CORPORATE LAW · BY DR ADRIAN ADAMS

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ORIGINAL PUBLISHED INTERIOR · 26 OCTOBER 2026

Chapter 5 — Membership, Meetings and Dividends

Preservation note. The material below is a readable text extraction from the existing original book, kept in the same page order without editorial rewriting. Its complete, original approved page layout and link annotations are preserved in the PDFs. Open the complete reading edition.

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CHAPTER 5 · CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION Membership, Members’ Powers, Shareholder Meetings & Dividends A professional Australian corporate-law teaching chapter for LLB, JD and LLM students and practising business decision-makers. Source alignment: Week 5 Forum lecture and first live-transcript portion, Week 5 narrated-dividends transcript and JUNI summary, Week 6 Tutorial 5 (all original questions reproduced), and the required reading, Company Law (3rd ed, 2023), Chapter 6, pp 145– 176. Legislation checked against the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), compilation No 149, 19 September 2026. PUBLICATION CONTROL This is a self-contained Chapter 5 addition; it does not modify the existing Chapters 1–4 archive. It uses original explanatory prose rather than reproducing the protected textbook chapter. Only the first received portion of the Week 5 live Forum has been integrated here. The remaining live Forum recording and any separate Intrepid Mines documents are not represented as having been reviewed. THE CORE TEACHING METHOD Facts → identify company type and membership → locate control of management and meeting powers → apply the exact procedure and voting thresholds → explain the case law → assess legality, commercial consequences and remedies → give a reasoned recommendation. For dividends, always move through: s 254SA → s 254T → s 254U → s 254V → s 254W. How the prescribed textbook and tutorial fit together Chapter 6 of the prescribed text introduces shareholder rights, the significance of the register of members, evidence of share ownership, share transfers, shareholder decision- CORPORATE LAW 1 | CORPORATE LAW

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making, general meetings and dividend distributions. Its running Retrofit example illustrates Julian's desire to retain control while issuing shares to Bev. These concepts are applied in the university's more difficult FreshFoods/HBC problem: activist shareholders want to influence management, remove directors and exploit formal meeting rights without possessing significant voting power. The apparent contradiction is the central lesson. Shareholders own shares in the company, but they do not individually own the company's stores, bank accounts or operating assets. Management ordinarily belongs to the board. Shareholders exercise specific powers conferred by legislation and constitution: electing/removing certain directors, amending constitutions and invoking meeting rights. A sophisticated answer does not equate having a right to speak at a meeting with having power to dictate commercial operations. Learning outcomes At the end of Chapter 5, students should be able to explain how membership arises and ends, why registers and certificates matter, how the company distinguishes transferred shares from the company's underlying assets, when activist shareholders may requisition meetings, put resolutions on an agenda, distribute persuasive statements, cast votes and appoint proxies, and why a dividend may be unauthorised or revocable despite earlier profits and board announcements. Part I · Membership and the nature of a share 1. A share is property, not a piece of company property When a person buys shares in FreshFoods Ltd, they acquire the legal and economic rights attached to those shares: potentially voting, dividends, transfer and participation in surplus assets on winding up. They do not acquire the right to remove food from a FreshFoods warehouse or order staff around. The separate corporate personality and statutory allocation of powers matter. A share is personal property; consider s 1070A and the contractual force of the constitution under s 140. 2. Becoming a member under s 231 Section 231(a) deals with becoming a member on registration. Under s 231(b), a person must agree to join after registration and have their name entered in the register of members; s 231(c) provides a special case on conversion. In practice a person may subscribe for new shares, take a transfer or exercise an option; the register remains CORPORATE LAW 2 | CORPORATE LAW

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critically important in confirming membership and the associated ability to vote. A minority investor should not assume that payment alone establishes every incident of registered membership. Example: HBC has 110 supporters who have each purchased two FreshFoods shares. Before executing an activist campaign, counsel should check that each of the 110 is the registered member, entitled to vote on the relevant resolution. Beneficial interests held through a nominee may not count the same way when the Act uses the number of members. That factual check is more important than merely knowing the combined 220- share holding. 3. Why the register of members matters Sections 168–169 require a company to maintain a register of members and relevant share details. The register records identities and addresses, entry dates, numbers and classes of shares and paid-up status. Sections 173 and 177 deal with inspection and appropriate uses of register information; access is not a licence to obtain personal contact details for unrelated marketing. Section 176 gives the register evidentiary force; s 175 permits rectification in appropriate circumstances. Counsel advising HBC must be precise about what shareholder records may lawfully be obtained and used. CASE ILLUSTRATION — REGISTER AND ITS LIMITS IMF (Australia) Ltd v Sons of Gwalia Ltd [2005] FCAFC 75: the Court considered restrictions on using company register information to contact shareholders about litigation concerning purchase of shares. The example teaches the difference between rights relevant to holding shares and external aims connected merely with having purchased shares. The case belongs next to s 177, not in an unrelated case list. Re Clifton Springs Hotel Ltd [1939] VLR 27: the registration of partly paid shares furnished evidence of the holding and liability; the lesson is to inspect the statutory register when ownership or obligations are disputed. The register is strong evidence but can be corrected under s 175 where justified. 4. Share certificates: evidence, not magic Section 1070C concerns share certificates, which provide prima facie evidence of title. Certificates do not cure every defect in transfer or underlying title. Under s 1071H timing obligations apply when relevant securities are allotted or transferred. The textbook's Re CORPORATE LAW 3 | CORPORATE LAW

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Bahia and San Francisco Rail Co (1868) LR 3 QB 584 illustrates reliance on incorrect corporate certificates and estoppel. The real-world point is that a company may face a damages claim when its representations about title mislead an innocent purchaser, even when the wrongful transfer itself was defective. SPECIMEN — SHARE CERTIFICATE SAMPLE EDUCATIONAL COMPANY PTY LTD · ACN 000 000 000 Certificate No. SC–0007 This certifies that Jordan Example is the registered holder of 500 fully paid ordinary shares in Sample Educational Company Pty Ltd, subject to the company's constitution and applicable law. Class Number Paid per share Unpaid Ordinary 500 $1.00 $0.00 Director signature: ___________________ Date: ______________ Original illustrative template — not a copy of the publisher's sample; not legal evidence of actual shares. 5. Transferring shares and refusing registration Under s 1070A, shares are transferable as provided in the constitution or applicable statutory framework. Listed securities are generally settled electronically, including through CHESS. Proprietary companies can have pre-emptive rights or director discretion under their constitutions or the replaceable rules. Section 1072G permits directors of proprietary companies to refuse registration of a transfer under the replaceable rule, but the proper use of a discretion and the company's interests remain relevant. Section 1071E prescribes notice of refusal, and s 1071F provides for Court intervention when refusal lacks just cause. CASE ILLUSTRATION — REFUSAL OF TRANSFERS Roberts v Coussens (1991) 25 NSWLR 171 and Beck v Tuckey [2007] NSWSC 1065 are useful when examining the discretion to refuse a transfer and the availability of a statutory remedy under s 1071F. Do not advise that a director's refusal is unchallengeable merely because the constitution uses broad words. CORPORATE LAW 4 | CORPORATE LAW

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6. Cessation of membership Membership can cease after a properly registered transfer, transmission on death or bankruptcy, compulsory acquisition, valid forfeiture, or operation of company lien provisions when properly engaged. These pathways have different conditions and should not be treated as automatic synonyms. A lawyer checks the constitution, register, statutory route and evidence of the claimed change. Part II · Shareholder meetings: from minority status to effective action APPLYING CORPORATE PROCEDURE · WEEK 5 LIVE FORUM Who can call the shareholders together? A practical guide to the meeting rules Imagine that you advise a group of shareholders who disagree profoundly with the direction of a company's board. They do not have control of the company and cannot simply instruct the directors to change an operational decision. Their immediate question is therefore a practical one: how can they lawfully bring the matter before the shareholders? A capable corporate lawyer first identifies the decision-making organ, then the substantive power to be exercised, and only then the meeting procedure. It is a serious error to begin with a notice form before asking whether the proposed resolution can lawfully be passed. Use the statute as a map, not a list to memorise. Chapter 2G is divided into Part 2G.1 (directors' meetings and resolutions, ss 248A–248G) and Part 2G.2 (members' meetings and resolutions, beginning at s 249A). The latter includes the 249-series rules about convening and conducting a general meeting and the 250- series rules about voting, proxies and annual general meetings. Thus a question about a board quorum points to s 248F; a shareholder quorum points to s 249T; and how votes are cast and counted takes you into the 250 series. Start with the legal power: s 249C and s 249CA Often, the simplest course is for a director to call the meeting voluntarily. Under s 249C, a director may call a meeting of the company's members. Because s 249C is a replaceable CORPORATE LAW 5 | CORPORATE LAW

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rule, its application requires examination of the company's constitution and the statutory rules on replaceable rules. A different provision, s 249CA(1)–(3), preserves the director's meeting-call power in a listed company despite contrary constitutional provisions. Do not write in an exam that s 249C itself is invariably mandatory for every company: the listed- company protection is in s 249CA. A shareholder might request a meeting informally. If the board agrees and has authority to call it, that can avoid a contested requisition. A shareholder may also have a nominee director on the board, but that director must still discharge duties owed to the company and cannot be treated as a messenger who automatically obeys the nominating shareholder. The notice, timing, proper-purpose and other meeting requirements remain applicable even when directors voluntarily call the meeting. When agreement fails: s 249D is a formal statutory requisition A requisition is a formal request that, if valid, engages a duty on the directors. Section 249D(1) requires directors to call and arrange a general meeting when members with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at the meeting request it. This is a voting-power test, not a 5%-of-members test. It is not interchangeable with the alternative 100-member route for proposing a resolution under s 249N. Section 249D(2)(a)–(d) requires the requisition to be written, to state any resolution proposed, to be signed by the requesting members, and to be given to the company. Identical wording may appear on separate signature copies under s 249D(3). The percentage of voting power is measured at midnight before the request is given, under s 249D(4). Under s 249D(5) the directors must call the meeting within 21 days and arrange for it to be held within two months after receipt. Calling the meeting means issuing the necessary meeting notice; it does not mean the members must actually assemble within 21 days. 1 · Power Lawful member resolution? 2 · Votes At least 5%? 3 · Request Signed written requisition 4 · Notice Call within 21 days 5 · Meeting Hold within two months Always check two clocks. Section 249D(5)'s requisition deadlines do not displace the separate minimum notice period. For a listed company such as FreshFoods, s 249HA ordinarily requires 28 days' notice. Accordingly the board needs a lawful meeting date that fits both the notice rules and the two-month outer limit. The CORPORATE LAW 6 | CORPORATE LAW

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agenda and any director-removal or appointment procedure may impose additional requirements, notably s 203D. Section 249E — what happens when the directors default? If the directors do not call the meeting within the statutory 21 days, s 249E(1) allows members holding more than 50% of the votes held by all of the original requisitionists to call and arrange it. That is more than half of the requisitioning votes, not more than half of the company's total votes, and not simply more than half the number of individual signatories. Under s 249E(2) the meeting must be called in substantially the normal way and held not later than three months after the original request was given. Section 249E(3) enables requisitionists to obtain a copy of the register of members free of charge for this purpose, notwithstanding the ordinary charging provision. Under s 249E(4), the company must pay reasonable expenses incurred because directors failed to call and arrange the meeting. Under s 249E(5), the company may recover those expenses from directors, with an important statutory safeguard for a director who proves they took all reasonable steps to cause compliance. Subsection (4A) concerns the strict- liability character of offences based on subsections (3) and (4). For client advice, describe expenses as reasonable and causally connected to the default, not as a blank cheque. Section 249F — a direct route, but the members bear the expense Under s 249F(1), members holding at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at the meeting can call and arrange it themselves without first using s 249D. Unlike the s 249E default route, those members must pay the expenses. Section 249F(2) requires the same general calling procedures, so far as possible. Section 249F(3) calculates the percentage of votes at midnight before the meeting is called. This distinction matters commercially: for a listed company, shareholder communications, legal documentation, venue arrangements and meeting logistics may be expensive. Advice comparison. If FreshFoods shareholders reach the 5% threshold, a properly prepared s 249D requisition is usually a sensible starting point because the company must arrange a valid meeting if the request and purpose satisfy the law. The shareholders do not obtain extra substantive voting powers merely by using s 249D. A direct s 249F meeting may be considered where the group wishes to organise matters itself and accepts the cost and procedural responsibility. If CORPORATE LAW 7 | CORPORATE LAW

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directors default on a valid s 249D request, s 249E is the separate statutory response. Both routes involve compliance with notice and other meeting rules. Proper purpose and the division of powers — why NRMA v Parker matters Case explanation: National Roads & Motorists' Association v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517. NRMA members sought to use a general meeting and proposed resolutions concerning the distribution of voting papers, a matter falling within the board's management function under the governing rules. The court considered whether members could compel a meeting to decide something beyond the legal power of the general meeting. McLelland J held, in substance, that shareholders could not use resolutions to take over directors' management authority. The decision is particularly important when evaluating whether a proposed requisition is directed to a matter members may legally decide. It is not a rule that shareholders are forbidden to express opinions: the legal objection concerns the attempted formal exercise of a power not vested in the general meeting. Case explanation: Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80. An activist group with more than 100 bank shareholders sought to place resolutions at the bank's AGM expressing opinions about climate-related management matters. The Full Federal Court held that, without a supporting statutory or constitutional power, the proposed formal advisory resolutions were not resolutions shareholders were entitled to compel the company to put to a vote. The Full Court endorsed the central principle in NRMA v Parker. Crucially, the result does not prevent shareholders asking questions, making comments, campaigning or properly proposing a resolution that does fall within their powers, such as removing directors subject to the correct legal procedures. How to use these authorities in an exam: First identify the wording and legal effect of the proposal. Next identify who has the substantive power under the Act and constitution. Apply NRMA v Parker and ACCR v CBA if members seek to direct the company's ordinary management through a binding or legally unauthorised advisory resolution. Then independently test whether a meeting may be requisitioned and whether the notices and timelines are valid. This prevents the common mistake of equating compliance with meeting procedure with a valid substantive resolution. CORPORATE LAW 8 | CORPORATE LAW

