltd (in liq) v Yasseen (1996) 14 ACLC 1387, concerns a non-appointed individual who dealt as the company’s principal representative with landlords, insurers, suppliers, lawyers and regulators, exercised practical control over security and staff, and negotiated the sale of the business. The importance lies not in a job title but in a pattern of significant company-wide functions. A consultant engaged for limited specialist tasks is different from someone who effectively manages the company’s general affairs. Use this distinction in Leah’s problem. Oomens’ second illustration, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 565, concerns a person said to have resigned but who continued negotiating taxation, supplier-payment and business-sale matters, as well as signing or controlling financial instruments. The article reports a finding that his substantive post-resignation functions supported de facto status. This is exceptionally useful for the Leah facts: asking what a person did after the supposed resignation often matters more than the document’s label. Because the article is a secondary source, a publication-quality edition should separately verify the judgment before expanding beyond the account Oomens provides. For shadow directors, Oomens discusses Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 38 NSWLR 290. His account concerns a substantial shareholder’s influence over Giant Resources through nominee directors and strategic financial decisions. It illustrates why directors appointed on a constituency’s nomination must still decide for the company rather than merely implement that constituency’s will. The issue is effective decision-making and whether the board’s independent judgment was displaced, not whether a large shareholder possessed bargaining strength alone. Oomens also discusses Ho v Akai Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] FCAFC 159. The proceeding concerned allegations of strategic control in a distressed corporate group. Its procedural posture is important: the reported appeal addressed a prima facie case in an interlocutory setting, not a final trial finding of liability on every allegation. The article’s discussion of high-level strategy, refinancing and restructuring nevertheless provides a useful factual comparison for Leah and for the breadth of shadow-director activity that may matter in insolvency. The older article must be read alongside the later, directly supplied judicial reasoning in *Buzzle* and *Grimaldi*, rather than substituted for those judgments. CORPORATE LAW 212 | CORPORATE LAW

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H. What the lecturer’s edited Buzzle judgment actually adds — [228]–[250] White J’s analysis begins with whether a body corporate can be a shadow director. At [228]–[231], the Court distinguishes the requirement that a formally appointed director be an individual, reflected in s 201B(1), from the wider reference to a “person” in the de facto/shadow limbs. A corporate supplier was therefore not excluded merely because a company itself could not be formally appointed as a director. This is a statutory- interpretation point: read each limb in its own text rather than importing conditions from another limb. At [232]–[237], the judgment rejects the proposition that shadow directors are conceptually incapable of engaging liabilities directed at directors merely because they remain in the shadows. It explains that de facto and shadow categories can overlap: a person may personally exercise director functions and also have the appointed directors habitually follow their instructions or wishes. In a strong Leah answer, analyse both tests separately even if the same evidence is relevant to both; do not conclude the categories are mutually exclusive. At [240], White J explicitly warns against colourful metaphors that fail to identify actual legal criteria. At [242]–[243], the Court distinguishes directors obeying an outsider as directors from a commercial board deciding to accept contract terms offered by a powerful supplier. Apple’s insistence on protective conditions in an arm’s-length trading relationship did not itself establish that Apple was taking over board decisions. This is the lecturer’s commercial-pressure point applied to a precise factual distinction. At [244]–[247], the Court addresses causation: it is not enough for an outsider’s expressed preferences and a board’s ultimate decision merely to coincide. The evidence must support the required connection between the instruction or wish and the directors’ conduct. The board need not lose all discretion in every matter, but the purported controller must be linked to the habitual compliance. At [248], the time dimension matters: one or two isolated instances do not normally establish being “accustomed” to act in that way. At [249], the proper performance of professional functions or a business relationship matters for the statutory qualification. At [250], compliance by a governing majority of the board can suffice; obedience only by non-director employees is not enough. These five elements—board level, relevant instruction, causal connection, habitual practice, proper- advice qualification—should be worked through individually in every shadow-director problem. CORPORATE LAW 213 | CORPORATE LAW