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FreshFoods / HBC — step-by-step solicitor's advice HBC has 110 registered shareholders holding two shares each: 220 shares. Before advising that HBC can requisition an extraordinary general meeting, verify FreshFoods' total voting power and the voting rights attaching to HBC's shares. There is not enough information from 220 shares alone to establish the 5% voting threshold under ss 249D or 249F. The separate 100-member pathway under s 249N concerns proposing a resolution at a meeting and does not itself give HBC the power to call a new meeting. HBC's proposed compulsory human-checkout staffing policy is likely to run into the board-management principle, because it tells directors how to operate the business. A campaign to remove and replace directors is different: for a public company, director removal is a statutory member power under s 203D, subject to its detailed notice and procedural requirements. Distinguish the validity of the proposed resolution, the persons qualified to initiate the meeting, and the meeting's procedural validity. Advice to the supervising partner or client. “We should review the constitution and voting register; calculate voting power at the statutorily prescribed time; obtain the signed requisition and precise draft resolutions; verify whether the proposed matters are within shareholders' powers; apply ss 249D–249F and 249Q; comply with s 249HA and the director-removal requirements of s 203D; and budget for the financial consequences of choosing s 249F rather than the requisition route. We should not assert that 110 shareholders can force an EGM unless they meet the voting-power threshold.” Check your understanding — two short questions Question A. Five shareholders requisition a meeting with 6% of the votes. The board does nothing within 21 days. Two of the requisitionists hold 4% voting power between them; the other three hold 2%. Who can call the meeting under s 249E? Question B. A listed company agrees to call a shareholders' meeting. May it issue notice today and hold the meeting tomorrow merely because the requesting shareholders want an immediate vote? CORPORATE LAW 9 | CORPORATE LAW

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Answer A. Section 249E(1) tests whether the members taking over hold more than half of the votes of all the requisitionists. The two members holding 4% collectively hold more than half of the original 6% and can use the statutory default route, subject to proper procedures. The three members holding 2% do not satisfy that test, despite outnumbering the other two. This demonstrates why the statute counts votes, not heads. Answer B. No. The power to call a meeting does not bypass the notice provisions. Section 249HA ordinarily requires a listed company to give at least 28 days' notice; relevant specific exceptions must be checked. The meeting must also satisfy the content-of-notice rules and any special procedures for the resolution proposed. Publication and research checkpoint. This teaching section integrates the additional live Forum explanation and uses the statutory provisions as the governing rules rather than repeating transcription slips. The prescribed course materials help identify the question, while the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the company constitution and the judgments govern the legal answer. The external links and case pinpoints require the separate final publication link audit. Statutory masterclass: directors’ meetings (Pt 2G.1, ss 248A–248G), members’ meetings (ss 249A–249Z), voting and AGMs (ss 250A–250S) A board and a general meeting are separate organs of a company. The board manages the business where the law and constitution give it that function; members use the particular powers conferred upon them by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), share rights and the constitution. The three statutory groups below are therefore not interchangeable. A board quorum problem calls for s 248F; a shareholder quorum problem calls for s 249T; the number of votes cast on a poll calls for s 250E and the rules governing the poll. Study route from the Week 5 live Forum: (1) identify who is deciding; (2) identify the procedural route; (3) check who can vote and whether the resolution is legally within that organ’s powers; (4) check formal requirements, signatures, dates, quorum, CORPORATE LAW 10 | CORPORATE LAW

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notice and voting method; (5) evaluate defects, challenges, costs and remedies. For FreshFoods, do not confuse 110 members with 5% voting power. Which statutory group applies? BOARD DECISION ss 248A–248G Directors, chair, quorum SHAREHOLDER PROCESS ss 249A–249Z Meetings, requisitions, notices VOTE + AGM ss 250A–250S Proxies, polls, votes, audit Original educational diagram. Always ask who is legally exercising the power. A. Directors’ resolutions and board meetings — ss 248A–248G These provisions occupy Part 2G.1. Many are replaceable rules, which means a company constitution may displace them unless the Act makes a provision mandatory. Board procedures must also be read with directors’ powers under s 198A, conflict provisions including s 195 for public companies, and the minute-keeping rules in s 251A. Section 248A — circulating board resolutions What the law does: Subsection (1) allows a resolution without a meeting where every director entitled to vote signs a document favouring it. Subsection (2) permits separate identical copies. Subsection (3) makes the decision effective when the last director signs. Why it matters: This is a unanimous paper decision, not a mere majority email poll. The minutes still need appropriate recording under s 251A. Student or practitioner application: Three directors approve the issue of shares: two signatures do not satisfy the statutory circulating-resolution route if all three are entitled to vote. Section 248B — one-director proprietary companies What the law does: Subsection (1): a sole director can pass a resolution by recording and signing it. Subsection (2): the sole director can similarly make a statutory declaration that otherwise would have been made at a board meeting. CORPORATE LAW 11 | CORPORATE LAW

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Why it matters: A one-director proprietary company need not convene an imaginary two- person board. Student or practitioner application: Use the signed written record of the sole director rather than the s 248F default quorum rule. Section 248C — calling directors’ meetings What the law does: A director may call a board meeting by giving reasonable notice individually to every other director. This is a replaceable rule. Why it matters: A board decision can be challenged if a director was not given a reasonable opportunity to attend; reasonableness depends on context. Student or practitioner application: Check the company constitution and the means/timing of notice before treating an urgent board decision as procedurally effective. Section 248D — technology and remote board meetings What the law does: Subsection (1) permits technology to call or hold a board meeting. Subsection (2)(a)–(c) recognises physical, hybrid or wholly virtual arrangements. Subsection (3) requires the technology to be reasonable. Why it matters: Modern directors may be geographically dispersed; lawful digital participation must still make the decision-making process workable. Student or practitioner application: A connection that cuts a director off from proceedings raises a different legal issue from the mere use of video technology. Section 248E — board chair What the law does: Subsection (1) enables directors to choose a chair and the chair’s term. Subsection (2)(a)–(b) requires election of a director present if no chair exists or the chair cannot or will not act. Why it matters: The board needs an authorised presiding officer; the rule is distinct from the chair of a members’ meeting under s 249U. CORPORATE LAW 12 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 248F — quorum for directors What the law does: The default quorum is two directors unless directors determine otherwise; a quorum must remain present throughout. Special conflict-of-interest rules (including s 195) and sole-director rules affect the analysis. Why it matters: The fact that two members attend a shareholder meeting does not prove that the board has a quorum. The two tests apply to different organs. Student or practitioner application: If three directors start a board meeting but two leave before the vote, test whether quorum persisted throughout. Section 248G — majority voting and casting vote What the law does: Subsection (1) generally requires a majority of votes cast by directors entitled to vote; subsection (2) gives the chair an additional casting vote if required, subject to disqualification or the constitution. Why it matters: An invalidly participating or conflicted director may change the majority analysis. This is a replaceable board rule, not a shareholder special-resolution rule. B. Members’ decisions and meeting procedures — ss 249A–249Z Part 2G.2 is the principal procedural home for general meetings. Students need not reproduce every word of every subsection in an exam; they must locate the precise operative requirement and apply it to the correct facts. The numerical thresholds, notice dates and member-versus-voting-power distinctions are frequently decisive. Section 249A — circulating resolutions of multi-member proprietary companies What the law does: (1) confines the mechanism to qualifying proprietary-company member resolutions and excludes removal of an auditor under s 329; (2) requires all voting members (and each joint holder) to sign in favour; (3) allows identical copies; (4) fixes passage when the last signs; (5)(a)–(c) deals with supplying required documents and ASIC lodgement substitutes; (6) deems meeting requirements met; (7) preserves general-law assent rules. Why it matters: This is not a shortcut for a public, ASX-listed FreshFoods shareholder resolution. CORPORATE LAW 13 | CORPORATE LAW

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Student or practitioner application: A family proprietary company can pass a unanimous written resolution without booking a meeting room, but an ASX-listed company generally cannot use this section. Section 249B — one-member companies What the law does: (1) permits the only member to record and sign a resolution; (2) addresses documents required to be lodged with ASIC. Why it matters: Distinguish the sole member decision here from the sole director decision in s 248B. Section 249C — director-initiated general meetings What the law does: A director may call a meeting of members (replaceable rule). Why it matters: A board director calling a shareholder meeting under s 249C is different from a director calling a board meeting under s 248C. Section 249CA — listed-company director meetings What the law does: (1) directors may call members’ meetings; (2) confines the provision to listed companies; (3) makes it operate despite contrary constitutional terms. Why it matters: FreshFoods is listed: this mandatory statutory route matters even if the constitution suggests otherwise. Section 249D — the formal shareholder requisition What the law does: (1) gives the right to members with at least 5% of votes that may be cast; (2)(a)–(d) requires a written, signed request stating proposed resolutions and given to the company; (3) permits identical separate signature copies; (4) measures voting percentages at midnight before giving the request; (5) requires directors to call within 21 days and hold within two months. Why it matters: The 100-member alternative does not apply to s 249D. That alternative belongs to the separate notice-of-resolution procedure under s 249N. CORPORATE LAW 14 | CORPORATE LAW

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Student or practitioner application: HBC has 110 members, each with two shares, but only 220 known shares. Without the company’s total relevant votes, counsel cannot conclude it possesses the required 5%. Section 249E — default after failure to call a requisitioned meeting What the law does: (1) if directors fail to call within 21 days, members holding more than 50% of the votes among the original requisitionists may arrange the meeting; (2) requires substantially ordinary procedures and a meeting within three months of the original request; (3) permits a free register copy for that purpose; (4) requires company payment of reasonable expenses; (4A) provides strict-liability offences; (5) allows recovery from responsible directors subject to their reasonable-steps safeguard. Why it matters: This is a remedial right flowing from an original, valid s 249D request. It does not create a new 100-member calling threshold. Student or practitioner application: Document both the requisition delivery date and the directors’ compliance; if necessary, identify which requisitionists hold over half the original requisitionists’ votes. Section 249F — members call meeting themselves What the law does: (1) members with at least 5% of relevant votes may call and arrange a meeting but must pay the expenses; (2) requires usual calling procedures as far as possible; (3) measures voting power at midnight before the meeting is called. Why it matters: An aggressive campaign may proceed without waiting for the board, but an ASX-listed issuer’s meeting costs may be significant. Student or practitioner application: For HBC, seek lawful coalitions or additional shares if voting percentage falls short; weigh the cost advantage of a valid s 249D requisition. Section 249G — Court-ordered meeting What the law does: (1) where another method is impracticable, the Court may order a meeting; (2)(a)–(b) allows application by a director or member entitled to vote. CORPORATE LAW 15 | CORPORATE LAW

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Why it matters: Use in genuine impracticability, not simply because activists dislike the board’s response. Section 249H — notice for non-listed general meetings What the law does: (1) sets a 21-day general minimum, unless the constitution specifies longer; (2)(a) allows an AGM on shorter notice only with agreement of all entitled members and (2)(b) another general meeting with 95% of votes agreeing, subject to exceptions; (3)(a)–(b) protects the 21-day minimum for public-company removal/ replacement of directors under s 203D; (4) protects auditor-removal meetings. Why it matters: Do not assume a 95% waiver can override every special statutory notice constraint. Section 249HA — listed-company 28-day notice What the law does: (1) at least 28 days for listed-company members’ meetings; (2) limits to listed companies; (3) prevails over the constitution. Why it matters: FreshFoods’ listed status means that 21 days is not the controlling baseline. Section 249J — who receives notices and when What the law does: (1) each voting member and director receives individual written notice (one joint member sufficient); (2) notice goes to first named joint holder by default; (3)(a)–(d) sets permitted personal, post, electronic and constitutional channels; (4) supplies default deemed-receipt timing, including postal and electronic rules. Why it matters: Time calculation turns on when notice is legally given, not simply the date someone drafted it. Section 249K — auditor notice and communications What the law does: (1)(a)–(b) entitles the auditor to general meeting notice and related communications on the same basis as members; (2) creates strict-liability consequences. Why it matters: Auditors are part of formal corporate accountability, not optional invitees. Section 249L — essential content of notice What the law does: (1)(a)(i)–(iii) requires meeting time/location and technology participation details where relevant; (1)(b) general nature of business; (1)(c) full notice of any special resolution; (1)(d)(i)–(iii) prescribed proxy information; (2)(a)–(b) CORPORATE LAW 16 | CORPORATE LAW

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remuneration-report and second-strike disclosures for listed AGMs; (3) clear, concise, effective presentation. Why it matters: A vague notice can mislead shareholders about the decision they are being asked to make. Student or practitioner application: If HBC seeks director-removal resolutions, name each director and clearly identify the proposed vote. Section 249LA — regulatory exemptions in meeting notices What the law does: (1) permits regulations to omit specified meeting-notice information subject to conditions; (2)(a)–(b) contemplates distinctions among kinds of information and companies; (3) deems compliant omissions included. Why it matters: Do not presume an omission is fatal without checking applicable regulations. Section 249M — notice of adjourned meeting What the law does: If a meeting is adjourned for one month or more, new notice of the resumed meeting must be given (replaceable rule). Why it matters: Adjournment does not always remove the original notice requirements. Section 249N — member-proposed resolutions What the law does: (1)(a)–(b): at least 5% of votes on the resolution OR at least 100 members entitled to vote; (1A)(a)–(b) allows prescribed adjustments to the 100-member number; (2)(a)–(c) requires written notice, exact resolution wording and member signatures; (3) permits identical signature counterparts; (4) measures voting percentage at midnight before giving notice. Why it matters: A right to get a resolution considered is not a right to force directors to exercise management powers that legally belong to the board. Student or practitioner application: 110 registered, voting HBC members ordinarily satisfy the member-count alternative (subject to relevant regulations), but their proposed human-staffing directive separately faces the NRMA v Parker division-of-powers issue. CORPORATE LAW 17 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 249O — company notice and timing of proposed resolutions What the law does: (1) sends a s 249N resolution to the next general meeting occurring more than two months after notice is given; (2) requires company circulation; (3) company ordinarily pays if notice arrives in time for the standard meeting notice; (4) members bear late separate-circulation costs unless the company resolves otherwise; (5) (a)–(b) permits refusal of a defamatory or over-1,000-word resolution, or non-prepayment of valid costs. Why it matters: The 1 October 2026 notice cannot compel inclusion at an AGM on 18 November 2026: less than two months have elapsed. Student or practitioner application: Count calendar dates precisely, distinguish whether the company elects to cooperate voluntarily, and avoid advising that a timely s 249N form overrides s 249O. Section 249P — member statements and advocacy What the law does: (1)(a)–(b) allows a supporting/opposing statement about a proposed resolution or other proper meeting business; (2)(a)–(b) applies the 5% or 100-voting- member alternatives; (2A) allows regulations to change the member number; (3)(a)–(c) requires written, signed delivery; (4)–(5) permits counterparts and fixes timing for vote percentage; (6) requires circulation; (7)–(8) allocate costs depending on timing; (9)(a)–(b) permits refusal for defamation, over 1,000 words or nonpayment of applicable expenses. Why it matters: This is the statutory advocacy tool that allows HBC to seek support beyond its own small holding. It is not restricted to the exact shareholders who proposed a resolution. Student or practitioner application: Prepare a concise and factual campaign statement explaining proposed changes, director candidates and the commercial consequences of automation. Section 249Q — proper purpose What the law does: The general meeting must be held for a proper purpose. Why it matters: Connect the procedural power with substantive competence. Courts may refuse to compel futile or legally incompetent resolutions. CORPORATE LAW 18 | CORPORATE LAW

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Student or practitioner application: Use NRMA v Parker and ACCR v Commonwealth Bank in the FreshFoods staffing proposal; distinguish a valid vote to remove directors under s 203D. Section 249R — physical, hybrid and virtual meetings What the law does: Paragraphs (a)–(c) permit one or more physical venues, hybrid meetings, and wholly virtual meetings only if expressly permitted or required by the company constitution. Why it matters: A video link alone is not proof that every purely virtual meeting complies with the Act. Section 249RA — place, time and participation What the law does: (1)(a)–(c) fixes legal venue for physical/hybrid/virtual meetings; (2) fixes meeting time by the venue; (3) treats online attendance as presence in person for relevant purposes. Why it matters: These rules matter for jurisdiction, quorum, attendance and meeting procedures. Section 249S — reasonable opportunity to participate What the law does: (1) demands a reasonable overall opportunity for entitled members; (2)–(6) addresses time, physical venue and multi-venue technology; (7)(a)–(b) requires reasonable virtual technology that lets online participants exercise rights to ask questions or comment orally and in writing. Why it matters: A one-way webcast that prevents participation cannot simply be treated as equivalent to full virtual attendance. Student or practitioner application: When advising on a contested meeting, preserve attendance records, technical logs and any recorded failures to enable questions. Section 249T — quorum at general meeting What the law does: (1) default two members throughout; (2) counts proxies and corporate representatives under special rules; (3) adjourns if no quorum within 30 CORPORATE LAW 19 | CORPORATE LAW

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minutes; (3A)(a)–(c) allows directors to set reconvening arrangements; (3B)(a)–(d) provides defaults; (4) dissolves resumed meeting if no quorum in time. Why it matters: Contrasts with the s 248F board quorum. Review the applicable constitution and member count. Section 249U — chair at general meeting What the law does: (1) directors may elect an individual chair; (2) directors at the meeting elect a chair if required; (3)(a)–(b) provides for members to elect a chair if no board-appointed chair is available; (4) requires adjournment where a majority of votes present directs it. Why it matters: The chair’s role includes voting administration; it is not an independent power to ignore valid member rights. Section 249V — auditor’s speaking rights What the law does: (1) auditor may attend; (2) may speak on auditor business; (3)(a)– (b) preserves that right if retiring or removed; (4) permits written authorisation of a representative. Why it matters: Protects accountability where members challenge financial reporting or audit quality. Section 249W — adjourned meeting What the law does: (1) a resolution is passed on the date it is actually adopted at the resumed meeting; (2) ordinarily only unfinished business may be transacted (replaceable rule). Why it matters: Do not back-date a resolution to the date of the original meeting. Section 249X — who may appoint a proxy What the law does: (1) permits a voting member to appoint another person; (1A) proxy may be individual or corporate; (2) number/proportion of votes may be specified; (3) permits two proxies for members with at least two votes and supplies a default equal split; (4) disregards fractional votes. Why it matters: Allows dispersed investors to participate even when they cannot attend personally. CORPORATE LAW 20 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 249Y — rights and limits of proxies What the law does: (1)(a)–(c) speaking, voting within appointment and demanding polls; (2) a constitution may restrict proxy voting on a show of hands; (3) the constitution determines the effect of a member’s attendance, otherwise proxy authority is suspended while the member is present. Why it matters: Read actual appointment terms; not every appointed proxy can act however they choose. Section 249Z — equal treatment in circulating proxy material What the law does: (1)(a)–(b) requires forms or willing-proxy lists to be made available to comparable eligible members, with different consequences for material sent on request or unsolicited; (2) strict-liability offence. Why it matters: Prevents selective manipulation of proxies through company communications. C. Proxy validity, voting, polls and AGMs — ss 250A–250S Part 2G.2 continues past the 249 series. For a listed company, the distinction between a show of hands and a poll is especially consequential: a poll ordinarily reflects shares/ votes rather than headcount. Several newer provisions override historical replaceable rules, and remuneration-related proxy votes have special restrictions. Section 250A — valid proxy appointments What the law does: (1)(a)–(d): signed/authenticated appointment, member name/ address, company, nominated proxy or office, and meetings covered; (1A) authentication regulations; (2) constitution may relax some content; (3) undated appointment defaults to date given; (6) witness not required; (7) later inconsistent appointment supersedes earlier one. Why it matters: A proxy form is a legally operative document, not merely a convenient attendance pass. Student or practitioner application: Check the shareholder identity, named proxy, meeting date, authority and any vote directions. CORPORATE LAW 21 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 250B — delivery deadlines for proxy documents What the law does: (1)(a)–(b) appointment and attorney authority received at least 48 hours before meeting; (2) comparable rule for resumed meetings; (3)(a)–(b) receipt by permissible physical, fax or electronic means; (5) company constitution or meeting notice may reduce the 48-hour window. Why it matters: Do not state that 48 hours is an irreducible minimum: subsection (5) expressly permits reduction. Section 250BA — listed-company receipt arrangements What the law does: (1)(a)–(b) notice must give a physical receipt place or electronic information for proxy documents; (2) listed-company limitation; (3) prevails over constitution. Why it matters: A listed company must give shareholders a real means of appointing proxies. Section 250BB — directed proxies What the law does: (1)(a)–(d) regulates how a proxy follows specified directions on show of hands or a poll, with distinct duties of the chair versus non-chair proxy; (2)–(4) identify offence situations; (5) strict liability. Why it matters: A proxy who was directed to vote against removal cannot simply vote in favour because they personally support the board. Section 250BC — automatic transfer of directed proxy to chair What the law does: (a)–(d) where a directed non-chair proxy is absent or fails to vote in a poll, the chair is treated as proxy for voting on that resolution. Why it matters: Designed to stop directed votes from disappearing just because the nominated proxy fails to cast them. Section 250BD — restricted remuneration-related proxy voting What the law does: Contains voting prohibitions and carefully defined exceptions involving key management personnel and their closely related parties, particularly for remuneration-linked resolutions. CORPORATE LAW 22 | CORPORATE LAW

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Why it matters: Before advising on a listed company remuneration vote, check who is appointed, whose remuneration is affected, directions, express authority and the detailed statutory exceptions. Section 250C — validity despite changed circumstances What the law does: (1) permits some directed proxy votes even where proxy could not vote in personal capacity; (2)(a)–(e) generally preserves proxy votes despite member death, incapacity, revocation, revocation of appointing authority or transfer, unless written notice reached the company before the meeting. Why it matters: Ensures meeting results are not upset by undisclosed events outside the company’s knowledge. Section 250D — corporate representative What the law does: (1)(a)–(d) a body corporate can appoint a human representative for member, creditor, debenture or proxy powers; (2) permits restrictions and office-based appointments; (3) multiple representatives possible but only one exercises the body’s powers at a time; (4) default full authority. Why it matters: A shareholder company is not a human: its authorised individual representative must have appointment evidence. Section 250E — votes on hands versus poll What the law does: (1)(a)–(b) generally one vote per member on a show of hands, one vote per share on a poll, subject to share-class rights; (2) one vote per member without share capital; (3) chair casting vote as replaceable rule. Why it matters: An investor with one million shares and another with two shares may each show one hand; a poll correctly reflects voting shareholdings. Student or practitioner application: The FreshFoods campaign requires both a threshold analysis and an eventual poll-vote strategy. Section 250F — jointly held shares What the law does: Under this replaceable rule only the first-listed holder’s vote counts where multiple joint holders vote on a share. Why it matters: Registration order may matter when checking disputed votes. CORPORATE LAW 23 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 250G — challenging vote entitlement What the law does: (a)–(b) challenge must occur at meeting and the chair decides it (replaceable rule). Why it matters: Raise evidence of disqualified or improperly registered votes at the meeting, not as a mere afterthought. Section 250H — split and partial poll votes What the law does: (a)–(b) a person with multiple votes need not use them all and can divide them among choices on a poll. Why it matters: A large investor may vote some shares for a director and others against, subject to applicable directions and rights. Section 250J — conducting a vote What the law does: (1) generally allows hands unless a poll is demanded; (1A) requires chair disclosure of received proxy votes and voting directions before vote; (2) concerns the chair’s declaration and its conclusiveness on a show of hands. Why it matters: Must be qualified by s 250JA: listed-company votes cannot simply be decided by show of hands in many cases. Section 250JA — mandatory poll in listed companies What the law does: (1)(a)–(c) a poll is compulsory for resolutions in the meeting notice, s 249O member-notified resolutions or when a poll is demanded; (2) overrides s 250J and the constitution. Why it matters: Critical to FreshFoods: a listed company must ordinarily determine formally noticed resolutions by poll. Section 250K — when poll demands are permitted What the law does: (1) poll may generally be demanded on any resolution; (2)(a)–(b) constitution may limit polls for electing chair or adjournment; (3) permits withdrawal. Why it matters: The subject of the motion may affect procedural scope. CORPORATE LAW 24 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 250L — who may demand a poll, and when What the law does: (1)(a)–(c) five voting members, 5% of votes, or chair may demand; (2) constitution can lower threshold; (3)(a)–(c) demand may precede vote/declaration or follow immediately; (4) fixes voting power at midnight before demand. Why it matters: The threshold to demand a poll is five members, not the 100 members alternative for proposing a resolution. Section 250M — how and when poll taken What the law does: (1) chair controls ordinary poll timing and manner; (2) poll on chair- election or adjournment is taken immediately. Why it matters: A delay ordered by the chair must be checked against this distinction. Section 250MA — special resolution test What the law does: (a) notice must include special-resolution information under s 249L(1)(c); (b) at least 75% of votes cast by members entitled to vote; (c) resolution must otherwise be valid. Why it matters: Compare to ordinary resolutions, generally more than 50% of relevant votes cast. Student or practitioner application: Changing a company constitution under s 136(2) ordinarily requires a valid special resolution. Section 250N — mandatory public-company AGMs What the law does: (1) first AGM within 18 months after registration; (2) at least one per calendar year and within five months of financial-year end; (2A) strict-liability provision; (3) AGM is additional to other meetings; (4) exception for a one-member public company; (5)–(6) particular crowdfunding-related exceptions. Why it matters: The lecturer’s general statement that public companies hold AGMs every year has statutory exceptions. Student or practitioner application: For a 30 June year end, the standard five- month deadline is 30 November, subject to applicable exceptions/extensions. CORPORATE LAW 25 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 250P — ASIC extension of AGM period What the law does: (1) company application to ASIC; (2) application before ordinary deadline enables written extension; (3)–(4) compliance with extended period/conditions; (5) strict liability. Why it matters: Company cannot assume an AGM extension merely because convening is difficult. Section 250PAA — class exemptions for external administration What the law does: (1)(a)–(e) ASIC legislative instruments may exempt relevant winding-up, administration, deed or restructuring classes; (2) conditions; (3) Gazette publication. Why it matters: Insolvency regimes can affect otherwise normal AGM requirements. Section 250PAB — individual externally administered exemptions What the law does: Permits applications from appropriate liquidators, administrators and restructuring practitioners, with ASIC written exemptions and possible conditions. Why it matters: Distinguish case-specific exemption from an exemption for a class of companies. Section 250PA — written questions to auditor What the law does: (1)(a)–(b) listed-company member can send relevant audit question at least five business days before AGM; (2)–(3) company may examine and must forward it; (4)–(8) auditor/lead-auditor question list and limits; (9) company makes list available at AGM. Why it matters: Members can exercise information rights without controlling daily management. Section 250R — ordinary AGM business and remuneration report What the law does: (1)(a)–(d) reports, director election, auditor appointment/ remuneration may be AGM business without individual notice; (2)–(3) listed-company remuneration-report advisory vote; (4)–(10) restrictions, proxy exceptions and operation against conflicting rules. Why it matters: Unlike a vote removing directors, an advisory remuneration vote ordinarily does not itself bind the board. CORPORATE LAW 26 | CORPORATE LAW