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I. What the lecturer’s edited Grimaldi judgment adds — [133]–[143] *Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2)* [2012] FCAFC 6 supplies the companion functional analysis. At [133], the Full Federal Court emphasises that an apparently functioning, formally constituted board does not preclude a different individual being a de facto director. The Court examined informal governance and significant transactions with missing formal approvals. The issue is not simply whether the person attended meetings, but whether they undertook functions properly expected of a director in that corporation’s real circumstances. The evidence considered included the person’s participation in company-wide decisions, significant dealings, the character of financial and transactional functions and the degree of acquiescence of executive directors. At [141], the Court concluded that Grimaldi performed director functions of sufficient extent and significance to be treated as acting in that position. At [142], some conduct was board-authorised and some undertaken on his own initiative: both could matter. At [143], the Court noted that officer status can be an independently sufficient route where the relevant duty or remedy requires proof of officer status rather than director status. The Act’s current structure locates the director definition in s 9AC and the officer definition in s 9AD; older judgments citing s 9 must be mapped to the revised location rather than treated as invalid authorities. The critical difference between the cases is the direction of the inquiry. De facto analysis follows the individual’s actual performance of governance functions. Shadow analysis follows the formal directors’ patterned response to someone else’s instructions or wishes. A board’s “rubber stamping” may be relevant to both questions, but it proves neither automatically: for de facto status ask which decisions the outsider actually took; for shadow status identify directions and habitual, causally connected compliance by directors or their governing majority. J. Remuneration, accountability and the evidence limits of the 2024 Australian Board Remuneration Survey The supplied Governance Institute of Australia / McGuirk Remuneration 2024 Abridged Australian Board Remuneration Survey is an empirical governance resource. Its introduction reports remuneration data for 1,089 boards, drawn from 667 online contributors, 225 continuing contributor boards and 197 client boards. It states that 845 of the boards (about 78%) remunerate all directors, a chair or another director. That sample statistic is not a legal rule, is not a national census of all companies and does not prove the market value of an individual director’s services. CORPORATE LAW 214 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 202A is the replaceable rule dealing with directors’ remuneration; it must be considered with the actual constitution, any employment/service contract and additional public-company or listed-entity requirements. A director’s fee and an executive’s employment remuneration are analytically distinct even though one person may hold both roles. In the two-strikes governance system, the statutory remuneration-report and spill-resolution provisions, including ss 250U–250W, concern specific listed-company circumstances. The professional lesson is to distinguish who sets pay, what approvals and disclosure are required, what the survey data can legitimately benchmark, and how conflicts are managed. Do not infer from the remuneration survey that a particular fee complies with the law. K. Disqualification and resignation: separate status from liability The forum slides identify three avenues of management disqualification: automatic statutory disqualification under s 206B in specified circumstances; court-ordered disqualification under ss 206C–206E subject to their individual criteria; and ASIC disqualification under s 206F where its statutory company-failure conditions are met. Section 206G addresses leave to manage in relevant circumstances. These were designated non-examinable in the week’s slides but remain important in legal practice. A lawyer must never conclude that an allegation or merely a corporate financial loss itself triggers automatic disqualification; the exact statutory trigger and any exception must be proved. For Leah, distinguish the legal effectiveness of her resignation from her later functional status. Section 203A is a replaceable rule concerning written resignation; s 203AA addresses effective timing including notice to ASIC, and s 203AB may defeat a resignation that would leave a company without directors. These are threshold questions. Even if Leah was no longer a formally appointed director, later conduct may separately meet s 9AC(1)(b)(i) and/or (ii). Avoid treating an incomplete ASIC record as conclusive proof of either continuing formal office or valid resignation. Obtain the resignation notice, dates, ASIC communications and company constitution. L. Source hierarchy and further research required Source priority in this chapter is: (1) current legislation at the Federal Register of Legislation; (2) the lecturer’s supplied original edited judgments for their precise paragraphs, with verified full judgments as needed; (3) the Week 4/5 firsthand transcripts for lecturer emphasis and application; (4) Oomens’ secondary analysis and the supplied practical governance readings for interpretive and professional context; (5) the 2024 remuneration survey for its stated empirical observations. The separate Chapter 7 CORPORATE LAW 215 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW PRESCRIBED TEXTBOOK AND WEEK 4 SOURCES The complete supplied extract from Chapple et al, Company Law (3rd ed, 2023), Chapter 7, pp 177?202, has now been reviewed and integrated into the teaching narrative that follows. The lecturer-edited Buzzle and Grimaldi judgments, Oomens article, company-secretary reading, remuneration survey, Week 4 forum and Week 5 tutorial remain part of this chapter?s research foundation. Current statutory definitions are in ss 9AC (director) and 9AD (officer). Academic resources support interpretation and context; current legislation and the controlling judgments supply operative rules. 216 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW Corporate governance in action: teaching from the complete prescribed Chapter 7 extract Chapter 7 of Chapple and co-authors' Company Law (3rd edition, 2023), supplied here at textbook pages 177–202, supports a considerably richer treatment of governance than a simple list of types of directors. Its four learning outcomes concern governance theories and principles, the legal concept of an officer, the division of power between directors and members, and the appointment, remuneration and removal of directors. The prescribed Retrofit case study adds a continuing client's perspective: Julian wants to appoint capable managers, respond to a director's temporary absence, consider the history of a potential appointee, and decide how the company's governance should operate. This section synthesises that material in original student-facing prose and integrates the lecturer's Week 4 forum and Week 5 tutorial analysis. It is not a reproduction of the textbook. Governance is a problem of information, incentives and lawful authority The first question is why corporate governance rules exist at all. In a small business the owner may directly supervise every employee and inspect each invoice. Growth changes the problem: ownership, management and the economic consequences of decisions become separated. Agency theory identifies the danger that managers controlling decisions might pursue goals diverging from those of members who supplied capital. Monitoring, transparent reporting, independent review, incentives, defined delegations and director accountability attempt to reduce these agency costs. A student should be able to explain an example: a manager receives a bonus for short-term turnover and therefore accepts risky contracts that later burden the company. Governance systems must address the incentive, the approval threshold and the information received by directors—not merely declare that the board ‘should act properly’. Stakeholder theory offers a complementary, wider lens. Corporate activity affects workers, communities, customers, creditors and the environment, not just the members' immediate return on capital. These interests can be economically material 217 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW to long-run corporate performance and sometimes also engage enforceable legal duties. The theory does not mean directors may disregard the company's legal obligations or that every person affected by a board decision has an enforceable shareholder right. The lawyer must distinguish an ethical governance commitment, an ASX reporting expectation, a statutory duty and a legally enforceable individual entitlement. The difference is central to the FreshFoods tutorial: the labour impacts of automation may be relevant to board policy and stakeholder engagement, but they do not automatically give shareholders a right to make day-to-day management decisions by ordinary resolution. The textbook also situates governance principles in regulatory context: a company's constitution and mandatory law, ASIC oversight, corporate reporting, and where relevant the ASX Corporate Governance Council's recommendations and Listing Rules. Listed companies may need to explain governance practices publicly. Students must check which recommendations apply to the company in question and distinguish recommendations operating on an ‘if not, why not’ basis from mandatory Act or Listing Rule obligations. Those sources perform different legal functions and should not be cited as though they are interchangeable. Begin by classifying the actor: director, officer, secretary, member or adviser The correct current statutory definitions are s 9AC (director) and s 9AD (officer) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Older textbook wording may quote definitions formerly contained in s 9; a final exam or practice answer should cite the provisions in their current location. Section 9AC captures a person validly appointed, an acting alternate director as the provision specifies, and persons who satisfy the statutory de facto or shadow categories despite defects in appointment or absence from the register. Section 9AD extends the concept of officer to specified directors and secretaries and to persons satisfying functional decision-making or financial-influence criteria, among other categories. Status depends on statutory elements and evidence, not merely on the label in an employment or consultancy contract. A de facto director performs functions characteristic of a director without effective formal appointment. The Full Federal Court in Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6 at [133]–[143] considered the substantial, director-like functions actually undertaken and how the company's real governance operated. A shadow 218 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW director, by contrast, is relevant where appointed directors are accustomed to following another person's instructions or wishes. In Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233 at [228]–[250], White J emphasised that extensive commercial influence or contractual leverage is not automatically the habitual board-level following contemplated by the statute. Compare the board's actual patterns of decisions, the identity of the source of instructions, causation and whether the professional/business-advice qualification applies. The Oomens article's examples help sharpen the difference. Neither title, personal wealth nor a consultant's self-description resolves the test. The designation officer is especially useful for clients who exercise financial or strategic influence from behind a formal governance chart. In ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4, the High Court emphasised the importance of the statutory functional test. A person may face officer duties through actual significant participation in business decisions or capacity to affect financial standing; whether the test is satisfied requires evidence about their role. For Leah in the BlueWave tutorial, the proper sequence is: test whether her resignation became effective; analyse de facto status from the functions she undertook; separately analyse shadow status from the directors' habituated compliance; and consider officer status even if the director tests are not met. Each status test has its own evidentiary focus. The company secretary: why this role is more than organising a meeting The textbook includes the company secretary among important company officers. Section 204A provides that a public company must have at least one secretary, with the required residency qualification; a proprietary company is not generally under the same requirement. Section 204B deals with secretary eligibility and consent; s 204D concerns appointment by directors as a replaceable rule, subject to the corporate circumstances. The statutory governance duties cannot be reduced to typing minutes. A competent secretary ensures notices, agendas, conflict disclosures, records, lodgements and governance timelines are recognised and communicated; the board still makes the decisions allocated to it. The course's Courtenay Zajicek and Kate Sherburn article on accepting the company-secretary role adds practical depth. When an in-house lawyer doubles as company secretary, distinguish legal advice given in professional capacity from 219 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW organisational governance administration. The same meeting may contain legally privileged advice and ordinary board information; confidential handling, instructions, records and legal professional privilege require role clarity. A secretary should also ask about insurance, any legally permissible indemnity, sufficient time and resources, constitution requirements, board and committee procedures, and whether reporting systems allow directors to act on timely information. Professional diligence is not satisfied by simply preparing an attractive board pack. How directors obtain management authority The starting governance provision is s 198A(1), under which the business is managed by or under the direction of directors where the replaceable rule applies. Section 198A(2) allows directors to exercise company powers except those the Act or constitution requires the company to exercise in general meeting. First decide whether the replaceable rule governs this particular company, then read the constitution and any mandatory applicable provisions. A member's economic interest in shares is not equivalent to an unlimited legal power to manage employees and operations. Section 198E supplies special powers for the same person acting as sole director and sole shareholder of a proprietary company and should not be ignored in those circumstances. This is why the ownership-management cases matter. Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 is foundational for the proposition that a shareholder majority does not itself displace management powers validly assigned to directors. NRMA v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517 and Stanham v National Trust of Australia (NSW) (1989) 15 ACLR 87 are useful in identifying whether proposed member resolutions are legally within the meeting's competence. Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 did not grant shareholders a free-standing right to put any advisory motion to a vote. These cases are not blanket assertions that shareholders have no power. Rather, they teach the lawyer to identify the exact source and limit of the proposed meeting power. A counterexample makes the distinction memorable: s 203D confers a statutory power on members of public companies to remove directors through the specified procedure. The shareholders may not normally order the supermarket manager to retain a specified number of staffed checkouts; they may, however, pursue the legally competent governance remedy of replacing directors, provided the statutory notice, 220 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW director response and meeting requirements are met. Both conclusions follow from the same method of allocating powers rather than from contradictory attitudes toward shareholder democracy. Delegation, committees, reliance and responsibility The textbook discusses managing directors, executive committees, audit and remuneration committees. Section 198C addresses appointment of managing directors and the relevant delegation powers, while s 198D allows directors to delegate powers to persons and committees within the statutory framework. Delegating a power to authorise a supplier payment does not simply delegate away a director's legal duties. Section 190 governs the responsibility of a director for the exercise of delegated powers, including the conditions for any relevant relief; s 189 concerns reliance on information or advice of others and requires attention to the statutory preconditions. Section 180 establishes the civil duty of care and diligence, and the business-judgment provision in s 180(2) has its own elements. A board should document the authority delegated, the matters reserved, the information it receives and the supervisory steps taken. Suppose Retrofit's director Julian delegates daily purchasing to Tom and bank negotiations to a committee. A supplier challenges an unauthorised guarantee while accounts show escalating liquidity pressure. The advice must separate (1) the authority Tom or the committee actually possessed, (2) whether the company became bound to an outsider under contract or statutory assumptions, (3) the directors' continuing standard of care and supervision, and (4) whether any particular statutory duty or defence is engaged. It would be wrong to conclude ‘delegation is permitted; therefore no director is liable’ or to conclude ‘any adverse outcome proves negligence’. The provisions ask different questions. 221 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW Conduct of board meetings: the legal value of process Directors exercise governance through valid board processes, rather than through unrecorded private conversations where the statute or constitution requires collective action. Sections 248A–248G contain relevant replaceable rules on circulating resolutions, calling meetings, technology, quorum and voting. Section 251A concerns minute books and the recording of resolutions and meetings. Precise requirements depend on the company's form, constitution and which rules apply. Students should ask whether a valid notice went to the relevant directors, whether the quorum existed when a decision was made, whether a conflicted director could participate, whether a majority of eligible votes supported the resolution, and whether the minutes fairly evidence what happened. A minute is not a transcript. It is an authoritative business record of the matters considered, decisions reached, significant dissent or interests disclosed, and responsibility for implementation. The connection to directors' duties is substantive: when ASIC or a court later asks whether the directors exercised independent judgment, obtained adequate information or monitored delegates, contemporaneous board papers and accurate minutes may be decisive evidence. The governance theory learned at the start of the chapter becomes observable corporate practice in the record of a meeting. Appointment, qualifications and director identification Section 201A sets minimum director numbers and relevant Australian residency requirements, distinguishing proprietary and public companies; a public company ordinarily needs at least three directors with at least two ordinarily resident in Australia. Section 201B includes baseline eligibility and disqualification requirements. Section 201E is particularly important for public companies: appointments of more than one director by a single resolution are subject to the provision's special requirements. Section 201G is the replaceable rule for member appointments. Section 201H addresses director appointments by other directors subject to the governing procedure and, in relevant cases, subsequent member confirmation. The constitution may regulate nomination or qualification requirements, but it cannot simply override mandatory legislation. 222 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW Modern director-identification requirements exist under the statutory director-ID regime, including s 1272C, subject to commencement and administrative rules. A director should not be told that receiving an internal appointment letter is alone enough. Appropriate consent, eligibility, identification requirements, ASIC notification and an actual board or member appointment process must be checked. The user-supplied 2023 textbook is valuable for conceptual teaching but cannot be assumed to reflect every 2026 administrative commencement, threshold or procedural change. The Retrofit scenario makes this issue concrete. If Julian wants Tom appointed because he knows the business, the solicitor should ask who is empowered to appoint, whether Tom consents, whether Tom is disqualified, which written resolutions and identity checks are needed, and whether the constitution imposes additional processes. If Andy has previously been associated with insolvencies or a fine, neither ‘insolvent company’ nor ‘fine’ alone establishes every element of disqualification. Examine ss 206B–206F and the precise judgment, offence or order and any applicable duration. If a director is absent overseas, consider the governing rules on alternate directors, quorum and valid technology-assisted meetings rather than treating temporary travel as automatically terminating office. Removal of directors: identify the company type before the section Under s 203C, a proprietary company ordinarily may remove a director by member resolution where that replaceable rule applies, subject to constitution and other applicable law. Section 203D(1) instead provides an express statutory member-removal procedure for public companies. Its subsections matter independently: s 203D(2) requires advance notice of intention subject to the statutory company-called meeting exception; s 203D(3) places an obligation on the company to provide the notice to the affected director; ss 203D(4)–(6) protect the director's opportunity to make a written statement and speak, including specified exceptions or limits; and the remaining statutory text requires further reading for the concrete facts. Section 203E restricts public-company directors from removing a fellow director by their own resolution or notice. This procedural fairness protects against abrupt board changes without depriving members of their substantive statutory power. 223 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW In the FreshFoods tutorial, if the AGM is on 18 November 2026, the ordinary two-month s 203D(2) deadline is 18 September 2026. That calendar date is different from a listed company's normal meeting notice under s 249HA. A separate analysis must establish when the company called the meeting, whether the statutory exception applies, whether the relevant notice reached the company, who was required to send it to the affected directors, and whether director representations were handled correctly. The removal of Priya, Marcus and Daniel and appointment of three replacements should be analysed as separate proposed resolutions, with s 201E considered for appointment resolutions. The 110 shareholders' possession of 220 shares is not, by itself, proof of any particular voting percentage; check total issued shares and any separate requisition rules before asserting they can compel a meeting. Resignation and late ASIC notification Section 203A provides a replaceable resignation rule, while s 203AA includes rules relevant to the effective date of a director's resignation and notification to ASIC. Section 203AB limits resignation or removal leaving a company without directors in the circumstances covered. A student must not reason that ‘Leah sent a resignation letter; therefore she is certainly not a director’ or that ‘ASIC still lists her; therefore every resignation was necessarily ineffective’. Obtain the letter, the date it reached the correct corporate address, the applicable constitution, the date ASIC was notified, records of attempts to notify and evidence relating to any statutory correction or application. Only then can the formal-status question be resolved. Even if Leah validly resigned, her subsequent conduct at BlueWave raises de facto, shadow and officer questions. The correct conclusion in the problem is qualified: major strategic and financial decisions made with board acquiescence are significant evidence of possible de facto or officer status; habitual board compliance with her actual instructions supports a separate shadow theory; professional restructuring advice and genuine independent board deliberation can weigh against that shadow inference. A lawyer must obtain board minutes, bank correspondence, the consultancy agreement, project decision records and evidence of who held ultimate authority before predicting the court's finding. Remedies and statutory consequences then depend on identifying a particular duty and breach, not merely describing a person as influential. 224 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW Remuneration, disclosures and board accountability The source chapter also addresses director remuneration and the role of committees. Section 202A provides a relevant replaceable rule concerning remuneration and its approval mechanism; public-company remuneration disclosure and voting have additional statutory rules, including aspects of the reporting and meeting regimes. A committee can investigate market comparisons and recommend pay structures, but its authority must come from the constitution, board terms of reference or an applicable rule. If directors set their own remuneration, conflicts and relevant statutory restrictions must be considered. The course's Australian Board Remuneration Survey is useful as empirical information about practice; it is not the source of a statutory entitlement to any particular fee. Good remuneration advice must also consider actual incentives. A short-term bonus for rapid automation might encourage management to disregard operational risks, while an entirely inflexible compensation scheme might struggle to recruit specialised executives. Directors must decide how remuneration supports lawful objectives, disclose what law requires and keep appropriate conflict and committee records. The proper legal answer states who has power to approve, any mandatory procedures, applicable disclosure and what risks the proposed incentive creates. It does not simply quote a market-average amount from a survey and call the question solved. Putting the entire chapter to work in legal advice The fresh governance reading improves all three original tutorial problems. In FreshFoods, the student must identify the management power first, distinguish advisory from operative resolutions, explain why ACCR v CBA and Stanham matter, then apply ss 203D and 201E to the separate route of changing directors. In Question 2, the student must explain Buzzle's requirements for habitual board-level action on instructions separately from Grimaldi's focus on functions undertaken as a director, including the possible alternative officer test. In Leah, the student must construct a factual timeline for resignation and then analyse the two statutory director limbs independently, with evidence and counterarguments before making a reasoned conclusion. The common method is to identify the actual corporate actor, ask where power comes from, locate the precise statutory subsection, explain the case's operative reasoning, 225 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW apply facts for and against every element, identify missing documents and evidence, and conclude with a realistic legal or governance next step. That is the bridge from the prescribed reading to professional advice—and the reason these materials belong within the chapter's teaching narrative, not merely in a reading-list appendix. Source alignment: Chapple et al, Company Law (3rd ed, 2023), Chapter 7, supplied pp 177–202; Bond Week 4 live forum and Week 5 live tutorial; lecturer-edited Buzzle and Grimaldi extracts; Oomens shadow/de facto directors article; company-secretary article; board remuneration survey. The corporate-law statements above are original synthesis, with current provisions distinguished from the 2023 textbook's historical references. Primary legislative research: Corporations Act 2001, Federal Register of Legislation. For statutory detail, use the provisions identified above and check the version operative on the material date. 226 | CORPORATE LAW