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Section 250RA — auditor attendance for listed AGMs What the law does: (1)–(4) ensures individual auditors, audit firms or company audit teams are appropriately represented to answer questions, including strict-liability offences. Why it matters: An AGM is an accountability forum, not just a formality. Section 250S — questions about company management What the law does: (1) chair must afford members as a whole a reasonable chance to ask questions or comment on management at an AGM; (2) strict-liability offence. Why it matters: This gives HBC an avenue to criticise human-checkout automation at the AGM even if HBC cannot require directors to obey an ordinary shareholder motion about day-to-day operations. Student or practitioner application: Prepare careful questions about costs, customer impact, workforce strategy and disclosures without confusing questions with a binding operational resolution. D. How the live Forum links to membership, documentary proof and NL mining companies The lecturer begins with the foundations of membership to show why the precise identity of a shareholder matters when members later attempt to vote or requisition a meeting. Under s 231, consent and entry on the members’ register determine the acquisition of membership in the relevant ordinary case; ss 168–169 prescribe the register’s information, while ss 173, 176–177 govern access, evidentiary status and improper use. The live Forum’s illustration of a dealer using share-register addresses for unrelated car marketing is precisely the kind of misuse the restrictions seek to prevent. A share certificate under s 1070C is prima facie proof of title, but it does not simply override the register of members. A validly registered holder and an unregistered transferee may have different rights even when the transferee has paid consideration. In a proprietary company, the replaceable rule granting directors broad power to refuse a share transfer is s 1072G, not the misheard “207A(1)(G)” from the rough summary; actual legal duties and s 1071F relief still require careful consideration. Under s 1071E, notice of refusal must normally be provided within two months. CORPORATE LAW 27 | CORPORATE LAW

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No-liability (NL) mining company: A special kind of public company with mining- only objects; it cannot contractually recover unpaid share calls from a shareholder who refuses to pay. Forfeiture procedures may instead operate under the Act. Distinguish that position from a usual company limited by shares, in which members’ exposure generally includes unpaid share capital. Under s 254W(3), a due, unpaid call on an NL share affects the shareholder’s dividend entitlement. Why useful: this connects Chapter 2 company classification with Chapter 5 paid-up status, membership rights, financial distributions and cessation of membership. The forum also mentions transfer, death, bankruptcy, compulsory acquisition, forfeiture and lien as pathways affecting shareholding. Each works differently: the transfer or transmission and entry in the register, any constitutional restrictions, directors’ duties and separate takeover/insolvency legislation determine the particular consequence. Do not assert that every 90% acquisition automatically gives the acquirer an unconditional power to compulsorily acquire shares; the relevant statutory regime and conditions must be checked. E. The FreshFoods legal workflow — teach students how to apply the provisions Client problem Correct law to apply Advice and evidence Can HBC require a new EGM? s 249D(1)–(5); ss 249E–249F Obtain register, total votes and share rights; verify 5% and written signed requisition. 110 members alone is not enough. Can it propose a motion at an existing AGM? ss 249N(1)(a)–(b), (2)–(4); 249O(1)–(5) Verify 100 voting members or 5% voting power; check exact AGM timing and 1,000- word constraints. Can it campaign to other shareholders? s 249P(1)–(9); ss 173, 177 Prepare legitimate factual statement, written signatures and reasonable distribution expense plan. Can it order the board to keep human checkouts? s 198A; s 249Q; NRMA v Parker; ACCR v CBA A management directive may be substantively invalid; investigate director- removal route under s 203D. CORPORATE LAW 28 | CORPORATE LAW

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Client problem Correct law to apply Advice and evidence Which notice rules apply to a listed AGM/EGM? ss 249HA(1)–(3); 249J–249L Allow 28-day minimum; explain business, each removal/appointment, virtual attendance and proxy rights. How are the resolutions voted on? ss 250A–250D, 250E, 250J–250MA Check valid proxy appointments; poll under s 250JA for formally noticed listed-company resolutions; count voting rights. May shareholders ask about checkouts even without binding motion? ss 249S(1)–(7), 250S(1)–(2) Confirm a real opportunity to ask questions and make comments orally and in writing when virtual. Exam-style model answer: 110 HBC shareholders versus 5% voting power Issue. Does HBC have a statutory right to compel the FreshFoods board to convene a meeting and can it place its preferred motions before shareholders? Rule. Section 249D(1) requires at least 5% of voting power for a requisitioned meeting, together with formalities in s 249D(2)–(4) and the 21-day/two-month timetable in s 249D(5). Section 249N(1) separately permits at least 100 eligible members to propose a resolution; s 249O determines when that proposed resolution must be considered. Application. HBC’s 110 registered voting members, who together hold 220 shares, do not establish 5% of the relevant votes absent total voting-power evidence. Nonetheless, the 110-member figure ordinarily satisfies the separate s 249N member-count path (subject to applicable regulations). HBC gave notice on 1 October 2026 for an AGM on 18 November 2026: the AGM is fewer than two months after notice, so s 249O(1) does not compel inclusion at that meeting. Further, a binding resolution dictating human checkout levels is vulnerable as it concerns board management, whereas a properly framed removal of directors may fall within s 203D, subject to its requirements. NRMA v Parker and ACCR v CBA explain the substantive distinction. Counterargument. HBC may press that procedural rights and substantial public interest justify a vote. That does not independently convert management policy into shareholder power; it does support the strategy of campaigning, asking AGM questions and seeking election/removal of directors. Conclusion and advice. Verify the register and votes, seek support to meet 5%, CORPORATE LAW 29 | CORPORATE LAW

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use a valid s 249N notice and s 249P statement where available, and preserve the director-removal notice timetable. Do not advise the company that it must hold an invalid management-policy vote. F. Original document examples: what the student should recognise Board written resolution (ss 248A/248B): company name and ACN; exact board decision; date of last required signature; director signatories; minute-book recording. Shareholder requisition (s 249D): company/addressee; exact proposed resolutions; members’ names; signatures and identical counterparts; date of delivery; evidence of 5% of voting power. Member-proposed resolution (s 249N): full wording; signing members; 5% vote or 100-member eligibility basis; submission date. Proxy (ss 249X, 250A–250B): member identity, company, appointed proxy, meeting details, directed voting instructions, signature/authentication and receipt deadline. These are original teaching descriptions, not actual lodged company documents. G. Revision questions — review first, then check the next-page answers Question 1. Which section governs quorum if an HBC director asks whether a board decision can be made with one director present? Which section applies to quorum at an HBC shareholder meeting? Question 2. Explain three differences between s 249D, s 249N and s 249P. Question 3. An ASX-listed company proposes a director-removal resolution on its notice. Does the vote proceed by show of hands or by poll? Identify the statute. Question 4. Distinguish the 48-hour proxy deadline from the alternative permitted by statute. Question 5. What use can HBC make of s 250S even if it cannot legally compel directors to retain staffed checkouts? CORPORATE LAW 30 | CORPORATE LAW

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Revision questions — fully explained model answers Answer 1. The default board quorum is governed by s 248F (ordinarily two directors unless changed), subject to conflicts and other legal rules; the members’ meeting quorum is s 249T(1), ordinarily two members with the special counting requirements in s 249T(2). A single-director proprietary company uses s 248B for a signed record of its resolution. Answer 2. Section 249D requires at least 5% of votes and compels directors to call a new general meeting if its written requisition formalities are met; s 249N permits a 5%-of-votes group or at least 100 voting members to propose resolutions at a general meeting; s 249P uses comparable thresholds to require distribution of a statement about an appropriate meeting matter. Timing, permissible wording and cost rules then differ under ss 249D–249P. Answer 3. Under s 250JA(1)(a), a listed company must decide by poll a resolution set out in the meeting notice. Section 250JA(2) prevails over the show-of-hands replaceable rule in s 250J and contrary constitutional terms. A poll is important because s 250E(1)(b) generally allocates a vote to each share, subject to share rights. Answer 4. Under s 250B(1), appointment and any requisite attorney authority normally must be received 48 hours before the meeting. Under s 250B(5), the company’s constitution or the meeting notice may reduce the 48-hour period. Read the notice, determine the legal receipt point and verify electronic delivery if applicable. Answer 5. Section 250S(1) requires the AGM chair to allow a reasonable opportunity for the members as a whole to question or comment on management. HBC may ask about automation, workforce effects or strategy and seek a response, CORPORATE LAW 31 | CORPORATE LAW

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 1 WEEK 5 FORUM · PART 3 · INTEGRATED TEACHING Live Forum masterclass: meetings, requisitions, votes and real corporate advice When you open Chapter 2G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), you are not looking at a random collection of rules. You are looking at the operating instructions for corporate democracy. Imagine standing before a room of 1,000 future lawyers: the first question is not “Which section can I memorise?” It is “Who is legally permitted to make this decision, and what must happen before it becomes valid?” This chapter answers those questions in the order a student, company secretary or practising solicitor would use them. Statutory map: distinguish board decisions, shareholder meeting procedures and voting mechanics. Lesson 1: a decision without a meeting is not an informal shortcut For a board with more than one director, s 248A ordinarily permits a circulating resolution if every director entitled to vote signs the same resolution wording. Under subsection (2), signatures may appear on different identical copies. Under subsection (3), the resolution takes effect when the last eligible director signs. The record must be kept in the minute books under s 251A. This is not an ordinary majority vote: one missing signature prevents the circulating resolution taking effect through this statutory mechanism. Now change the facts. The company has one director and one member. Section 248B governs the sole director’s recorded decisions, while s 249B permits a company with one member to pass a members’ resolution when that member records and signs it. Two separate capacities are involved: the same human might be the sole director and sole shareholder, but a decision to approve a board transaction is legally different from a

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 2 decision requiring shareholders’ approval. The correct record must identify which capacity is being exercised. Lesson 2: shareholders do not necessarily have the power to manage A shareholder owns shares, not a fractional right to command store employees. Under the replaceable rule in s 198A, the business is managed by or under the direction of directors. Shareholders retain statutory and constitutional powers such as particular director-removal decisions, constitutional change and lawful meeting requisitions. That allocation must be understood before preparing any formal resolution. Interpretation lesson: the word must in s 249D does not mean the directors must convene any meeting on any topic merely because enough shareholders have signed. Section 249Q requires a proper purpose, and the authorities require scrutiny of whether the proposed resolution concerns business the members can lawfully determine. Likewise, may often confers a discretion, not an unlimited personal licence; the constitution and directors’ duties remain relevant. Five-question statutory interpretation sequence to use in a client interview and examination. Lesson 3: two notices, two clocks, and one valid meeting The formal requisition is a shareholder demand delivered to the company. Under s 249D(1)–(5), the requesting members collectively need 5% of voting power, not necessarily 5% of the number of shareholders. Their signed document must state the actual proposed resolutions, use identical wording across multiple signature copies, and be received by the company. The voting-power calculation uses the statutory reference time: midnight before the request is given. Once a valid requisition for lawful business is received, directors must call the meeting within 21 days and it must be held within two months of receipt. The notice of meeting is different: it is the communication issued to members identifying when and how the