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ORIGINAL TUTORIAL 4 (TAUGHT IN WEEK 5) — QUESTIONS VERBATIM The tutorial’s substantive question text is reproduced from the supplied university Tutorial 4 (for Week 5) handout in the original order, including its reference to the officer definition in s 9AC. Editorial correction: since the current legislative reorganisation, “director” is in s 9AC and “officer” is in s 9AD. The original question has NOT been silently altered. Substantive High Distinction answers commence on a following page, not immediately after the questions. Question 1 FreshFoods Ltd ('FreshFoods') is an ASX-listed company that operates a large chain of supermarkets throughout Australia. FreshFoods has recently announced plans to introduce fully automated checkout and shelf-stocking technology across most of its stores. The board believes that the technology will substantially reduce operating costs and allow FreshFoods to compete more effectively with online retailers. A community organisation called Humans Behind the Counter ('HBC') campaigns against the widespread replacement of retail employees with automated technology. HBC argues that FreshFoods should commit to retaining a minimum level of human employment in every store. FreshFoods' annual general meeting is scheduled to take place on 18 November 2026. HBC persuades 110 of its members to become shareholders of FreshFoods. Each purchases two FreshFoods shares. HBC wants FreshFoods' shareholders to vote at the AGM on the following resolution: 'That FreshFoods Ltd must retain sufficient human employees so that at least 50% of all checkout lanes operating in each FreshFoods supermarket are staffed by human employees, and that the board must implement this policy throughout the company within six months.' [Proposal 1] The directors of FreshFoods oppose the proposal. They believe decisions about staffing levels, automation and the operation of individual supermarkets should be made by the board rather than by shareholders. They also believe HBC's policy would significantly increase the company's operating costs. After meeting with the board and learning that it will not voluntarily adopt the policy, HBC considers another strategy. It wants the shareholders to remove the existing CORPORATE LAW 227 | CORPORATE LAW

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directors, Priya, Marcus and Daniel, and replace them with three candidates supported by HBC, all of whom have promised to reconsider FreshFoods' automation strategy. [Proposal 2] Advise HBC on the following: 1. Assuming HBC complies with the relevant procedural requirements (which we will discuss next week, so do not consider them), would FreshFoods be required to put Proposal 1 to shareholders at the AGM? Why or why not? In answering this question: identify the underlying legal issue raised by HBC’s first resolution; consider whether there is any substantive problem with the proposed resolution; and use the relevant case law considered in the Week 4 materials to support your reasoning. Restrict your answer to material covered in the Week 4 Forum and readings. Do not consider doctrines that have not yet been covered in the course. 2. Could FreshFoods have a legal basis for refusing to put resolutions concerning HBC's Proposal 2 to the AGM? Why or why not? What specific resolutions would HBC need to propose if it wanted to: remove the existing directors; and appoint HBC's preferred candidates in their place? Again, restrict your analysis to concepts covered in the Week 4 Forum. 3. HBC decides to pursue Proposal 2. Focusing specifically on the rules governing the removal of directors of a public company, identify the steps that must be taken: by HBC/the relevant shareholders; and by FreshFoods. In your answer, calculate the relevant dates and deadlines on the assumption that the AGM will take place on 18 November 2026. Question 2 Consider the definitions of 'director' and 'officer' in s 9AC of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), together with the case law considered in the prescribed reading. Explain what is meant by: 1. a shadow director. Consider Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233 at [228]-[250]. CORPORATE LAW 228 | CORPORATE LAW

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2. a de facto director. Consider Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6 at [133]-[143]. Question 3 Leah was formally appointed as a director of BlueWave Marine Pty Ltd, a company established by several of her former university friends to manufacture electric recreational boats. After serving on the board for approximately a year, Leah decided that she no longer wished to be a director. She informed the company that she was resigning and believed that her resignation had taken effect. Because of an administrative error, however, the company's records relating to her position were not properly updated with ASIC. Several weeks later, BlueWave began experiencing serious financial difficulties. The company engaged Leah as a 'strategic restructuring consultant'. Her consulting agreement stated that she was not a director and that her role was limited to advising the board. In practice, however, Leah became deeply involved in BlueWave's affairs. Among other things, she: negotiated with BlueWave's bank concerning an extension of its loan facilities; negotiated payment arrangements with several major suppliers; represented BlueWave at meetings with potential investors; decided which of BlueWave's three boat models should cease production; and developed a plan under which one manufacturing facility would be closed. Formally, Leah presented her recommendations concerning product lines and the factory closure to BlueWave's board. The directors, however, habitually approved her recommendations without substantive discussion and then allowed Leah to oversee their implementation. The directors continued to make some decisions independently, particularly concerning ordinary day-to-day expenditure. Nevertheless, when significant questions concerning BlueWave's financial restructuring arose, they routinely sought Leah's views before acting. A dispute subsequently arises as to whether Leah was a director during the period in which she believed that she was acting only as a consultant. Advise Leah whether, despite her purported resignation and the terms of her consulting agreement, she may fall within the statutory definition of a director as: CORPORATE LAW 229 | CORPORATE LAW

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a de facto director; and/or a shadow director. In your answer, identify the factual matters that a court would regard as significant and apply the principles from the cases considered in this week's materials. CORPORATE LAW 230 | CORPORATE LAW

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HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWERS — APPLYING LAW TO FACTS QUESTION 1(1) — FRESHFOODS: MANDATORY CHECKOUT STAFFING RESOLUTION THE STUDENT'S FIRST TASK: CLASSIFY THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE CAMPAIGN. HBC is campaigning about employment and automation. The proposal may raise strong economic, ethical and social concerns. But the legal instrument it has chosen is a direction that FreshFoods must retain enough human employees to staff at least 50% of checkout lanes operating in each supermarket, and that the board implement the policy company- wide within six months. Each component matters. The 50% rule prescribes an operational result in every store; the six-month rule prescribes the timetable; the word “must” removes any suggestion that the board may make its own decision. A lawyer who describes this merely as a “shareholder discussion” has omitted the operative legal command. THE ISSUE STATED AS A LEGAL QUESTION. Assuming all meeting notice and requisition procedures have been satisfied—as the handout instructs—is the subject matter of Proposal 1 a decision that members in general meeting can make by the proposed resolution? If it is, FreshFoods may be required to follow the appropriate meeting procedure. If it is not, compliance with procedural thresholds cannot create a competence the members otherwise lack. That is why the question asks students to consider a substantive problem. The correct answer must not recite s 249N as though 110 signatories necessarily settle the outcome. WHY s 124 IS NOT THE FINAL ANSWER. FreshFoods as a separate legal person can generally enter contracts, buy technology and employ staff within the lawful scope of its capacity. Section 124 concerns capacity and corporate powers. It does not decide whether an ordinary member meeting may prescribe the staffing configuration. Section 124 is relevant as the background distinction between powers of the entity and powers of internal organs; the more direct rule is s 198A and the applicable constitution. Cite s 124 to prevent conceptual confusion, not as a false source of HBC's authority. WHY ss 134–135 AND THE CONSTITUTION COME NEXT. Company governance is determined through replaceable rules, the constitution or a combination permitted by the Act. Section 198A is a replaceable rule. A competent answer therefore states its management allocation and acknowledges the need to examine FreshFoods' actual constitution. If an applicable constitution expressly reserves a decision to members, that may affect the result. The problem does not provide such a rule, so a student should not CORPORATE LAW 231 | CORPORATE LAW

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invent one. Explain the assumption: “On the ordinary allocation, and absent a special constitutional reservation, the board exercises this management function.” That single qualification is the difference between legally careful advice and overconfident generalisation. WHY s 198A(1) MATTERS. It specifies that the business is to be managed by or under the direction of the directors. A decision about checkout technology and minimum staffing is part of managing FreshFoods' retail business: it affects wages, store costs, customer service, purchasing capital equipment and operational policy. Section 198A(2) confirms the directors can exercise powers not reserved by the Act or constitution to a members' meeting. The subsection distinction matters: (1) tells you who manages the business; (2) helps you work out the scope of the directors' powers against member-reserved powers. The tutorial is primarily a (1) management problem, but (2) supports the broader allocation. WHY AUTOMATIC SELF-CLEANSING IS USED. That authority supports a proposition about the effect of the corporate constitution: where management is allocated to directors, an ordinary general meeting resolution cannot simply take over that power. Compare the reason for the rule with FreshFoods' problem. If every campaign of small shareholders could compel a detailed staffing and technology decision by ordinary vote, the board's legal management authority would be displaced. That is a legal structural point, not an argument that automation is better for society or profits. The board is not guaranteed to be correct in business judgment; it is the organ normally authorised to make the decision. WHY NRMA v PARKER IS USED. Automatic Self-Cleansing explains the allocation; NRMA v Parker addresses whether a resolution outside the members' substantive power must nevertheless be processed through meeting-requisition procedures. The NRMA dispute concerned a proposed decision in an area controlled by its directors under governing rules. The court's treatment shows that a procedurally supported request does not oblige a corporation to convene or entertain an incompetent management resolution. Connect the case to the exact question, “Would FreshFoods be required to put Proposal 1 to shareholders?” rather than citing it vaguely as a statement that directors are important. WHY ACCR v CBA IS ESPECIALLY STRONG. ACCR also involved activism organised by a group of more than 100 members and proposed corporate motions concerning public-interest risks. The Full Federal Court rejected the argument that the meeting notice machinery itself authorised the relevant advisory management resolutions. The attempted motions did not become competent merely because they were framed as expressions of opinion, rather than binding directives. HBC's proposal is more directly prescriptive than CORPORATE LAW 232 | CORPORATE LAW

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ACCR's advisory proposals because it expressly says the board “must” implement its employment quota. Therefore the case strongly reinforces the substantive objection. Do not reverse ACCR's holding by saying that courts required companies to provide advisory votes; that would be a serious doctrinal error. STRONGEST ARGUMENT FOR HBC. The group could say it has a genuine stake, has acquired shares lawfully, is seeking a vote at a properly convened AGM, and is concerned about the company's community relationships, workforce and long-term reputational value. It might further argue that shareholder democracy should allow members to communicate strong preferences. These points show that the campaign is legitimate as advocacy. But they do not identify a statute or constitutional clause empowering an ordinary resolution to dictate managerial staffing levels. The strongest legal counterargument would be a particular provision of the company's constitution conferring the necessary member power; without it, sentiment and procedural compliance alone do not overcome s 198A. DO NOT MISSTATE THE COMPANY'S OPTIONS. A company can voluntarily consult members, obtain feedback or introduce an advisory proposal through a legally appropriate mechanism; that is not the same as HBC possessing an unrestricted right to require such a motion. HBC might also pursue a separate strategy of proposing valid constitutional change, but that would require analysis of s 136 and the proposed amendment's own validity; the tutorial specifically tells students not to speculate about doctrines outside Week 4. The simplest fully responsive answer stays with the motion actually drafted. CONCLUSION AND CLIENT ADVICE. FreshFoods has a strong legal basis to refuse to place Proposal 1 before members as a resolution capable of binding the board, because it is an operational management direction ordinarily outside the powers of a general meeting. A compelling answer explains the exact route: ss 134–135 identify internal governance arrangements; s 198A(1)–(2) allocates management to directors; Automatic Self-Cleansing, NRMA v Parker and ACCR v CBA explain why procedural requisition rights cannot confer substantive management power on members. Advise HBC that the current drafting is unlikely to achieve its objective and that any lawful alternative must be assessed on its own legal basis. No shareholding percentage or AGM outcome can be invented from 220 shares alone. CORPORATE LAW 233 | CORPORATE LAW

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POST-TUTORIAL EXPLANATION — WHY STANHAM IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT In the live Week 5 tutorial, the lecturer expressly agreed that Stanham is the most apt meeting-context analogy because the FreshFoods AGM is already scheduled. Start with the incompetence of the subject matter: Proposal 1 sets a staffing rule and commands implementation. Section 198A(1) deals with management; s 198A(2) addresses the exercise of other company powers. Read both subject to the actual constitution. Automatic Self- Cleansing explains why a member majority cannot substitute its view for the board on management matters. NRMA v Parker establishes that a meeting need not be convened solely to vote on incompetent business. Stanham shows that a valid AGM may proceed without an improper item. ACCR v CBA prevents the proposed item from becoming competent merely because it is recast as non-binding. These cases have distinct functions; do not cite them as interchangeable propositions. The tutor emphasised how to write an IRAC: issue = whether members may direct staffing and compel implementation; rule = management power in the Act/constitution interpreted by the four cases; application = 50% requirement for every supermarket plus a six-month instruction to the board; conclusion = absent an unusual member power in the constitution or specific statute, no obligation to put Proposal 1 to vote. The facts do not establish the contents of the company’s constitution, so state that qualification rather than claiming to have read it. The 110 members and 220 shares are deliberately not the answer to the substantive competence question; technical requisition issues are reserved by the question instructions. QUESTION 1(2) — FRESHFOODS: REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF DIRECTORS BEGIN AGAIN WITH THE WORDING AND THE NATURE OF THE LEGAL POWER. Proposal 2 differs from Proposal 1 in its legal object. HBC is no longer asking the general meeting to fix staffing ratios or impose a six-month operational implementation. It seeks to exercise the governance power to remove and appoint those who are entrusted with management. That difference matters because corporate law distributes responsibilities: the directors decide management questions, while members retain certain structural rights concerning who serves as directors. A board cannot defend itself by asserting that every resolution it dislikes is an intrusion into management. Identify the express statute before deciding which organ prevails. SECTION 203D(1) — THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. FreshFoods is an ASX-listed company, therefore a public company. The appropriate source is s 203D, not the proprietary- company replaceable rule in s 203C. Section 203D(1) authorises members of a public CORPORATE LAW 234 | CORPORATE LAW

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company to remove a director by resolution even if the constitution or relevant agreement otherwise says something inconsistent. The “despite” wording is crucial: the board cannot insist that its management powers under s 198A generally entitle it to override an express member removal power. The two provisions operate on different decisions. If a director has been appointed to represent holders of particular shares or debentures, the specific qualification in s 203D(1) must be considered; the handout does not provide those facts, so acknowledge the reservation and investigate. SECTION 203E — THE REVERSE LIMIT. For public companies, the statute restricts directors removing fellow directors by a board resolution. This helps students see the structural separation more clearly. Directors ordinarily manage operations, but do not have an automatic collective right to dismiss a fellow public-company director. The prescribed member resolution is the route for removal under s 203D. FreshFoods could not lawfully object merely that the incumbent board does not approve of HBC's replacements. The board may insist on statutory compliance, but not invent a substantive veto over an express member power. SEPARATE RESOLUTIONS TO REMOVE EACH DIRECTOR. HBC should propose properly identified resolutions concerning Priya, Marcus and Daniel individually, each accompanied by required special notices and director-specific procedural protections. A legal draft must clearly identify each director, the intended action and the meeting at which it is proposed. It should not misdescribe HBC as the entity that can itself remove the directors: HBC may organise members, but the operative vote belongs to the company's members in general meeting. The handout gives 110 members with a combined 220 shares, not majority control of the company. SECTION 201G — WHO CAN APPOINT. Members may appoint directors under the relevant replaceable rule where applicable, but the constitution must be inspected. The power to remove under s 203D does not, by itself, make every HBC nominee automatically eligible or appointed. The company must satisfy s 201A(2)'s public- company minimum and residence requirements; candidate eligibility under s 201B; signed consent under s 201D; and relevant constitutional and director-ID requirements. These details matter even where the examination focuses predominantly on the division of corporate powers. The lawyer should not promise the client a new board without verifying whether the named nominees can lawfully take office. SECTION 201E — A HIGH-LEVEL PUBLIC-COMPANY DRAFTING TRAP. Where s 201E applies, a single appointment resolution dealing with two or more directors is void unless the statutory precondition for voting on appointments together has been met, CORPORATE LAW 235 | CORPORATE LAW

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subject to the section's specified exceptions. That is why three separately named appointment motions are the safest ordinary method for HBC. The purpose of the safeguard is to ensure shareholders are not forced to approve or reject a slate when they might support one candidate and oppose another. This provision answers “how should we frame the appointment resolutions?” rather than “do shareholders have a power to remove directors?” It belongs next to s 201G, not in place of it. THE DRAFTING CAN BE EXPLAINED IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE. Motion A: members resolve to remove Priya from the office of director of FreshFoods Ltd. Motion B: remove Marcus. Motion C: remove Daniel. Motion D: appoint the fully identified first nominee, subject to a valid appointment mechanism and their acceptance. Motion E: appoint the second nominee. Motion F: appoint the third. In real drafting, counsel would consider sequencing and conditional operation so that the company does not inadvertently fall below its minimum statutory board. The facts do not state all the existing directors or nominees' eligibility; do not assume the three named incumbents are necessarily the complete board without confirmation. NO GUARANTEE OF AUTOMATION POLICY AFTER SUCCESSFUL REMOVAL. HBC's nominees may have promised to reconsider automation, but the members' appointment power does not transform the nominees into legally bound agents of HBC. Once appointed, directors must exercise their own corporate powers and comply with applicable director duties. A nominee may have a political or commercial mandate to reconsider a decision, but cannot be directed to breach statute or ignore independent judgment. This is an important lesson in advising clients: achieving control of governance offices is not the same as guaranteeing a particular future management outcome. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND CONDITIONS. FreshFoods may legitimately argue that HBC has missed special notice deadlines, the AGM does not have a competent appointment item on its agenda, proposed candidates lack valid consent, the member appointment rule has been altered by the constitution or a specific protected director- representative qualification applies. These are not mere excuses; they are genuine legal issues where the facts support them. Yet those arguments are different from saying shareholders lack substantive authority to remove public-company directors. The handout asks whether the board could have a legal basis for refusal, so the sophisticated answer distinguishes invalid procedure or appointment from an impermissible substantive veto. CONCLUSION. Proposal 2 invokes a member power that Proposal 1 lacked. Subject to strict statutory notice, protected-director qualifications, valid meeting procedures, properly framed individual removal and appointment motions, and candidate eligibility, CORPORATE LAW 236 | CORPORATE LAW

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members may remove the incumbents and elect replacements. A lawyer should advise HBC to plan the motions precisely, secure suitable nominees, assess its likely voting support, inspect the constitution, and treat s 203D and s 201E as independent but connected safeguards. The board's managerial discretion under s 198A does not itself defeat this governance route. POST-TUTORIAL EXPLANATION — SIX DISTINCT DECISIONS AND WHY EACH MATTERS The tutor explained Proposal 2 as two actions: remove Priya, Marcus and Daniel; then appoint three named substitutes. The substantive statutory routes differ: s 203D(1) authorises removal in a public company, whereas s 201G concerns member appointments under a replaceable rule. The public-company safeguard in s 201E means separate appointments are ordinarily needed unless the meeting first unanimously approves a joint appointment resolution. Therefore prepare six specifically identified resolutions rather than one vague motion “replace the board”. Examine eligibility, candidate consent, relevant constitutional terms, the s 201A public-company minimum and whether any incumbent represents particular security holders under the proviso to s 203D(1). An incumbent director’s commercial disagreement is not a power to veto a procedurally competent removal motion. The recommendation to “replace the board” is not the same as obtaining a binding commitment to implement HBC’s staffing policy. If elected, replacement directors must exercise their own corporate judgment and comply with their duties. HBC’s 110 supporters are not proof of sufficient voting power: 110 × 2 = 220 shares, but the total votes eligible at the AGM are unspecified, and a majority threshold cannot be computed. State the absence of the denominator and the need for lawful member notice, meeting and voting compliance rather than assuming success. QUESTION 1(3) — REMOVAL STEPS, NOTICE, RIGHTS AND EXACT DATES A PRACTICAL LAWYER'S TIMELINE BEGINS WITH THE ACTUAL MEETING DATE. The AGM is 18 November 2026. The statutory reference point for the ordinary special notice of intention to remove directors is s 203D(2), which generally requires notice at least two calendar months before the meeting. Counting backwards produces 18 September 2026. It is crucial that the notice must reach the company within the required time; drafting the document by that date or discussing it with a campaign group is not the same as effective receipt. The record should show the intended resolution, the person or persons giving notice, the manner of delivery and evidence the company received it. CORPORATE LAW 237 | CORPORATE LAW