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 3 meeting will take place. For most meetings the notice period under s 249H is at least 21 days; for listed companies, s 249HA generally requires 28 days. The company must comply with both the call deadline and the minimum period between meeting notice and meeting date, subject to any applicable exception. The word “call” must never be confused with “hold”. Timeline illustrating the requisition, meeting notice, 21-day deadline, two-month meeting deadline and the separate s 249E response. Lesson 4: what the directors’ failure actually costs If directors fail to call a validly requisitioned meeting within 21 days, s 249E(1) allows members holding more than 50% of the votes of the original requisitionists to arrange the meeting. This is not 50% of all company members or all company votes. Section 249E(2) requires the meeting to be called in substantially the usual way and held within three months after the original request. Under subsections (3)–(4), the company must supply the register for this purpose and reimburse reasonable costs attributable to the default. Subsection (5) allows cost recovery from directors, with a protection for directors who establish they took all reasonable steps to make the board comply. The statutory rules about strict liability and deduction from directors’ fees must also be checked before advising on enforcement. The alternative in s 249F is commercially different. Qualifying shareholders with 5% of the relevant votes can call a meeting directly, but ordinarily bear its expense. This does not let them ignore notice provisions, alter shareholders’ substantive powers or bypass a requirement for lawful proposed business. A careful solicitor normally compares both routes and advises on cost, speed, enforceability and procedural risk.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 4 Lesson 5: 110 investors cannot manufacture 5% from their headcount In FreshFoods, 110 activists purchase two shares each. That is 220 shares. Whether they satisfy s 249D depends upon the total votes that could be cast, not how many supporters have joined HBC. If the company hypothetically has 1,000,000 votes and each HBC ordinary share carries one vote, the activists have 0.022%, a long way below the statutory 5%. Under s 249N(1)(b), however, 100 qualifying voting members may give notice of a proposed resolution for a general meeting (subject to s 249N(1A) and other rules). Section 249O(1) concerns the next general meeting more than two months after notice is given. Neither procedure converts an invalid substantive proposal into a valid one. Illustrative voting-power comparison showing why the 100-member alternative in s 249N differs from the 5% in s 249D. Lesson 6: written resolutions, voting, polls and proxies are four different mechanisms A circulating resolution under s 248A or s 249A is passed without holding the relevant meeting and requires the statutory signatures. A shareholder voting at a meeting can generally vote through the approved meeting procedure. A proxy is a separate person appointed to act for a shareholder under ss 249X–250C. Direct voting is a meeting arrangement in which the member casts a vote personally in advance if the constitution and procedural framework support it; it is not automatically the same as using a proxy or signing a circulating resolution. Whether a particular company offers such a facility must be checked from its constitution and notice materials.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 5 Side-by-side teaching specimens: traditional proxy appointment (voting by representative) and modern direct voting if authorised by company rules. In a directed proxy, the shareholder specifies the instructions on a given resolution. In an undirected or open proxy, the proxy has discretion subject to the governing law and appointment; restrictions matter especially on remuneration-related resolutions under s 250BD. The relevant documents must be properly signed or authenticated and lodged by the statutory and meeting-notice deadlines. For listed companies, additional proxy and poll protections apply. Lesson 7: one person/one hand is not one share/one vote Under the replaceable rule in s 250E, a member of a share-capital company generally has one vote on a show of hands but one vote per share on a poll, subject to share-class rights and other restrictions. Listed-company resolutions specified by s 250JA must use a poll even where the constitution suggests otherwise. A demand for a poll has its own rules under ss 250K–250M; it is not a casual request that anyone can make at any time. The chair and qualifying voting members have defined powers to demand a poll, and the request must comply with timing requirements.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 6 Numerical voting illustration: a show of hands can differ from a poll because voting power follows shareholding. Lesson 8: meeting participation must be real, not theatrical Sections 249Q–249S require a proper purpose and meaningful member participation. Under s 249R(a), a meeting may occur at physical venues; under s 249R(b), hybrid meetings are permissible; wholly virtual meetings under s 249R(c) require express constitutional permission or requirement. It is incorrect to assume all post-2022 companies automatically obtain an unrestricted online-only option. A passive livestream is not necessarily equivalent to a meeting at which members can participate. ASIC guidance emphasises the rights to ask questions and make comments orally and in writing through technology. Quorum (s 249T), chair (s 249U), vote counting and records must all be satisfied. Lesson 9: special resolutions require more than 75% confidence An ordinary resolution normally requires a simple majority of votes cast by those entitled to vote. A special resolution under s 250MA requires the specified notice under s 249L(1)(c) and the statutory supermajority: at least 75% of votes cast by members entitled to vote, subject to any applicable higher constitutional threshold. Common uses include constitutional alteration under s 136. Do not use the 75% figure without examining the notice and the relevant meeting procedure.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 7 Lesson 10: shareholder activism in a complete practical example Suppose HBC asks for a meeting to order FreshFoods to retain staffed checkouts and, alternatively, to remove two directors. A lawyer should first interpret the precise text of both proposals. The operational order is vulnerable under the allocation-of-power authorities. The removal proposal engages s 203D and can be within shareholder competence, but that does not eliminate meeting-requisition thresholds, notice periods or specific removal procedures. A sophisticated opinion separates the validity of the subject matter, the right to call a meeting, the ability to put a resolution on an existing agenda, and the votes needed to pass the resolution.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 8 Active learning: final Week 5 Forum problems Tutorial-style problem 1 — meeting threshold FreshFoods Ltd has 12 million ordinary votes. HBC comprises 110 registered shareholders with two ordinary votes each. The AGM is in six weeks. HBC wishes to force a new EGM, require an advisory vote directing directors to close automated checkouts, and obtain a binding vote removing a director. Advise HBC on the statutory pathways and the governing cases. Tutorial-style problem 2 — failed requisition A qualifying coalition with 6% of voting power delivers a signed requisition specifying a valid director-removal resolution. Twenty-three days later the directors have not called a meeting. Of the original coalition, members holding 3.1% of total company voting power seek to call a meeting. Advise on the applicable conditions, timing and expenses. Tutorial-style problem 3 — circulating resolution and poll Four voting members of Blue Coast Pty Ltd attempt to amend its constitution by circulating a resolution. Three sign. The fourth refuses. At a subsequent meeting, two members vote in favour on a show of hands, while a member holding 75% of shares votes against. Discuss the legal effect of the circulating document, voting methods and any special-resolution implications.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 9 High Distinction model answers — final Forum problems Answer 1 — issues, law, cases, application and advice Issue: distinguish power to requisition an EGM from the ability to propose a resolution at an already scheduled meeting; determine whether either proposed resolution is substantively competent. Rule: s 249D requires members with at least 5% of votes that may be cast, a signed written document setting out proposed resolutions and delivery to the company. Section 249N separately allows qualifying members to propose a resolution, including through the alternative 100-member pathway (subject to the regulations), while s 249O directs attention to the next general meeting more than two months after notice. Under s 198A and NRMA v Parker, reinforced by ACCR v CBA, a general meeting cannot compel directors to carry out ordinary management functions without authority. Section 203D provides a shareholder power concerning removal of directors of a public company, subject to its own process. Application: HBC has only 220 votes out of 12 million, approximately 0.00183%, far below 5%. The group cannot force an EGM on that basis. Although 110 registered voting members may satisfy the separate s 249N member threshold, an AGM in six weeks does not meet s 249O(1)’s more-than-two-month timing rule; the next qualifying meeting must be considered. The proposed binding order to close automated checkouts intrudes on management under s 198A. A properly framed director-removal resolution is different: it concerns a recognised shareholder power. Counsel should check the directors’ appointment terms, s 203D notices and the constitution. Recommendation: verify the register and classes, identify additional holders willing to join a coalition, prepare lawful resolution wording, consider member statements under s 249P and check timing and costs. Avoid representing s 249N as a power to force an immediate EGM. Answer 2 — directors fail to act Issue: whether requisitionists may exercise s 249E and recover expenses. Rule: under s 249D(5), directors must call a validly requested general meeting within 21 days and arrange for it to be held within two months. Once they fail, s 249E(1) allows members with more than 50% of the votes of the original requesting members to call and arrange it; subsection (2) requires the meeting within three months of the original request. The company must generally reimburse reasonable expenses arising from the directors’ failure under s 249E(4), with potential recourse against directors under subsection (5) subject to its protection. Application: the new group holds 3.1% of total voting power, more than half of the original 6% requisitionists’ votes (half is 3%). Provided those members actually formed

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 10 part of the original requisition, the s 249E(1) threshold is met. Day 23 follows the directors’ day-21 default. The members must still prepare compliant meeting notices, allow the prescribed notice period and complete the meeting within three months measured from the original request date, not day 23. Conclusion: they can ordinarily proceed under s 249E and seek reasonable costs; counsel should document the original signatures, voting power and costs carefully. Answer 3 — unanimous signatures versus majority voting Issue: whether a circulating decision was completed and whether show-of-hands support legally amends the constitution. Rule: s 249A requires every member entitled to vote to sign a relevant multi-member proprietary-company circulating resolution; the resolution passes when the last such member signs. An ordinary show of hands differs from a poll under s 250E, subject to the constitution and share rights. Constitutional amendment under s 136 ordinarily requires a special resolution, satisfying s 250MA’s notice and voting requirements. Application: three signatures out of four do not complete a circulating resolution. The meeting’s apparent 2–1 support on hands cannot be equated to the necessary special resolution, particularly where a shareholder with 75% of shares opposes the change. The applicable procedure and ability to demand a poll must be considered. Conclusion: no amendment is established on these facts; advise on correct meeting notice, voting rules and alternative consensual drafting.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 11 Final FAQs — apply the rules correctly Does 100 shareholders let us demand an EGM? No. Section 249D uses the 5% voting-power threshold. Section 249N retains an alternative 100-member route for proposing resolutions at a qualifying general meeting, subject to any applicable regulations and the powers of the meeting. Do directors have to hold the requisitioned meeting within 21 days? No. They must call it within 21 days. The meeting is to be held within two months from receipt of the valid request, while notice rules independently apply. Can a member send a single signature sheet without the resolution? The statutory request must state the proposed resolutions. Multiple identical copies can be signed, but each must meet the statutory wording and signature requirements. Is a proxy the same as direct voting? No. A proxy is a representative appointed to attend or vote for the member. A direct vote is cast by the member personally in accordance with any constitutional and meeting arrangements enabling that facility. Can shareholders force a formally advisory vote on the board’s staffing policy? Not automatically. The proposed resolution must fall within members’ powers. Apply NRMA v Parker, ACCR v CBA, s 198A and the company constitution. Is the company always required to hold a completely virtual AGM? No. Hybrid meetings are permitted under the statutory scheme, but wholly virtual meetings ordinarily require express authorisation in the constitution; meaningful participation remains necessary.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 12 Final MCQs — answer before turning the page MCQ 1. The s 249D meeting requisition threshold is: A. Any 100 shareholders B. At least 5% of votes which may be cast C. A majority of members D. All directors MCQ 2. The board receives a valid s 249D requisition on Day 0. The directors must: A. Hold the meeting within 21 days B. Call the meeting within 21 days and hold it within two months C. Send 28 days’ notice in every company D. Call only if they approve the proposal MCQ 3. Under s 249E, after failure by directors the persons entitled to call the meeting are: A. Any one initial signatory B. More than 50% of the original requisitionists by headcount C. Original signatories controlling more than 50% of requisitioning votes D. 50% of all company shareholders MCQ 4. A meeting of FreshFoods resolves to instruct the board to redesign store operations. The main concern is: A. Any 5% can issue directions to directors B. It may be beyond shareholders’ substantive powers C. Members cannot speak at AGMs D. The meeting must always use a show of hands MCQ 5. A company wants to hold a wholly virtual general meeting. Under s 249R(c), it ordinarily needs: A. Express constitutional permission or requirement B. A simple board email

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 13 C. Approval by any single shareholder D. No special condition MCQ 6. For a multi-member proprietary company circulating resolution under s 249A: A. Two-thirds sign B. A simple majority signs C. Every eligible voting member signs the same resolution wording D. It must always be passed by poll

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 14 MCQ answers with explanations MCQ 1 — B Section 249D concerns voting power; the 100-member alternative belongs to s 249N and is not a power to force a new meeting. MCQ 2 — B The 21 days concerns calling; two months concerns holding. Listed-company notice timing under s 249HA is separate. MCQ 3 — C The statutory threshold refers to more than half the votes held by those who made the initial s 249D request. MCQ 4 — B NRMA v Parker and ACCR v CBA require separating the meeting procedure from the authority to make the decision. MCQ 5 — A The statute and ASIC guidance distinguish hybrid meetings from wholly virtual-only meetings. MCQ 6 — C Unanimity of eligible signatories is essential for the circulating statutory mechanism.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 15 Short-answer questions — try them yourself Short-answer 1 Write the four elements of a valid shareholder requisition under s 249D(2). Short-answer 2 Explain the distinction between s 249D, s 249E and s 249F, including who pays the meeting expenses. Short-answer 3 Explain how the two separate notices operate in a requisitioned meeting. Short-answer 4 Explain the difference between a shareholder proxy, a direct vote, and a circulating resolution. Short-answer 5 A group has 110 voting members but less than 1% of votes. Explain two lawful commercial strategies a solicitor might consider.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER 5 · WEEK 5 FORUM FINAL TEACHING | 16 Short-answer model responses Short-answer model response 1 The request must (a) be in writing, (b) state any resolutions to be proposed, (c) be signed by members making it, and (d) be given to the company. Check the 5% threshold under s 249D(1), identical copies under (3), the midnight calculation under (4) and the deadlines under (5). Short-answer model response 2 Section 249D enables shareholders holding at least 5% of voting power to require directors to call the meeting. Section 249E lets original requisitionists holding more than half the requesting votes act after a failure within 21 days; the company pays reasonable expenses caused by the default, with possible recovery from directors. Section 249F permits a 5% coalition to call directly, with those members bearing expenses. Short-answer model response 3 First, requesting shareholders give the requisition to the company under s 249D. The directors then call a meeting by giving a notice to the members under ss 249H–249L and 249HA where applicable. The directors’ 21-day deadline to call is not itself the general meeting’s 21- or 28-day minimum notice period. The meeting also has a separate two-month outer deadline. Short-answer model response 4 A proxy under ss 249X–250C is a representative appointed by the member to act at the meeting. Direct voting, where validly authorised, is the member’s own vote cast under the company’s constitutional/meeting voting facility. A circulating resolution under s 248A or 249A is a resolution passed without a meeting through the statutory signature mechanism; eligible signatories must satisfy the applicable unanimity rule. Short-answer model response 5 Check whether qualifying holders can collectively reach 5% and, if not, lawfully contact shareholders through the register subject to ss 173 and 177 and applicable privacy/use limits. The group may also consider an appropriate s 249N proposal for a later general meeting using its 100-member route, provided the resolution is legally competent, timely under s 249O and formally compliant. If necessary, consider acquiring further voting interests only after proper commercial and regulatory advice.

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even if ordinary members cannot compel the board to accept an operational instruction inconsistent with s 198A and the company’s constitution. H. Legislative reference and legal accuracy notes The key legislation for this chapter is the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Federal Register of Legislation. The detailed provision summaries above are grounded in the published Commonwealth compilation, and should be read with the official statute: Chapter 2G, Parts 2G.1–2G.2 (official authorised HTML text, 19 December 2025). A 19 September 2026 compilation is identified by the chapter’s earlier source checkpoint, but a full paragraph-by-paragraph reconciliation between all editions has not been independently certified for this new insertion. The publication authority audit must be completed before making a full-certification claim. Transcription corrections retained in the teaching narrative: The broad share- transfer refusal replaceable rule is s 1072G, not “207A(1)(G)”; the share-register inspection rule is s 173, not “s 208A”; director removal under s 203D remains a separate substantive and procedural question; directors’ meetings (ss 248A–248G), members’ meetings (ss 249A–249Z) and voting and AGMs (ss 250A–250S) must never be treated as interchangeable. The source is the first supplied portion of the Week 5 live Forum; any further recording was not yet received when this update was prepared. Suppose 110 HBC supporters hold two shares each in a major listed supermarket. They are numerous as people, but their 220 shares are a tiny part of the company's voting capital. Australian corporate law deliberately uses two different measuring devices. Some rights are reserved to members holding a percentage of voting power. Others also give a voice to a fixed number of individual members, even where their aggregate votes are small. Confusing those thresholds is the principal pitfall in the Week 6 tutorial. 7. Division of powers: a proposed staffing mandate is not a board instruction The starting point is s 198A, the replaceable rule giving management of the company to or under the direction of directors, and empowering directors to exercise company powers other than those reserved to the general meeting. In a listed company, check the actual constitution. Directors manage strategy and operations; shareholders vote on matters the Act or constitution allocates to them. CORPORATE LAW 32 | CORPORATE LAW

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LEADING AUTHORITY — MANAGEMENT CANNOT BE USURPED Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 (Full Court). Shareholder activists sought to advance resolutions relating to the bank's management and climate-related practices. The Court held that a resolution requires a statutory or constitutional foundation; the shareholders did not obtain a general right to vote on management directions simply because they could raise concerns. Why this case matters to FreshFoods: a mandatory resolution ordering the board to keep human checkout staff is not within members' ordinary management powers. It is quite different from removing and electing directors under an applicable statutory power. Further historical support for the division of powers appears in Automatic Self- Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 and John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113. NRMA v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517 is particularly important in analysing whether a proposed member resolution is something that may properly be put to a corporate meeting. 8. Calling a meeting: ss 249C–249G Sections 249C and 249CA: a director may call a meeting; s 249CA gives listed-company directors this power despite contrary constitutional provision. Section 249D: members holding at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at the meeting may make a formal written requisition stating proposed resolutions, signed and delivered to the company. The voting percentage is measured at midnight before the request is given. Directors must call the meeting within 21 days and ensure it is held within two months. Note these are two separate deadlines. Section 249E: if the directors fail within 21 days, members holding more than 50% of the votes held by all requisitionists may call the meeting. It must be held within three months of the requisition; reasonable expenses fall on the company, with possible recovery from directors. This is not a free-standing right for any arbitrary minority of shareholders. Section 249F: holders of at least 5% of the votes can call the meeting themselves without first requisitioning it, but must pay its expenses. For a large listed company these costs can be commercially considerable. Section 249G allows a Court-ordered meeting if convening one otherwise is impracticable; it is not an easy alternative whenever a 5% threshold is missed. CORPORATE LAW 33 | CORPORATE LAW

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110 supporters × 2 shares each = 220 shares 220 shares is not proof of 5% voting power. To reach 5%, HBC needs reliable information on voting rights and the voting capital relevant to the proposed resolution, not a guess based on the headcount of its campaign. 9. Member-proposed resolutions: ss 249N–249O Section 249N permits a notice of proposed resolution from either members holding 5% of the votes on the resolution or at least 100 voting members (subject to any valid prescribed variation). Here the headcount route matters: 110 qualifying HBC members can meet the latter threshold even with a very small shareholding. A written notice must state the resolution exactly and be signed by the proposing members. Section 249O provides that the resolution is to be considered at the next general meeting that takes place more than two months after notice is given. This is not a statutory right to demand inclusion in an AGM less than two months away. Example: Notice given on 1 October for an AGM on 18 November leaves less than two months. Section 249O does not compel FreshFoods to place it on that AGM's agenda. HBC can seek voluntary cooperation or plan for the next qualifying meeting. But the resolution must also be substantively within shareholder competence; procedural eligibility alone cannot make the human-checkout policy binding. 10. Members’ statements: s 249P Section 249P gives members a campaigning instrument separate from s 249N: 5% voting power or 100 voting members may request circulation of a statement about a proposed resolution or another matter properly considered at a general meeting. The request must be in writing, signed and delivered. A statement over 1,000 words or defamatory need not be distributed. The company normally bears the distribution cost when it receives the statement in time to accompany the meeting notice; late statements may put costs on the requesting members, together with an advance-cost requirement. Crucially, the right is not restricted to the same shareholders who originally proposed a resolution. WHY S 249P MATTERS STRATEGICALLY HBC's 110 shareholders can satisfy the numerical member threshold to communicate a persuasive business case to other investors, even though their own votes cannot carry the resolutions. They could explain evidence of customer dissatisfaction, reputational risk, operating costs and alternative staffing CORPORATE LAW 34 | CORPORATE LAW

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arrangements. The statement must remain lawful and must not imply that an unenforceable management direction has become binding. 11. Notice, meeting mechanics and voting Sections 249H–249HA distinguish the general 21-day minimum meeting notice from the 28-day minimum for listed companies, subject to relevant qualifications. Section 249L describes information that a notice must contain. Sections 249Q–249S require a proper meeting purpose and meaningful opportunity for members to participate, including applicable rules for physical, hybrid and wholly virtual meetings. Provisions such as ss 249T–249U cover quorum and chairing. It is not enough simply to send an email saying 'meeting next week' or run a one-way webcast labelled as a valid virtual meeting. Where a public-company director is to be removed, s 203D(2) generally requires at least two months' notice of the intention to move the removal resolution, but includes an exception where the company calls a meeting after receiving that notice. The company must also comply with the statutory rights of the affected director. This is legally distinct from the usual 28-day listed-company meeting notice under s 249HA. An adviser must map both timeframes, not treat one as replacing the other. Voting: s 250E deals with voting rights under replaceable rules. For listed companies, s 250JA requires polls on specified resolutions. Under a poll, voting usually reflects the number of voting shares rather than one vote per person. Section 249A provides a circulating-resolution procedure for qualifying proprietary companies, and s 249B a one- member resolution procedure. Neither is a shortcut for passing an ASX-listed company resolution without properly convening members. FIVE PROVISIONS TO SEPARATE IN AN EXAM s 249D: 5% — force the directors to call a new meeting. s 249E: requisitionists act after the directors fail; their internal >50% rule applies. s 249F: 5% — call the meeting directly, generally paying the expenses. s 249N: 5% or 100 members — propose a resolution for a qualifying general meeting. s 249P: 5% or 100 members — request circulation of a lawful member statement. CORPORATE LAW 35 | CORPORATE LAW

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12. Using a proxy: representation when a shareholder cannot attend Section 249X deals with the right to appoint a proxy; s 249Y explains rights including speaking, voting according to the appointment and joining a demand for a poll. Sections 250A–250B govern appointment formality and lodging documents. A proxy can be directed (for example instructed to vote FOR removing a director) or open (with discretion subject to applicable law and form terms). For an activist campaign, valid proxies are often more consequential than the number of shareholders attending physically: votes must actually be collected and cast correctly. EXAMPLE SHAREHOLDER PROXY FORM FRESHFOODS LTD — illustrative educational form only Member name: ____________________________ Holder reference: ______________ I appoint: [ ] the Chair of the Meeting [ ] ____________________________ as my proxy for the general meeting on ___________ Proposed resolution FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN Remove Priya as director (if lawfully proposed) ☐ ☐ ☐ Remove Marcus as director (if lawfully proposed) ☐ ☐ ☐ Elect candidate X as director (if lawfully proposed) ☐ ☐ ☐ Signature __________________________ Date ____________________ Illustration only. Use the company's actual meeting notice, form and statutory requirements. This is not an official FreshFoods document or filing. 13. Requisition timeline: an applied guide Day 0 Valid s 249D signed requisition delivered by members holding at least 5% votes. Within 21 days Directors must call the meeting (issue the necessary notice). If they do not, s 249E may be used by the qualifying majority of requisitionists. At least 28 days Listed-company meeting notice under s 249HA (subject to interaction with other procedural requirements). CORPORATE LAW 36 | CORPORATE LAW

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Within 2 months Directors must hold the requisitioned meeting under s 249D(5). Within 3 months Meeting called by qualifying requisitionists under s 249E must be held within this separate statutory outer limit. Do not calculate a precise calendar date for a removal resolution without checking s 203D(2), the date valid notices were delivered and how the meeting was called. CORPORATE LAW 37 | CORPORATE LAW

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PART III · THE LECTURER’S MUST-READ DIVIDEND PROVISIONS Dividends — ss 254SA–254W Chapter 5 now connects your lecturer’s full Week 5 narrated dividend explanation to the precise statutory tests and the FreshFoods tutorial problem. The questions are distinct: lawful payment, authority to determine it, revocability and debt formation, and share rights. 14. What exactly is a dividend? A dividend is a distribution made by a company to its shareholders in accordance with their relevant rights and the corporate law governing distributions. If a company has more resources than it needs to operate safely, it may choose to return value to shareholders instead of retaining every dollar for expansion, acquisitions or reserves. The key word is may. Profitability, by itself, ordinarily does not entitle shareholders to force payment. The company has general corporate powers under s 124(1)(d), including the power to distribute company property among members in kind or otherwise. That general power is constrained by the more specific dividend provisions, the constitution, share rights and directors’ duties. A reference in the supplied automated JUNI summary to “s 120” as the general dividend power should therefore be corrected to s 124(1)(d). How dividends are paid Section 254U(1) expressly contemplates several methods: cash, newly issued shares, options and transferring assets. For example, a business holding valuable property might propose an in-kind dividend, while a listed company might operate a dividend- reinvestment arrangement that issues shares instead of distributing all dividends in cash. The precise terms of any scheme matter. 2,000 shares × $0.25 per share = $500 dividend This calculation illustrates a basic equal per-share dividend. It does not establish that the company has met the statutory conditions for payment. CORPORATE LAW 38 | CORPORATE LAW

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15. Section 254SA — prohibition for companies limited by guarantee Section 254SA states the general rule that a company limited by guarantee must not pay a dividend to members. Such entities are commonly used where people join as members without holding ordinary share capital, including certain clubs and community organisations. The rule prevents members from using dividends to extract assets as though they were holders of ordinary shares in a commercial company. Example: A company limited by guarantee has accumulated a $400,000 surplus. Its members cannot simply vote themselves dividend cheques. The company type is the threshold issue. There is a specialised carve-out under s 254WA for qualifying mutual capital instruments issued by certain mutual entities. An answer saying “never, under any circumstances” would miss this exception. 16. Section 254T — three conditions before paying dividends Of all the provisions in this group, s 254T(1) is the most immediately useful for analysing a planned distribution. It is drafted as a prohibition: a company must not pay a dividend unless all three statutory limbs are satisfied. It is not an invitation to pick whichever limb is easiest to meet. (a) The asset–liability excess must be sufficient Immediately before a dividend is declared, the assets must exceed liabilities, and the excess must be sufficient to fund the payment. Under s 254T(2) the asset and liability figures must be worked out according to accounting standards in force at the relevant time, even where a standard otherwise would not apply to a company's financial year. This is not simply the cash balance in the bank. Assets − liabilities = asset surplus $3,000,000 − $2,200,000 = $800,000 A proposed $500,000 dividend falls within that hypothetical $800,000 excess. But passing this first numerical test does not authorise payment unless the remaining two tests are also satisfied. A $900,000 proposed dividend fails this test on those assumptions. CORPORATE LAW 39 | CORPORATE LAW

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(b) Fairness and reasonableness to shareholders as a whole Section 254T(1)(b) examines the effect of the dividend on the shareholders collectively. A shareholder cannot necessarily demand identical money to every other shareholder: different share classes may carry different dividend rights. Rather, the decision needs a proper legal and commercial basis, considering the actual share rights and the overall effect on shareholders. Example: A company's controllers want to benefit themselves through a selective distribution that excludes equivalent minority investors without a proper basis. That raises questions under this fairness limb and potentially, depending on the facts, the oppression provisions considered later in the course. (c) No material prejudice to creditors Section 254T(1)(c) asks whether payment would materially prejudice the company's ability to pay creditors. Suppose a company owns $4 million in buildings but has only $50,000 in cash while $200,000 in supplier invoices fall due within days. An otherwise valuable company may be illiquid: it cannot access enough money quickly enough. Directors must examine payment timing, financial forecasts and actual access to funds, not just asset valuations. Do not use the wrong statutory test. The slide’s and JUNI summary’s references to fraud are not the operative wording of paragraph (c). The statutory issue is material prejudice to the ability to pay creditors; it does not require an intention to defraud. The “balance sheet solvency” label is a convenient teaching shorthand, but the statute imposes both an asset-surplus requirement and separate fairness and creditor-protection requirements. The principal amendment to s 254T replacing the old profits rule occurred in 2010; the transcript’s reference to approximately 2012 is an understandable chronological approximation, not the date to publish as settled law. 17. Section 254U — directors’ power to determine dividends Section 254U(1) is a replaceable rule (see s 135): if applicable, it empowers the directors to decide that a dividend will be payable and to settle three essential matters — amount, payment date and method of payment. The directors do not obtain an unrestricted power to distribute assets in defiance of s 254T or the rights attached to shares. CORPORATE LAW 40 | CORPORATE LAW