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THE NECESSARY EXCEPTION. The words following the ordinary two-month requirement address an instance in which the company calls a meeting after receiving the notice. In that situation the removal resolution may be passed at that meeting despite less than two months having elapsed. This is an exception students must explain, not simply overlook after performing the date calculation. The problem says an AGM is “scheduled” but does not tell us when the company legally called it or on what date any HBC notice was received. A solicitor must therefore obtain the formal AGM calling resolution, the notice of meeting and the relevant receipt chronology. Without those facts, it is not sound advice to assert that a notice first given now absolutely cannot be voted on at the AGM, or that the exception necessarily applies. HBC'S FIRST ACTION. It must procure notice of intention to move the particular director- removal resolutions. There are three proposed directors to be removed, so each affected person and proposal should be unambiguous. HBC itself is described as a community organisation, and its 110 members are the shareholders; ensure the notice is given through persons lawfully entitled to give it rather than assuming the campaign organisation has corporate membership merely because it organised the purchases. As the handout focuses on s 203D, detailed member meeting-requisition thresholds should be kept distinct from the removal-specific procedural obligations. FRESHFOODS' FIRST RESPONSIBILITY. Under s 203D(3), once the removal notice is received, the company must give each affected director a copy as soon as practicable. The purpose is obvious: shareholders are being asked to dismiss a person holding corporate office, and that person must be given an opportunity to learn of the grounds or proposal and to answer it. There is no need for students to invent grounds or establish misconduct: s 203D removal by members is not generally predicated on proving a breach. The legal task is to respect the statutory process, not to conduct a disciplinary trial without facts. THE DIRECTOR'S RESPONSE. Section 203D(4) deals with the director's statement and opportunity to speak to the motion. The following subsections prescribe how the statement is communicated, including circulation with meeting notices where appropriate or, in the relevant circumstances, making the statement available or reading it at the meeting, subject to statutory limits. Why is this relevant? Because a fair and informed shareholder vote requires that members can hear the director's response before deciding. The right to respond is not a right to prevent a lawful removal vote. A strong tutorial answer assigns each step to the proper actor: HBC/members initiate; the company promptly notifies the director; the director may respond; the company facilitates the statutory communication; then members vote at a properly convened meeting. CORPORATE LAW 238 | CORPORATE LAW

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THE LISTED-COMPANY NOTICE TIMETABLE. Section 249HA ordinarily requires at least 28 days' notice for a listed-company general meeting. Counting 28 days back from 18 November produces 21 October 2026. The distinct 21-day public-company floor in s 249H(3) would give 28 October 2026, but it is not the controlling ordinary floor where the longer listed-company requirement applies. Make the arithmetic explicit: two calendar months is not always 60 days; 28 days is exactly four weeks; both are calculated from the identified meeting date, but for different types of notice. The statute's rules on sending and receiving documents must be considered where exact service dates are disputed. THE DATE CALCULATIONS ARE NOT A VOTE FORECAST. HBC's 110 members × two shares each = 220 shares. It cannot obtain “220 votes out of 220” simply because that is its collective shareholding. The total votes capable of being cast, any different share classes, proxies, voting exclusions and actual turnout remain unknown. In an ordinary resolution, the usual issue is whether more than half of the votes validly cast in the relevant count favour it, subject to the Act and constitution. HBC must therefore canvass wider support. A client should be told candidly that a legally valid proposal can still fail because members do not support it. WHAT ABOUT s 203D(7)? Students often overlook the replacement retirement rule. If a replacement director takes office following removal, the Act has specific provisions for treating that director's retirement timing in relation to the predecessor's last appointment. The object is to prevent an ordinary change of personnel from distorting relevant turnover arrangements. This is not the main obstacle to the AGM vote, but it is part of teaching the complete provision. Section 203D(8) then identifies strict liability for the specified offences under particular subsections; do not describe every possible procedural defect or statutory subsection as automatically carrying strict criminal liability. WHAT IF THERE IS NON-COMPLIANCE? A lawyer distinguishes three possible problems. A resolution beyond the members' substantive powers is incompetent even if its notice is impeccable. A resolution within member competence may nonetheless be procedurally defective, and the effect of that defect depends on the particular statutory requirement and applicable rules concerning irregularities. A resolution may be validly proposed and passed yet fail to achieve HBC's preferred commercial outcome because newly appointed directors act independently. Each situation has its own possible advice, and none should be conflated with an automatic claim for damages. PROFESSIONAL CONCLUSION. For the 18 November AGM, the ordinary s 203D(2) deadline was 18 September; the ordinary listed-company meeting notice date under s 249HA is 21 October. FreshFoods must promptly send each affected director the special CORPORATE LAW 239 | CORPORATE LAW

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notice and afford the statutory response opportunities. The company-called meeting exception requires investigation of the legal calling date. The affected candidates' appointment and nomination requirements must be verified. Advise HBC to obtain the AGM timetable and constitution immediately, draft separate named motions, preserve evidence of service and calculate real voting support. This gives the client an actionable route instead of a false assurance of legal success. POST-TUTORIAL EXPLANATION — ALLOCATE NOTICE DUTIES TO THE CORRECT PERSON The lecturer repeatedly insisted that students track WHO GIVES notice and WHO RECEIVES it. Under s 203D(2), HBC or the participating members give the company notice of intention to move each removal resolution at least two months before the meeting; using 18 November 2026, the ordinary class deadline is 18 September 2026. Under s 203D(3), FreshFoods then gives each targeted director a copy as soon as practicable. Under s 203D(4), each director may send the company a written statement for members and speak at the meeting, even if not a shareholder. Under s 203D(5), the company must circulate the written statement with notices if time permits, otherwise distribute and read it out before the vote. Under s 203D(6), a statement over 1,000 words or defamatory need not be circulated. The teacher mentioned both word count and defamation because the company could be a publisher of the circulated material; neither is an invented limitation. The statute also addresses representative directors, retirement timing and strict-liability contraventions in s 203D(1), (7) and (8). Distinguish that two-month period from the listed-company meeting-notice requirement under s 249HA. The exceptions matter: s 203D(2) allows a company-called meeting to pass the removal motion with a shorter interval where it was called after receiving the notice. The facts do not provide the precise calling date, so do not assume the exception automatically operates. The lecturer accepted 18 September as the tutorial calculation but warned that a solicitor handling the real transaction would check the Acts Interpretation Act and the actual receipt date; a missed date can invalidate the proposed course. QUESTION 2(1) — SHADOW DIRECTOR: s 9AC(1)(b)(ii) AND BUZZLE BEGIN WITH THE STATUTORY WORDS. The tutorial directs you to consider the definition of “director” and “officer” and to use Buzzle at [228]–[250]. The operative shadow-director definition is s 9AC(1)(b)(ii). The claimant must identify a person, even though not validly appointed as a director, on whose instructions or wishes the company's directors are accustomed to act. The provision also contains an exclusion CORPORATE LAW 240 | CORPORATE LAW

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addressing advice properly given in a professional capacity or business relationship. Saying “an outsider with influence” is too vague. The precise question is about the behaviour of the appointed board in response to instructions or wishes and whether that behaviour has become habitual. EXAMINE THE COMPONENTS SEPARATELY. First, identify the appointed directors or relevant governing majority whose behaviour is being examined. Second, identify the alleged instruction or wish, not merely a general economic influence. Third, identify the specific subsequent board decisions said to have been made in accordance with the person's position. Fourth, show that following was customary or established rather than episodic. Fifth, consider whether the board made its own judgment in an ordinary advisory or commercial relationship. The quality of the evidence matters. Board votes, records of contrary decisions, communications insisting on particular resolutions and testimonies about real autonomy are more useful than vague descriptions such as “she was influential.” THE FACTS OF BUZZLE. Buzzle arose from consolidation of Apple-product resellers and commercial dealings in which Apple occupied a powerful role as supplier and financier or commercial counterparty. After business failure, Apple faced allegations seeking to characterise it as a shadow director and related responsible party. The claim was not a simple personal adviser situation: it concerned a strong contractual and commercial relationship in which Apple had important influence over what Buzzle could realistically do. The court considered whether this commercial power had actually become control of the directors in the statutory sense. THE JUDICIAL CONCLUSION. White J did not find that Apple was a shadow director. The evidence failed to establish that Buzzle's directors, or the relevant governing majority, were accustomed to act in accordance with Apple's governance instructions or wishes. Strong bargaining power and hard contractual requirements do not by themselves establish that the board acts at the counterparty's direction. An independent board may accept tough conditions because refusing would be commercially disastrous; choosing an unattractive option can still be the board's own judgment. That distinction is the heart of the case. THE POLICY REASON. Modern corporations depend on advice, financing, underwriting, trade credit and strategic expertise. If every major counterparty became a shadow director merely because its views matter, legitimate commercial relationships would be transformed into corporate governance appointments without the statutory proof. Conversely, the business-relationship label cannot shelter someone who actually turns the CORPORATE LAW 241 | CORPORATE LAW

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appointed directors into a compliant instrument of the outsider's decisions. The legal test is functional and evidentiary, not a blanket immunity for advisers or banks. APPLY TO A NEW EXAMPLE. Suppose a food retailer signs an exclusive supply arrangement requiring 30 days' inventory reporting. It chooses to comply because it needs its supplier; that fact alone is not shadow control. Suppose instead the supplier regularly dictates the exact board resolutions on pricing, staffing and capital expenditure and the directors habitually sign them without discussion; that could support a different result. Ask whether the decision was independent implementation of a commercial bargain or habitual obedience to another's instructions on matters for the board. The distinction is what Buzzle teaches. STATUTORY CONNECTION AND CONCLUSION. Cite s 9AC(1)(b)(ii) for the status rule, Buzzle [228]–[250] for its interpretation and factual limits, and s 9AD(1)(b)(iii) only where discussing separate officer status rather than casually mislocating the director definition. A shadow director need not be publicly known or formally appointed, but habitual board compliance must be established. The consequences of classification are exposure to relevant statutory duties—not automatic proof of breach, dishonesty or insolvency. POST-TUTORIAL EXPLANATION — WHITE J’S ACTUAL ELEMENTS, NOT THE “PUPPET MASTER” SHORTCUT The Week 5 discussion described a shadow director as the effective controller whose wishes a board habitually follows. That is an introductory illustration only. The edited Buzzle case supplies the exact proof requirements: the relevant instructions or wishes; conduct by directors in their capacity as directors, or at least a governing majority; habitual compliance over time; an adequate causal connection; and evaluation of the professional/business-advice qualification. White J expressly warns at [240] that metaphor may obscure the test. At [231], the Court declined to limit shadow-director status to natural persons merely because formal appointment under s 201B requires an individual. At [236], the Court accepted conceptual overlap between de facto and shadow status. At [247]–[250], it refined causation, board majority, habitual practice and the advice qualification. Apply the test fact by fact to Apple. Apple imposed commercially protective terms on a distressed reseller. Although Buzzle depended on Apple’s products, the board chose whether to accept those trading conditions because the reseller’s business needed continuity. Commercial dependence and hard bargaining were not evidence that Apple CORPORATE LAW 242 | CORPORATE LAW

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had usurped effective company-wide management. In *Leah*, by contrast, a pattern of directors routinely accepting restructuring decisions without independent consideration may support a stronger inference of substituted judgment. Yet the lawyer must prove more than simple agreement: obtain evidence of board-level instructions, decision chronology, considered alternatives and independent financial advice. QUESTION 2(2) — DE FACTO DIRECTOR: s 9AC(1)(b)(i) AND GRIMALDI THE PRECISE STATUTORY ENTRY POINT. Section 9AC(1)(b)(i) concerns a person who is not validly appointed but “acts in the position of a director.” This definition does not simply ask whether the company ignored a form or failed to notify ASIC; it asks what position the person actually occupied in substance. The key words are “acts in the position.” Students must assess real functions, the company-specific context, actual decision-making authority and the way the formal directors and officers treated the person. An inability to produce a board appointment resolution may make the definition relevant; it does not itself prove or disprove de facto status. WHY GRIMALDI IS THE ASSIGNED CASE. Chameleon Mining was involved in substantial corporate transactions in which Grimaldi performed extensive functions without a formal board appointment. The Full Federal Court examined whether those functions, in the company context, amounted to him acting as director. The tutorial asks for [133]–[143] because that discussion and the conclusion give a way to analyse real governance functions instead of relying on superficial labels. In particular, at [141] the Court examined the significance, breadth and independence of the functions undertaken. The case is not a formula that says “any important consultant becomes a director.” THE TWO-LEVEL REASONING. At the first level, identify tasks and their consequences. Grimaldi's involvement in capital raising, significant transactions, professional advice instructions and corporate negotiation went beyond routine support in the specific circumstances. At the second level, ask how the business actually worked: did he act with substantial independence; did appointed directors permit him to exercise significant authority; was he treated as one of those directing the corporate enterprise? This second step is essential because many executive employees and lawyers also perform tasks that are important. Their performance of delegated work does not automatically convert them into directors. THE CORRECT COMPARATOR IS THE COMPANY IN QUESTION. A large listed company may have a senior executive who regularly negotiates very large contracts without occupying a director's position because the board retains strategic authority and CORPORATE LAW 243 | CORPORATE LAW

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controls the mandate. A small distressed company may hand an adviser effective control over virtually all strategic business questions. The same type of negotiation might therefore have different implications in context. This is why “high value” is evidence but not the legal test. Grimaldi favours a real-world evaluation over an inflexible list of supposedly exclusive director tasks. COMPARE THE TWO DIRECTOR DEFINITIONS. A de facto director acts in the director position; a shadow director causes the appointed directors habitually to act on their instructions or wishes. Evidence of board rubber-stamping may be relevant to both inquiries, but not in exactly the same way. For de facto status it may show the person exercised functions of the governing organ. For shadow status it may show the board habitually responded to their directions. A candidate can satisfy one definition, both, or neither. Do not confuse this issue with officer status under s 9AD: a person may be an officer without being a director. APPLY TO A LAWYER'S CLIENT FILE. The de facto inquiry requires appointment records, titles, contracts, signature authority, board minutes, correspondence to third parties, details of who made decisions about finance, operations and major assets, and evidence of whether decisions were merely recommended or already made. If the board is genuinely independently supervising a restructuring adviser, that may defeat the inference. If the adviser makes company-wide strategic decisions, holds themselves out as leading the company and implements those decisions with the board's passive acquiescence, the case for de facto status strengthens. CONCLUSION. Grimaldi teaches that the relevant statutory word “director” is not exhausted by the appointment register. The factual inquiry is whether the person's actual duties, authority and conduct amount to acting in the director's position in the particular company. Cite s 9AC(1)(b)(i) as operative law, Grimaldi [133]–[143] as the controlling factual and legal discussion, and Drysdale as the historical foundation. The resulting classification opens consideration of relevant obligations, but breach and remedies must still be proved separately. POST-TUTORIAL EXPLANATION — READ GRIMALDI WITH OOMENS’ AUSTIN EXAMPLE The tutor highlighted significant management functions and the viewpoint of outsiders dealing with the company, while the judicial test remains broader and context-dependent. *Grimaldi* [133] makes clear that a formally functioning board does not rule out de facto directorship; [141] concerns functions properly expected of a director in that company and sufficiently significant to justify director status; [142] recognises that both board-requested CORPORATE LAW 244 | CORPORATE LAW

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and self-initiated acts can count; [143] explains the potentially independent route through officer status. Oomens’ account of *Austin* shows why someone who believes they resigned may nevertheless assume substantial financial and management functions thereafter. *Mistmorn* supplies a contrast between specific consultant work and running the general affairs of a company. Do not make “outsiders thought the person was a director” an indispensable legal element: holding out is evidence, not the exclusive test. Ask who negotiated with creditors, who approved strategic transactions, whose approval the board sought, whether that person could determine the company’s direction and how the arrangements operated in practice. The original *Grimaldi* case dealt with the old s 9 definition; the operative 2026 statutory references are s 9AC for directors and s 9AD for officers. QUESTION 3 — LEAH: FULL FACTUAL ANALYSIS AND PROFESSIONAL ADVICE ISSUE SPOTTING — START WITH THE TIMELINE. A quick answer might say “Leah is a shadow director because the board rubber-stamped her,” or “she is a de facto director because she closed the factory.” Both may be arguable, but neither is an adequate first step. Leah was originally formally appointed to the board. She informed the company that she was resigning. There was an ASIC record problem. Weeks later she entered a consulting agreement and undertook extensive restructuring activity. Therefore the legal status question involves at least two periods: the end of her formal appointment and the later consultancy. The lawyer must determine the legal date on which her appointment ceased before considering whether she occupied a director role without formal appointment. FORMAL APPOINTMENT AND RESIGNATION LAW. Leah's original appointment is capable of placing her within s 9AC(1)(a)(i). Section 203A is a replaceable rule on written resignation and requires attention to the relevant company documentation. Section 203AA concerns the effective date of a director's resignation and the ASIC notification process. The facts do not provide the resignation letter, the date of notice, the ASIC lodgment date, the constitution or the identity of the remaining directors. Section 203AB also requires consideration if the departure would leave the company without any directors, although the scenario refers to several directors who continued making decisions. Accordingly, do not infer either that a mere oral statement automatically ended her office or that a record error conclusively kept her in office forever. These facts must be proved. WHAT A LAWYER MUST ASK ABOUT THE REGISTRY. Exactly when did Leah give notice and to whom? Was it written, signed or otherwise compliant with the governing CORPORATE LAW 245 | CORPORATE LAW

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process? Who had responsibility for lodging the company notification? Did ASIC actually receive a notification and, if so, when? Was an effective-date rectification sought under the statutory procedure? How many other directors were in office at the relevant time? Request the company constitution, registers, director consents, the resignation notice, ASIC correspondence and any relevant application for correction. Only after reviewing those materials can counsel fix the boundary between formal and potentially de facto status. DE FACTO ISSUE AND RULE. Assume for analysis that Leah's formal appointment effectively ended before the restructuring. Under s 9AC(1)(b)(i) the question is whether she nevertheless acted in the position of director. In Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6, particularly [133]–[143], the Full Federal Court evaluated the practical nature and importance of a person's corporate functions. The inquiry is company-specific and not confined to whether the person attended formal board meetings or had the word “director” on business cards. In Drysdale the High Court recognised that functions undertaken without formal office can attract relevant director accountability. The consultant label is evidentiary but not determinative. DE FACTO APPLICATION — BANK AND FINANCE. Leah negotiated with BlueWave's bank about extending loan facilities when the company was experiencing serious financial difficulty. This could be executive or consultant work; corporate lenders frequently speak to advisers and authorised negotiators. Yet in BlueWave's situation, financial survival may be central to its commercial future. Ask whether Leah merely reported financing options for the board's decision or actually agreed terms or made commitments that the board accepted automatically. Her authority to negotiate is evidence of importance; her power to decide or effectively commit the company would be more persuasive evidence of director- like governance. The bank's records and the board's approval chronology are crucial. DE FACTO APPLICATION — SUPPLIERS AND INVESTORS. Leah also negotiated payment arrangements with major suppliers and represented BlueWave at investor meetings. Again, lawyers should not assert that either task necessarily belongs exclusively to directors. A CFO, adviser, chief executive or lawyer might perform these functions. But combined with her leading position in a financially distressed company, they contribute to the picture of a person who may have assumed an unusually broad and authoritative role. Examine whom investors understood to be the decision-maker, whether Leah represented herself as acting subject to instructions and who settled or approved the essential financial terms. CORPORATE LAW 246 | CORPORATE LAW

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DE FACTO APPLICATION — PRODUCT LINE. The hypothetical states that Leah “decided which of BlueWave's three boat models should cease production.” The word “decided” is materially stronger than “recommended.” Choosing to eliminate a product line changes the company's business model, revenue potential, stock and employment commitments. It is a strategic decision likely to affect a substantial part of a small manufacturing company. Ask who authorised the decision, whether it had already been implemented and whether the directors genuinely considered alternatives. If Leah made the strategic determination and the board simply accepted it, that strongly supports the inference that she acted in the position of director rather than only supplying analysis. DE FACTO APPLICATION — FACTORY CLOSURE. Leah developed a plan to shut one manufacturing facility and oversaw implementation. Preparing a detailed restructuring plan may be normal consultant work, but directing the decision and implementation of a factory closure could indicate very significant corporate authority. The factual distinction is between formulating options and controlling the decision. The words “developed a plan” alone are not conclusive; the associated facts that the board habitually approved proposals without substantive discussion and left implementation to Leah strengthen the inference of director-like governance. A full answer must give both sides of that comparison. DE FACTO APPLICATION — BOARD RELATIONSHIP. The directors continued to decide some ordinary day-to-day expenditure independently. That matters: it shows they had not surrendered every part of business management to Leah. But it is not decisive if the major strategic areas—the ones most central to corporate survival—were effectively directed by Leah. Under Grimaldi the court evaluates the real content, significance and authority of her activities, not just the numerical proportion of every company decision she took. The board's dependence on her in crises and its pattern of passive assent may be more significant than independent choice of relatively routine expenses. THE STRONGEST DE FACTO COUNTERARGUMENT. Leah's consulting agreement expressly denies director status and states that she gives advice. The directors received her recommendations, and formally approved them. Many organisations lawfully rely on specialist restructuring advice. Section 198D recognises directors' ability to delegate appropriate powers, and those entrusted with important tasks do not necessarily occupy the board position. The counterargument becomes stronger if independent minutes show that the directors questioned Leah, obtained different advice, rejected some significant proposals or set her authority limits. The legal answer should acknowledge these CORPORATE LAW 247 | CORPORATE LAW