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Example: On 16 October, a board determines that shareholders will receive 20 cents per ordinary share on 15 December, paid electronically. This is a decision determining a dividend under the s 254U model. As a general rule, a shareholder resolution is not an additional condition under that model. A company's particular constitution can change the governance analysis, so advisers must read it. Under s 254U(2) interest is not payable on a dividend under this statutory rule. This should not be confused with the separate question of when a payable dividend becomes a legally enforceable debt. The older constitutional approach — what your lecturer is contrasting Historically, many companies followed Table A articles under which directors recommended an amount but members formally declared the dividend. Some companies continue to operate under constitutions providing for declaration. This matters because s 254V(2), unlike s 254V(1), makes the declaration a debt-creating event. It would be inaccurate to say that a company falls into one system purely because it was registered before or after a particular calendar year. The correct starting point is the actual constitution. 18. Section 254V — the crucial issue: when a dividend becomes a debt The most important connection in your Week 5 narration is the connection between a board's dividend decision and the company's exposure to a debt. A debt is an enforceable obligation to pay, although not every debt gives rise to an immediate right to demand payment. When it arises may affect a shareholder's recovery rights and the company's solvency analysis. Section 254V(1): the later debt — and revocation before the due date Section 254V(1) provides that merely fixing a dividend's amount or payment date does not create the debt. The debt arises when the fixed date arrives. Until then, the company can revoke the decision. This is why your lecturer emphasised a change in financial circumstances between announcing a dividend and the scheduled date of payment. Section 254V(2): the earlier debt created by declaration If the company has a constitution that provides for the declaration of dividends, s 254V(2) instead treats the dividend as a debt when declared. That can occur well before the CORPORATE LAW 41 | CORPORATE LAW

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stated date of payment. The statutory right of pre-payment revocation in subsection (1) must not simply be assumed to apply in this different situation. Question s 254V(1) s 254V(2) Trigger Board determines a dividend Dividend declared under a constitution providing for declaration When debt arises When fixed payment date arrives When dividend declared Can decision be revoked beforehand? Yes, before the debt-creation date Not under the revocation mechanism in s 254V(1) Why material? Opportunity to respond to a financial crisis Earlier enforceable obligation and insolvency consequences Worked company scenario — what happens if disaster strikes? 16 October: Bayside Trading Ltd proposes a dividend of $1 million, with payment set for 15 December. 20 November: its largest customer enters insolvency; the company loses expected receipts and cannot safely pay the planned dividend. 15 December: the intended payment date arrives. 16 OCT Dividend decided → 20 NOV Financial crisis → 15 DEC Payment date If s 254V(1) governs: the decision can be revoked before 15 December. Proper revocation prevents that proposed dividend becoming a debt on the specified date. Directors must still consider any separate contractual promises, published representations and other legal obligations on the actual facts. If s 254V(2) governs: debt arose when the dividend was declared. Later cash flow trouble does not transform that debt into an optional payment. Directors must analyse how the obligation interacts with the company's ability to pay debts and the available restructuring or administration options. Professional accuracy: Non-payment does not automatically prove insolvency, and directors do not automatically become personally liable for the entire dividend. Insolvency under s 95A generally involves inability to pay debts when they become due; a s 588G claim has further statutory requirements, including the incurring of a CORPORATE LAW 42 | CORPORATE LAW

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relevant debt, insolvency or insolvency caused by incurring it, reasonable grounds for suspicion, and the applicable director-related conditions, subject to statutory defences or exceptions. Your lecturer used a simplified warning about directors’ exposure; a published legal textbook must teach the qualifying elements. Practical board advice A careful adviser would obtain the constitution, details of the dividend decision, class rights, the minutes, the payment date, current management accounts, solvency forecasts, debtor recoverability, banking facilities and creditors' due dates. Advisers should not sign off merely because the previous year's financial statements show a profit. All three s 254T conditions require active assessment and documentation. 19. Section 254W — dividend rights by company type Section 254W concerns who is entitled to dividends and on what basis. It does not itself authorise a company to disregard the payment restrictions in s 254T. Public companies — s 254W(1) Each share within a class of public-company shares has the same dividend rights unless the constitution provides different rights or a special resolution provides different rights. The correct comparison is between shares of the same class; preference shares, for instance, need not have identical rights to ordinary shares. The slide saying “everyone receives the same amount per share” works as an illustration for equal rights, but is not an unconditional rule covering all share classes and exceptions. 1,000 ordinary shares × $0.10 = $100 5,000 ordinary shares × $0.10 = $500 Proprietary companies — s 254W(2) The directors of a proprietary company may pay dividends as they see fit, subject to the terms on which its shares were issued. This provides flexibility, but directors must still examine the constitution, equal-treatment expectations, conflict-of-interest concerns, oppression risk, and the mandatory s 254T conditions. Freedom to exercise discretion is not freedom to act capriciously or unlawfully. CORPORATE LAW 43 | CORPORATE LAW

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No-liability companies — s 254W(3) and (4) Under subsection (3), a person is not entitled to a dividend on a share where a call on that share is due and unpaid. Under subsection (4), dividends are generally paid proportionally to the number of shares held, regardless of amounts paid up, but the section is expressly subject to constitutional provisions concerning shares other than ordinary shares. Specialised mutual entities — s 254WA Section 254WA addresses qualifying MCI mutual entities that are companies limited by guarantee. It modifies the ordinary s 254SA prohibition in relation to mutual capital instruments and adds a fairness requirement. This is a technical exception worth knowing exists even if the course concentrates on ordinary companies limited by shares. 20. Dividend decisions, directors’ duties and remedies The legislative dividend conditions do not operate in isolation. A board that authorises an improper payment may expose the company, and in some circumstances the directors, to remedies or regulatory consequences under other provisions. Depending on the facts, a practitioner should consider unlawful reductions of share capital (including s 256D where relevant), insolvent trading (s 588G), duties of care and good faith (including ss 180– 183), shareholder oppression (s 232), and injunctive relief (s 1324). These are separate causes of action with distinct thresholds, not automatic consequences of every dividend dispute. For an exam problem, identify the conduct first, state the matching elements and then apply the facts. Do not write “directors liable” simply because a dividend was later unaffordable. Ask who decided, what they knew, what date the debt arose and what company records supported the decision. CORPORATE LAW 44 | CORPORATE LAW

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CHAPTER 5 • CASE-LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION MASTERCLASS Shareholders and Dividends: From Statute to Legal Advice A connected teaching expansion, read after the core Chapter 5 narrative and before the Week 6 tutorial. This section adds deeper practical reasoning to the existing chapter; it does not replace the original lecture notes or university tutorial. Imagine you are advising the chair of a public company. Your client receives a letter signed by a small but organised group of members demanding an extraordinary general meeting. The directors believe the campaign is disruptive, the proposed resolution concerns operational policy, and the activists say they will arrange the meeting themselves. What should the lawyer do first? Not simply say yes because a meeting power exists, or no because directors normally manage the business. We must work methodically from the wording of the legislation, then test the proposed business against the company's constitutional division of powers. 1. Reading the legislation as a practising lawyer Chapter 2G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) divides meeting rules between decision- makers. Part 2G.1 (ss 248A–248G) regulates directors' meetings and decisions. Part 2G.2 (the 249 and 250 series) regulates members' meetings and their procedures. When a client says that “the company has voted”, ask who voted: the board, members at a general meeting, or a single-member company? Different provisions apply. Identify the organ Board or members? → Read the subsection Who, threshold, form? → Check power Constitution and cases → Apply procedure Dates, notices, votes → Advise Remedy and strategy Figure 1. The five-stage statutory-interpretation method for client interviews and examinations. First, distinguish mandatory provisions from replaceable rules. Section 135 explains the replaceable-rule mechanism; a company's constitution may displace an applicable replaceable rule, but it does not ordinarily displace a mandatory statutory obligation. Thus CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 1 | CORPORATE LAW

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s 249C is ordinarily a replaceable rule empowering a director to call a general meeting; s 249CA separately secures a director's calling power for listed companies. Second, identify the particular decision the members are trying to make. The director-management replaceable rule, s 198A, and the constitution may allocate ordinary commercial management to the board. Third, make each procedural step legally effective: otherwise a legitimate commercial campaign may fail on form or timing. Say it aloud: “A procedural right to request or propose a meeting does not confer a new substantive power to control management.” The distinction is crucial in NRMA v Parker and ACCR v CBA. 2. Circulating resolutions: the three questions students confuse Suppose three directors unanimously agree to purchase new computer equipment. They are all travelling, and there is no commercial reason to convene another board meeting. Section 248A, where applicable, provides a written circulating-resolution mechanism, requiring the signatures of the directors entitled to vote on the resolution. Separate documents may be used if their wording is identical. This is different from s 248B, which addresses decisions by a company with one director in the circumstances to which that provision applies. Now imagine a proprietary company has four voting members. Section 249A gives a written member-resolution procedure: every member entitled to vote must sign documents stating that they favour the resolution; ordinarily it passes when the last required member signs. A company with a single member uses s 249B, under which that member records and signs the resolution. These procedures should not be casually transferred to a widely held public company. Always check the company's type, the specific section and any exceptions. Worked example: A proprietary company's three members hold 90, 9 and 1 shares. A proposed s 249A resolution needs all three required signatures, not merely the owner of 90 shares. Contrast an ordinary poll at a properly convened meeting: voting rights are then counted under the applicable voting rules, not the unanimity requirement for this written procedure. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 2 | CORPORATE LAW

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3. A requisition creates two documents and two clocks A requisition under s 249D is a formal request by members with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at the general meeting. It is not enough to say that a group contains 100 people: the 100-member alternative was removed from this particular provision in 2015. Critically, the word “members” means that votes may be aggregated among a coalition. A shareholder with 2%, another with 2% and a third with 1.2% can satisfy the 5% voting threshold if their holdings carry the required votes and their requests are valid. Section 249D(2)(a)–(d) supplies the formal checklist: writing; the proposed resolutions; signatures of the requesting members; and delivery to the company. Section 249D(3) permits separately signed identical documents. Under s 249D(4), voting percentages are worked out at midnight immediately before the request is given. Under s 249D(5), directors must call the meeting within 21 days of the request and arrange for it to be held not later than two months after the request. Document A Members send s 249D requisition to company → 21-day deadline Directors call meeting → Document B Company sends meeting notice → Meeting Held within 2 months of A Figure 2. Do not confuse the requisition delivered to the company with the subsequent meeting notice to members. The two documents have different legal functions. The requisition activates the directors' duty to arrange the meeting. The notice of meeting informs members of when the meeting will occur and what business will be considered. Under s 249H, most non-listed general meetings require at least 21 days' notice, subject to statutory qualifications. Under s 249HA, listed-company meetings generally require at least 28 days. Section 249L regulates notice content, including the place, time, technology, general business and additional information for special resolutions. The notice period must fit inside the overall meeting deadline unless some lawful exception applies. What if the directors do nothing? Section 249E(1) permits members with more than 50% of the votes held by the original requesting members to take over calling the meeting after the directors' 21-day failure. It is not 50% of the company's total votes; and “more than” does not mean “at least”. Under s 249E(2) the meeting must be held not later than three months after the original requisition. Section 249E(3) addresses access to the register for CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 3 | CORPORATE LAW

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that purpose. Section 249E(4) makes the company liable for reasonable expenses caused by the default, while s 249E(5) enables the company to recover expenses from liable directors, with protection for those who prove they took all reasonable steps to cause compliance. Under s 249F, members with at least 5% of the votes may call their own meeting without first using s 249D, but the convening members must pay the expenses. This is not a shortcut around the 5% threshold, minimum notice or the need for a proper purpose. It may nevertheless be strategically useful where timing and control of arrangements justify the cost. 4. Where 100 members does still matter: s 249N A group that cannot force a new meeting may be able to have a resolution considered at an already scheduled meeting. Under s 249N(1)(a)–(b), the eligible proposing group is members holding at least 5% of the votes on that resolution or at least 100 voting members, subject to the regulation-making qualification in s 249N(1A). The proposed notice must comply with s 249N(2)(a)–(c); the voting percentage timing rule is in s 249N(4). Section 249O(1) directs attention to the next general meeting occurring more than two months after the notice. “More than two months” matters: if an AGM is in six weeks, do not assume a company is obliged to distribute and consider the proposal at that AGM. Section 249P separately governs eligible members' statements to be distributed, with content and cost rules to be checked on the actual facts. Neither section magically turns an unauthorised management instruction into valid shareholder business. FreshFoods calculation: 110 HBC members × 2 shares = 220 shares. If FreshFoods has, for illustration, 20 million votes, HBC controls only 0.0011% of votes. Their headcount may assist under s 249N, but their 220 shares do not on their own establish the 5% voting power needed by s 249D or s 249F. 5. What happens at the meeting? Section 249Q requires a proper purpose. Under ss 249R–249S, meeting format and participation matter: an entirely virtual meeting requires express constitutional permission; a hybrid meeting may be permissible even without that express permission. Technology is not satisfactory merely because people can watch a one-way stream—members must CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 4 | CORPORATE LAW

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have a reasonable opportunity to participate. ASIC's current guidance on virtual and hybrid meetings explains the practical requirements. Sections 249T and 249U address the default quorum and meeting chair. Voting requires a separate analysis under ss 250E–250M. On a show of hands, voting ordinarily reflects persons voting; on a poll, votes reflect the applicable voting rights attached to shares, often one vote per fully paid ordinary share. In listed companies, s 250JA requires a poll for relevant resolutions rather than allowing the result to turn on a mere show of hands. Shareholder Shares held Show of hands (illustration) Poll (assuming one vote/share) Major investor 900 1 vote 900 votes Five small holders combined 5 5 votes 5 votes Figure 3. Five hands may outnumber one hand, but on a poll 900 votes outweigh five. Real outcomes depend on class rights, proxies and the Act. A proxy is an authorised representative appointed to attend and/or vote for a member. Sections 249X–249Y establish proxy rights, with mechanics in ss 250A–250B and further protections for listed-company proxies in ss 250BA–250BD. A direct vote under a constitutionally authorised system is different: the member votes before the meeting without appointing another person as proxy. The book's historic proxy and modern direct- voting specimen illustrations should be labelled as educational samples, not actual legal forms, and students should be taught which fields, authentication and cut-offs need confirmation. 6. Four cases that make the statute work A. Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 Facts and procedural setting. A company's constitution vested management powers in the board. Members attempted, by ordinary resolution, to require a commercial course of action contrary to the directors' decision. The issue was not whether CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 5 | CORPORATE LAW