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possibilities and then explain why the given facts—particularly the explicit strategic product decision and habitual rubber-stamping—may support the opposite conclusion. DE FACTO CONCLUSION. On the stated facts there is a substantial risk that Leah could be characterised as a de facto director during the consultancy period if her formal appointment had actually ceased. Her strategic role was wide-ranging and apparently exercised with board acquiescence. The evidentiary question is whether she assumed director functions, not whether her consulting agreement used an exclusionary label. It would be defensible to conclude the risk is strong, but inappropriate to claim a court must necessarily find de facto status without testing the actual powers and board decisions. SHADOW ISSUE AND RULE — START FRESH. For shadow directorship apply s 9AC(1) (b)(ii), not merely the de facto discussion again. Ask whether BlueWave's formally appointed directors were accustomed to act in accordance with Leah's instructions or wishes. In Buzzle [228]–[250], commercial influence was not enough because the necessary established pattern of director-level compliance was not proved. The provision has a professional/business advice qualification, important because BlueWave engaged Leah precisely as a restructuring consultant. The test focuses on how the board behaved because of her communications, not on whether she personally signed a contract for BlueWave. SHADOW APPLICATION — HABITUAL COMPLIANCE. The hypothetical uses highly significant language: the directors “habitually approved” Leah's recommendations “without substantive discussion” and routinely sought her views before deciding significant restructuring questions. These facts support a pattern of accustomed following in matters of substantial business importance. The company did not merely consult Leah once. If the decisions made by the board tracked her preferred outcomes because the directors treated her wishes as commands, the statutory condition may be met. Examine the number, importance, repetition and causal pattern of those instances rather than relying on the word “habitually” in isolation. SHADOW APPLICATION — BUSINESS ADVICE QUALIFICATION. Leah can argue the directors sought her views because they hired her to supply restructuring expertise, not because they accepted her as a hidden governing authority. Her recommendations were formally submitted to the board, and the directors continued deciding ordinary expenses. Buzzle indicates the danger of treating commercially influential advice as shadow control. But it is not a categorical shield for a consultant: if the arrangement in substance involved habitual obedience to her instructions on the board's core strategic functions, the label “adviser” may not reflect what occurred. The issue is whether the advice was properly CORPORATE LAW 248 | CORPORATE LAW

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given within the relationship and the board exercised its own judgment, or whether board control had shifted. THE DIFFERENCE FROM BUZZLE. Apple was largely a powerful commercial counterparty protecting its own position in trading and financial arrangements, and the court did not establish Buzzle's customary compliance with Apple's governance instructions. Leah, by contrast, sat inside the company's restructuring process and was repeatedly involved in guiding company-wide decisions. That could make a shadow allegation stronger. But a difference in closeness does not automatically decide the law. There still must be evidence of instructions or wishes and the board's accustomed response. A board can reasonably accept professional advice many times; the issue is whether acceptance remained independent. WHY INDEPENDENT ORDINARY EXPENDITURE DOES NOT SETTLE SHADOW STATUS. The problem expressly says the directors acted independently in some day-to- day expenditure decisions. That is material evidence of retained judgment and must be addressed. But shadow status need not necessarily involve controlling every petty decision or every aspect of the company's business. Repeated submission on significant restructuring matters may be more telling than control over daily stationery purchases. Conversely, if the directors genuinely evaluated major restructuring proposals despite reaching the same conclusion, their routine acceptance might still be advice rather than obedience. The weight of the evidence must be explained in the application. SHADOW CONCLUSION. The case is plausible but genuinely contestable. It would be stronger with minutes showing that the board repeatedly followed Leah's explicit directions and did so without independent assessment. It would be weaker with documents showing the board made autonomous strategic decisions after reasoned evaluation. A precise conclusion therefore states that Leah may be a shadow director but the outcome requires proof of an established pattern and careful consideration of the professional/business advice qualification. This should be a separate conclusion from the stronger de facto risk. ALTERNATIVE OFFICER STATUS. Section 9AD(1)(b)(i) captures participation in decisions affecting the whole or a substantial part of BlueWave's business. The factory- closure and product-line decisions plainly raise that issue. Section 9AD(1)(b)(ii) concerns capacity significantly to affect financial standing: bank negotiations and survival restructuring may be relevant. ASIC v King supports a functional rather than purely titular approach. However, the question expressly asks for de facto and shadow director status, so this analysis should follow—not replace—the two principal answers. The CORPORATE LAW 249 | CORPORATE LAW

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litigation may plead alternative statuses, but each has to be supported by its own statutory elements. CONSEQUENCES, LIABILITY AND REMEDIES — DO NOT OVERCLAIM. Leah could owe director/officer duties if her status is established. That is not a conclusion that she breached ss 180–184 or insolvent-trading provisions. The handout says BlueWave is in financial difficulty; it does not establish statutory insolvency, the date a particular debt was incurred, a breach of care, misuse of position or information, losses causally linked to conduct, or the ingredients of a criminal offence. If any later claim arises, examine each element separately and the actual statutory and equitable remedies then available. Potential regulatory consequences may include civil penalty proceedings or compensation in a properly proved case, but no specific penalty, damages or disqualification order should be stated without the applicable claim and supporting facts. FINAL WRITTEN ADVICE TO LEAH. First, obtain the original resignation document and ASIC records to determine whether formal director status continued into the relevant period. Second, review the company's constitution, delegations, board minutes and bank/supplier/investor dealings to establish who genuinely exercised governing authority. Third, advise that her significant strategic decision-making creates a real de facto-director risk under s 9AC(1)(b)(i) and Grimaldi; the board's repeated compliance creates a possible shadow-director risk under s 9AC(1)(b)(ii) and Buzzle, subject to the professional advice qualification. Fourth, investigate officer status separately under s 9AD. Fifth, avoid admitting any statutory breach until duty, conduct, causation and loss are analysed. This is the balanced advice of a careful corporate lawyer rather than a blanket assertion of guilt or immunity. POST-TUTORIAL EXPLANATION — LEAH REQUIRES TWO SEPARATE IRAC ANALYSES The lecturer directly instructed students not to merge the de facto and shadow tests. Analyse Leah first as a potentially continuing formal director under ss 203A, 203AA and 203AB because the resignation date and ASIC notification are uncertain. Then write an independent de facto IRAC under s 9AC(1)(b)(i), using *Grimaldi* [133]–[143] and Oomens’ accounts of *Austin* and *Mistmorn*. Finally write a separate shadow IRAC under s 9AC(1)(b)(ii), using *Buzzle* [240]–[250], *Antico* and the *Ho v Akai* illustration. Add a separately labelled officer-status observation under s 9AD, not as a substitute for the requested two director analyses. For de facto status, the strongest evidence is Leah’s choice of discontinued product model, manufacturing-facility closure plan, creditor refinancing and investor-facing role: these go CORPORATE LAW 250 | CORPORATE LAW

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to the company’s survival and overall business strategy. The counterargument is that a specialist consultant can undertake demanding work within a lawful board mandate. For shadow status, the strongest evidence is habitual board approval of significant recommendations without substantive discussion; that suggests decisions may actually have been taken by Leah. The counterargument is that the board independently controlled day-to-day expenditure and may have accepted sound restructuring advice after a genuine evaluation. The inquiries are not mutually exclusive: *Buzzle* [236] explains a person may satisfy both categories in different respects. To advise the client, request the resignation letter, its delivery and ASIC filing dates, the current constitution, board and committee minutes, restructuring engagement contract, bank and supplier correspondence, investor presentations, decision papers, evidence of alternatives considered and the identities of those who actually exercised final authority. The outcome is fact-dependent, not established by the word “consultant” or by a missing ASIC update alone. Only after status is established should a lawyer investigate distinct contraventions—such as ss 180–183 or s 588G—through their own elements and available civil or regulatory consequences. Do not assert damages, disqualification or insolvency liability without proof of a duty, breach, causation and the specific remedial requirements. FURTHER LEGAL REASONING, REMEDIES AND MODEL-ANSWER CHECKS WHY s 203D DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY PRODUCE DAMAGES The remedy sought in Question 1 is primarily a lawful corporate governance decision: properly proposing and voting on removal and replacement resolutions. If the directors withhold a validly requisitioned item, members may need to consider the correct procedural relief under the Corporations Act, depending on the precise default and standing. That is distinct from proving a civil penalty contravention or personal damages. The question contains no proved economic loss to HBC caused by a director’s breach, and it would be a mistake to promise damages. If notice is late, the appropriate response may instead be to use a later lawful meeting, examine the company-called meeting exception in s 203D(2), or obtain advice on statutory meeting procedures. A practising lawyer recommends only steps supported by the facts and statutory cause of action. WHY s 203AA IS A SEPARATE ISSUE IN LEAH’S CASE An ASIC administrative omission is not automatically equivalent to continued appointment or effective resignation. The statutory timing mechanism is in s 203AA and must be applied to the actual resignation notice, notification date, and any rectification CORPORATE LAW 251 | CORPORATE LAW

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process. Section 203A supplies a replaceable-rule resignation method, while s 203AB prevents some departures that would leave no remaining directors. The problem lacks the dates needed to conclude which effect occurred. Explain these provisions first, then undertake the alternative de facto and shadow tests under s 9AC. This avoids the logically impossible conclusion that a person must be an unappointed director at precisely the same time as their formal appointment has conclusively continued. PROPER USE OF STATUTORY PINPOINTS In Question 1, use s 198A(1) for the rule that directors manage the business, s 198A(2) for their ability to exercise powers not reserved elsewhere, s 203D(1) for the contrasting removal power, s 203D(2) for the two-month notice and exception, s 203D(3) for the company’s prompt notification of the director, s 203D(4)–(6) for the director’s response and its treatment, s 201E for individual appointment voting and s 249HA for the 28-day listed-company notice. In Question 2, s 9AC(1)(b)(ii) is the shadow test and s 9AC(1)(b)(i) the de facto test. In Question 3, identify s 9AC(1)(a)(i) for Leah’s initial appointment, ss 203A–203AB for resignation and, if necessary, s 9AD for the alternative officer route. Each provision has a different job: accuracy means never citing them as if interchangeable. JUDGMENT-TO-FACT COMPARISON Use ACCR v CBA when the substantive competence of an attempted shareholder resolution is in issue. The Full Court dismissed the appeal: having sufficient members to request notice of a resolution did not supply a freestanding power to require the company to put an advisory management motion. Use Buzzle only after explaining the statutory “accustomed to act” criterion: Apple’s commercial leverage was not proved to amount to governance control. Use Grimaldi where an outsider actually performs director-character functions: substance, breadth, board acquiescence and independent initiatives matter. In Leah’s problem, the same “habitually approved” fact can be relevant to both tests, but the legal inference differs for each. WHAT THE STUDENT SHOULD SAY IN THEIR FINAL CONCLUSION HBC’s mandatory staffing policy is probably incompetent under the ordinary division of powers, subject to the constitution; replacing directors is a recognised member route if all statutory requirements are met, but 220 shares alone establish no realistic voting majority. The usual removal-intention deadline for 18 November was 18 September, with the company-called meeting exception to be checked. Leah’s resignation status remains fact- dependent; she has a substantial de facto-director risk and a serious but contestable CORPORATE LAW 252 | CORPORATE LAW

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shadow-director issue. No breach, insolvency, compensation or criminal penalty may be assumed from these facts. That is an honest, properly qualified, High Distinction-style conclusion. CORPORATE LAW 253 | CORPORATE LAW

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PUTTING THE LAW INTO PRACTICE — REVISION AND CLIENT ADVICE OPEN-QUESTION SCRIPT FOR THE WEEK 8 CLIENT INTERVIEW Before the law: “To make sure we advise the correct legal entity, would you tell me the company’s name and whether it is proprietary or public? Please talk me through the events in the order they happened.” Then check constitution and documentation: “Does the company have a constitution? Could you send us the current copy? Who are its directors and shareholders? What board or shareholder resolutions were passed? Who sent each notice, to whom, and on what dates?” This shows issue-spotting and gathers the statutory facts. If director-status facts emerge: “Was the person ever appointed? Was the appointment valid? Did they resign in writing? What was lodged with ASIC and when? What decisions did they personally make? When did board members follow their directions? Were those directions or independent advice? Which board members complied? What minutes and emails confirm that?” Then state the alternative classifications: s 9AC(1)(a)(i), (b)(i) and (b) (ii), with s 9AD as an additional officer question. If a powers dispute emerges: “What exactly are the shareholders asking the company to do? Is it an operational instruction or a proposed change in directors? Does the company constitution give the general meeting the relevant power? Is it a mandatory rule, such as s 203D? When is the meeting? When did the company receive the notice?” Then explain one principal authority for the decisive rule and one authority addressing the main counterargument. To conclude: “My preliminary view, based on the facts you have given me, is ... The result could change if the constitution, notice dates or board minutes show ... The next documents I would need are ... We will verify those and provide a considered recommendation.” That is more professional than giving an unqualified yes/no on incomplete material. LECTURE-TO-TUTORIAL ALIGNMENT MATRIX EXAM CALCULATIONS — EXPLAIN EVERY NUMBER HBC holdings: 110 members × 2 shares each = 220 shares. This proves quantity held by the group, not the percentage voting interest, because the total eligible shares and any class-specific voting entitlements are not supplied. One may say HBC has 110 members, CORPORATE LAW 254 | CORPORATE LAW

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but a procedural 100-member threshold (if relevant in a DIFFERENT question) does not determine whether Proposal 1 is substantively competent. 18 November 2026 AGM — special director removal notice under s 203D(2): move backward two CALENDAR months from 18 November to 18 September 2026. A company called AFTER receiving such notice might use the narrow statutory timing exception. The legal calling date is missing from the facts; do not assume it. 18 November 2026 AGM — listed-company meeting notice under s 249HA: count 28 days backward to 21 October 2026. Contrast s 249H(3) 21 days (28 October 2026), which is not enough because FreshFoods is listed. Never confuse the notice that the activist sends to the company with the notice the company sends to its shareholders. Leah — resignation periods under s 203AA: 28 days governs notification to ASIC and ordinary relation-back of effectiveness; 56 days is the ASIC application window for fixing an earlier effective day; 12 months is the ordinary Court application window (the Court can allow longer). The starting date for these is Leah’s actual cessation date, which the question has NOT supplied, so exact calendar dates cannot be calculated. Do not fabricate one. EXAM CONSEQUENCES AND PRACTICAL REMEDIES — LIMIT YOUR CONCLUSION TO PROVED FACTS FreshFoods/HBC: Members may pursue lawful governance mechanisms such as proposing competent appointment/removal resolutions and, where requirements are met, appropriate declaratory or injunctive court relief. A flawed or incompetent proposed resolution is not made valid merely by 110 signatures; nor does an unjustified refusal necessarily imply that an injunction is automatically available. Identify the actual contravention and the court’s statutory or equitable jurisdiction before advising relief. Leah: A director/officer status finding may trigger duties but is not a finding of breach. Depending on the facts, later consequences may include civil remedies, regulatory action, compensation and possible disqualification or penalties. Disqualification under ss 206C and related provisions and relief under s 1324 are separate legal questions, requiring additional statutory elements and evidence. For client advice, preserve documents and clarify the exact period of formal office, when decisions were made, solvency and loss rather than announce a dollar figure. Topic 1: statutory company identity and management organ → ss 124, 134–135 and 198A → Cuninghame and ACCR → FreshFoods Proposal 1. Topic 2: shareholders’ reserved CORPORATE LAW 255 | CORPORATE LAW

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removal power → ss 201A, 201B, 201D, 201G, 203D–203E → Stanham → FreshFoods Proposal 2 and date calculation. Topic 3: functional status and de facto director → s 9AC(1) (b)(i), s 9AD → Drysdale and Grimaldi [133]–[143] → Leah. Topic 4: shadow governance → s 9AC(1)(b)(ii) → Buzzle [228]–[250] and Antico → Leah and potentially controlling nominee appointors. READING AND PRIMARY SOURCES — WHAT YOU HAVE AND WHAT REMAINS SUPPLIED AND REVIEWED: complete Week 4 forum transcript; Week 4 JUNI Summary; Week 4 32-slide lecture; Corporate Law 263 Tutorial 4 (for Week 5) source handout; “This Week’s Reading” EPUB listing Chapter 7 of the textbook and the assigned edited Buzzle/Grimaldi extracts; a separate EPUB that points to the non-uploaded narrated slide video. The pasted markdown was cross-recognised as a transcript-like source, not a separate worked solutions document. AUTHORITY LINKS: Corporations Act current text https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A00818/latest/text ; ASIC replaceable rules https://www.asic.gov.au/for-business-and-companies/companies/register-a- company/the-replaceable-rules-for-company-governance ; ABRS director ID requirements https://www.abrs.gov.au/director-identification-number/who-needs- apply-and-when ; Grimaldi reported text https://casechat.au/cases/au/grimaldi-v- chameleon-mining-nl-no-2 ; Buzzle reported text https://casechat.au/cases/au/buzzle- operations-pty-ltd-in-liq-v-apple-computer-australia-pty-ltd-2 ; ACCR case https://casechat.au/cases/au/australasian-centre-for-corporate-responsibility-v- commonwealth-bank-of-australia . Third-party access and changing websites may affect availability; citation propositions have been independently checked but not every URL can be guaranteed permanently. The best corporate-law answer answers four questions in sequence. First, WHAT IS THE LEGAL STATUS? (public/proprietary company; member/director/officer; formal/de facto/shadow). Second, WHICH ORGAN HOLDS THE POWER? (s 198A or a specific CORPORATE LAW READING STATUS: The full textbook Chapter 7 and the narrated-slide MP4 remain unavailable for direct comparison. The lecturer·s edited Buzzle and Grimaldi judgment extracts and Oomens· four-page article were subsequently supplied and reviewed. The Week 4 forum transcript, Week 5 live tutorial transcript and slides were also reviewed. Key legal propositions were checked against the legislation and available reported judgments. 256 | CORPORATE LAW

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member power such as s 203D). Third, WHAT EXACT ELEMENTS AND PROCEDURES APPLY? (such as habitual compliance under s 9AC(1)(b)(ii) or the two-month notice and response rights under s 203D). Fourth, WHAT DO THE ACTUAL FACTS PROVE, AND WHAT DO THEY NOT PROVE? Put counterarguments and qualifying facts next to the element they affect. For FreshFoods, resist the urge to jump from 110 shareholders straight to s 249N; start with competence under s 198A and the actual director-removal power in s 203D. For Leah, resist the urge to conclude “a shadow director” simply because her recommendations were adopted; distinguish genuine independent advice, habitual governance direction, the separate de facto test and the alternative officer category. Always conclude conditionally when the problem withholds a critical event or date. Three memory sentences: (1) “Having shares does not give a shareholder authority to manage the supermarket.” (2) “Changing the board is different from ordering the board.” (3) “Corporate status follows real functions and control, not merely job titles.” POST-TUTORIAL CASE AND LEGISLATION SOURCE MAP — FOR EXAM AND PRACTICE ACT (operative research starting point): Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Federal Register compilation C2026C00432 (effective 19 September 2026): https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A00818/latest/details WEEK 4 FORUM: original live transcript and supplementary narrated-slide transcription; WEEK 5 TUTORIAL: full live classroom transcript and JUNI summary. The tutor transcript is a noisy automatic transcription; section references such as “s 19”/“s 190A” describing the management rule are corrected to s 198A after checking the legislation. UNIVERSITY CASE EXTRACTS: Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233 [228]–[250]; Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6 [133]–[143]. These were directly supplied; the legal analysis here works from their reasoning, not from a short online abstract. REQUIRED SECONDARY READING: Pieter Oomens, “Identifying de facto and shadow directors”, Australian Insolvency Journal (Oct–Dec 2007) 11–14. The reading discusses Mistmorn, Austin, Antico and Ho v Akai; older secondary summaries should not be mistaken for the full judgments, and references to statutory provisions must be checked against the 2026 Act. CORPORATE LAW 257 | CORPORATE LAW

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ADDITIONAL GOVERNANCE READINGS: Courtenay Zajicek and Kate Sherburn, “The What and the What Not: Key Considerations Before Becoming Company Secretary” (ACC); McGuirk Remuneration / Governance Institute of Australia, Australian Board Remuneration Survey Abridged Report (2024), 35 pages. The secretary article contains practical recommendations; the survey contains remuneration benchmarking observations, not legal rules. PRESCRIBED TEXTBOOK LIMITATION: “Chapter 7: Corporate governance and company management” is listed in the course directions but its complete authorised text was not included in the available materials. The manuscript therefore identifies the reading and does not claim page-by-page verification of unseen material. REFERENCES AND VERIFICATION NOTES Primary legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), official Federal Register of Legislation, https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A00818/latest/text . Section structure was checked against official 2026 compilations including the September 2026 compilation for the current s 9AC (director), s 9AD (officer), s 198A, ss 203A–203E and associated governance provisions. Current law and assigned course content are distinguished where necessary. Assigned / related case texts: Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 (available via casechat.au/cases/au/australasian-centre-for-corporate-responsibility-v-commonwealth- bank-of-australia); Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233 (casechat.au/cases/au/buzzle-operations-pty-ltd-in-liq-v-apple- computer-australia-pty-ltd-2); Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6 (casechat.au/cases/au/grimaldi-v-chameleon-mining-nl-no-2); Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale [1978] HCA 52; ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4 (official High Court site). Court decision sources should be checked again when direct primary judgment links are inserted into the book. CORPORATE LAW COURSE-SOURCE STATUS: Prescribed textbook Chapter 7 and the narrated-slide MP4 still require direct review. The edited Buzzle and Grimaldi case extracts and Oomens article were supplied and reviewed. The Week 4 forum and Week 5 tutorial transcripts were also integrated. Course EPUBs list readings; they are not copies of the full textbook chapter or video. 258 | CORPORATE LAW

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WORKING SOURCE LINKS — FOR DIRECT RESEARCH Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) — Official current Act Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v CBA [2016] FCAFC 80 Buzzle v Apple [2010] NSWSC 233 Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining [2012] FCAFC 6 Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale [1978] HCA 52 ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4 — High Court of Australia CORPORATE LAW Corporations Act · Official current text (19 September 2026 compilation) https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A00818/latest/text 259 | CORPORATE LAW