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shareholders were important; it was whether they could override powers constitutionally vested elsewhere. Decision and principle. The Court of Appeal treated the allocation of powers between the board and the members as binding under the constitution. Members could not simply seize management powers by an ordinary resolution where those powers were conferred on directors. Why it matters: it is the foundational company- law separation between ownership rights and management authority. Use it: before advising that shareholders can mandate a company's staffing policy or asset disposition, read the constitution alongside s 198A and any relevant statutory shareholder power. The director-removal route may be available even where the proposed operational direction is not. B. National Roads and Motorists' Association v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517 Facts. Members of the NRMA proposed a general-meeting resolution addressing how voting materials would be distributed, a matter falling within the directors' management competence under the organisation's rules. The case reached the New South Wales Supreme Court when the members sought to exercise meeting rights to achieve that decision. Issue and outcome. Was the directors' duty to convene a requisitioned meeting absolute, even where the proposed subject fell outside members' substantive decision-making power? McLelland J held that the directors were not required to convene the proposed meeting for business that members lacked power to decide. This is the important qualification to the word must in meeting requisition statutes. Why it matters now. The case helps explain the modern proper-purpose inquiry under s 249Q and the separate question of whether a proposed resolution falls within the general meeting's powers. Use in FreshFoods: distinguish an unenforceable resolution ordering the board to retain staffed checkouts from a properly framed resolution removing directors under s 203D. Client advice: do not reject every activist proposal; examine the exact wording and identify a lawful form of shareholder action. Report source status: historical reported judgment citation confirmed through recognised scholarly discussion; a freely accessible full-text judgment link has not been independently verified. C. Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 6 | CORPORATE LAW

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Facts and litigation. A shareholder advocacy organisation sought to place resolutions concerning climate-related disclosure and the bank's approach to environmental issues before members. The bank disputed whether the proposed resolutions could properly be advanced as shareholder resolutions. The Federal Court considered the company's management structure and shareholders' legal role; the matter reached the Full Federal Court. Issue and result. Could the statutory procedure for proposing resolutions itself give members power over matters ordinarily reserved to company management? The Full Court dismissed the appeal, reinforcing the need to distinguish what shareholders may propose procedurally from what the general meeting has power to determine substantively. The precise nature and form of each proposed resolution, including any constitution-alteration proposal, must be examined rather than treating all climate- related shareholder statements alike. Exam use. Apply ss 198A, 249N–249P and the constitution. Analyse the proposed text before saying it must be circulated. For a senior partner: consider an opinion that separates (i) statutory eligibility; (ii) notice timing; (iii) corporate power to pass the resolution; and (iv) relief or strategic alternatives. Read the published Full Court judgment. D. AXA Asia Pacific Holdings Ltd v Direct Share Purchasing Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 15 Facts. Direct requested an electronic copy of AXA's register of members. AXA supplied it but charged approximately $17,195. The dispute was not whether the share registry existed. It concerned the permissible cost charged to a person requesting the copy, including the role of AXA's registry service provider. Outcome. The Full Federal Court dismissed AXA's appeal and upheld the primary judge's assessment of a much smaller reasonable fee (approximately $250). Teaching significance: ss 173–174 do not merely offer theoretical access: access and copies are governed by enforceable statutory rules and fee limits. How to use it: a shareholder activist seeking to contact other shareholders should identify the statutory right to inspect or obtain the register, distinguish a proper corporate purpose from prohibited marketing, and check the current regulations governing fees and permitted use. Do not describe this case as establishing an unrestricted right to use member data. Read the Full Court judgment. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 7 | CORPORATE LAW

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7. How the case law changes your advice to the client The most effective answer is rarely only “the client cannot do that”. Suppose HBC lacks 5% voting power. The lawyer should check the register, assess whether lawful and proportionate shareholder contact can secure coalition support, explore whether an existing AGM can accommodate a valid s 249N resolution, verify whether a major shareholder will join, and consider the cost and risks of buying additional shares. Before recommending a meeting requisition, draft the actual resolution and test competence under Cuninghame, NRMA v Parker and ACCR v CBA. This is exactly why the lecturer insists on statutory interpretation as a practical skill. Statutory source: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), compilation 149 (19 September 2026), official Volume 1. The section numbers and main effects described above have been checked against that compilation's authoritative source listing and available section text; the current print layout and some fine exceptions still warrant a complete pinpoint-by-pinpoint publication review. The transcript is a teaching source, not a substitute for the Act. Editorial source-integrity note. The automatic transcript sometimes mishears NRMA v Parker as “Parker v British Airways” or similar. That phrase is not to be published as a case authority. The 100-member alternative survives for proposed resolutions under s 249N, not to compel a meeting under s 249D. The lecturer's comments on taxable dividend outcomes are context only; actual Australian dividend/franking treatment is not uniformly tax-free and depends on the shareholder. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 8 | CORPORATE LAW

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WEEK 6 TUTORIAL · ORIGINAL UNIVERSITY QUESTION WORDING Tutorial Question 1 — FreshFoods and HBC The following reproduces the exact text of the supplied tutorial handout. It is separate from the original author’s independently written explanatory model answer, which starts on the following page. ORIGINAL QUESTIONS — NOT SIMPLIFIED OR OMITTED Question 1: FreshFoods and HBC, continued . . . We return to FreshFoods Ltd ('FreshFoods') and Humans Behind the Counter ('HBC') from last week's tutorial. FreshFoods is an ASX-listed supermarket company. It plans to introduce automation that will significantly reduce the number of employees working in its stores. HBC opposes the plan. As we saw last week, 110 HBC members have become FreshFoods shareholders. Each owns two shares. HBC originally wanted shareholders to pass the following resolution: 'That FreshFoods Ltd must retain sufficient human employees so that at least 50% of all checkout lanes operating in each FreshFoods supermarket are staffed by human employees, and that the board must implement this policy throughout the company within six months.' [Proposal 1] After the FreshFoods board refused to adopt this policy, HBC developed an alternative strategy. It wants shareholders to remove the existing directors, Priya, Marcus and Daniel, and replace them with three candidates supported by HBC. [Proposal 2] Last week we considered the substantive validity of HBC's two proposals. This week, assume HBC wants to take the necessary procedural steps to put its proposals before FreshFoods' shareholders. 1. Calling a new shareholder meeting Assume that FreshFoods' 2026 AGM has already taken place. No other shareholder meeting is scheduled until the next AGM, approximately 11 months from now. HBC does not want to wait that long. a. Requisitioning a meeting CORPORATE LAW 45 | CORPORATE LAW

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Can HBC formally require FreshFoods to call a general meeting? In your answer: identify the applicable provision of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); explain the requirements HBC must satisfy; determine whether the 110 HBC shareholders, with two shares each, are presently entitled to requisition the meeting; explain what FreshFoods must do if it receives a valid request; and explain what options are available if the directors fail to comply with a valid request. If HBC does not presently satisfy the statutory threshold, do not stop there. Think like HBC's lawyer. What lawful and practical steps could HBC take to try to overcome the problem? b. HBC calling the meeting itself Could HBC instead call and arrange the general meeting itself without first requiring the board to do so? Identify: the relevant statutory provision; the threshold that must be satisfied; and an important practical disadvantage of taking this route. Would you recommend this course of action to HBC? Why or why not? c. What should HBC propose at the meeting? Assuming HBC can satisfy the requirements for calling the meeting, what resolutions should it include? In particular, should HBC include: Proposal 1 concerning human staffing levels; resolutions removing Priya, Marcus and Daniel; and/or resolutions appointing HBC's three preferred candidates? Relate your answer to the division-of-powers principles considered in last week's tutorial. 2. Putting resolutions on the agenda of an already-scheduled AGM We now change the facts: Assume that FreshFoods' 2026 AGM has not yet occurred. It is currently 1 October 2026, and the AGM is already scheduled for 18 November 2026. HBC decides that there is no need to call a separate meeting. Instead, it wants to require FreshFoods to put its resolutions on the agenda for the AGM. CORPORATE LAW 46 | CORPORATE LAW

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Advise HBC: What statutory procedure allows members to give FreshFoods notice of a resolution they propose to move at an already-scheduled general meeting? What shareholder threshold applies? Do HBC's 110 shareholders satisfy that threshold even though their total shareholding is very small? What formal requirements must HBC satisfy? Most importantly, can HBC get its resolutions onto the agenda for the 18 November 2026 AGM if it first gives FreshFoods notice on 1 October 2026? Why or why not? How does this process differ from the processes considered in Question 1 above? Also consider whether HBC should attempt to submit Proposal 1, even though last week's tutorial identified a substantive problem with that resolution. 3. Convincing the other shareholders Assume HBC succeeds in getting its valid resolutions before FreshFoods shareholders. HBC knows that its own shareholding is far too small to determine the outcome of the vote. It therefore wants to explain its arguments to FreshFoods' other shareholders before the meeting. Does the Corporations Act provide a mechanism that would allow HBC to require FreshFoods to distribute a statement supporting its proposed resolutions? Identify the applicable provision and explain: the shareholder threshold; the principal procedural requirements; any restrictions on the statement; and who is responsible for the cost of distributing it. Is the right to request distribution of such a statement restricted to the shareholders who originally proposed the resolution? CORPORATE LAW 47 | CORPORATE LAW

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WEEK 6 TUTORIAL · HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWERS Question 1 — Full written answers 1(A) · ISSUE, RULE, APPLICATION, COUNTERARGUMENT, CONCLUSION AND ADVICE Can HBC compel a new shareholder meeting under s 249D? Issue. The first question is not whether 110 people support HBC or whether it is politically desirable to debate checkout automation. It is whether those who sign a proposed requisition collectively control the percentage of voting power required by s 249D(1). Their proposed business strategy must also be mapped to matters properly decided in general meeting. Rule. Under s 249D(1), members with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at the general meeting can require the directors to call and arrange a meeting. Subsection (2) requires a written request setting out the resolutions, signed by the requesting members and given to the company. Separate identical copies may be signed under subs (3). The voting fraction is assessed at midnight immediately before the request under subs (4). Under subs (5) the directors must call within 21 days and the meeting must be held not later than two months after the request is delivered. A listed company's meeting must also meet the applicable notice requirements, particularly s 249HA. A meeting must be for a proper purpose under s 249Q. Application. HBC's 110 supporters have only 220 shares in total. The total number of FreshFoods voting shares is not provided, so it would be wrong to calculate a fictional precise percentage. Given the facts describe FreshFoods as a large ASX- listed supermarket and these shares as tiny holdings, HBC cannot on the given information establish 5% of the voting power and must not assert a present entitlement to requisition. Crucially, the 100-member route belongs to s 249N and s 249P, not s 249D. It cannot simply be imported into s 249D. What can counsel do? HBC should obtain lawfully available register and voting- capital information, confirm registered membership and voting rights, engage a shareholder registry or broker as appropriate, recruit existing substantial shareholders and institutional holders, obtain their written commitment to join the requisition, and consider whether HBC members can lawfully acquire more votes. The group must verify the 5% threshold on the statutory midnight snapshot and CORPORATE LAW 48 | CORPORATE LAW

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lodge properly signed requests with precise, substantively valid proposed resolutions. Commercial caution: purchasing shares solely to clear the threshold may be expensive and market disclosure and association rules may become relevant depending on the coordinated conduct. If directors ignore a valid request: s 249E(1) allows members with more than 50% of the votes held by all the requisitionists to convene it after the 21-day failure. They must hold it within three months of the request; reasonable expenses are paid by the company, with the possibility of recovery from responsible directors under s 249E(5). The 21-day call requirement is different from the two-month deadline for holding the meeting. The directors' failure also justifies considering appropriate court proceedings where statutory remedies are engaged. Counterargument. HBC may claim that a large headcount implies legitimacy. That is a persuasive political argument, but not the statutory threshold. Nor is the board necessarily obliged to propose any resolution HBC likes: an attempt to commandeer management will face the division-of-powers problem. Conclusion. HBC has no demonstrated present s 249D entitlement. Obtain sufficient voting support first, then use s 249D with legally valid director-election and removal resolutions and plan for a s 249E response if the board does not comply. 1(B) · MEMBERS CONVENING THE MEETING THEMSELVES Issue. Can HBC bypass the board and call the meeting directly? Law. Section 249F allows members having at least 5% of the votes castable at a general meeting to call and arrange the meeting without first making a s 249D requisition. Under s 249F(1), those members must pay expenses of calling and holding it; the procedure otherwise follows the available meeting-calling methods. Listed-company notice rules remain applicable. This differs materially from s 249E, where a properly qualifying group of requisitionists may obtain reimbursement from the company after board default. Application. HBC's 110 members with 220 shares have not been shown to satisfy the voting-power threshold. The option is unavailable on the present evidence. If HBC recruits enough votes, it could act under s 249F, but issuing notices, arranging a venue or hybrid platform, processing proxies and complying with listed-company CORPORATE LAW 49 | CORPORATE LAW

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rules could be costly. It could also bear strategic and reputational costs if the resolutions are incompetent or doomed to defeat. Recommendation and conclusion. Do not presently recommend s 249F. Establish a lawful coalition of at least 5% voting power, prefer a properly prepared s 249D request where feasible, and keep s 249F as a strategic alternative only after evaluating the costs and the merits of the proposed resolutions. 1(C) · DRAFTING RESOLUTIONS THAT MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO DECIDE Issue. Which of HBC's requested resolutions should be placed before members? Rule. Section 198A generally places management powers with the board; Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCAFC 80 and Automatic Self-Cleansing explain why ordinary members cannot seize those powers by majority vote. A public company's members may remove directors under s 203D, and appoint directors according to the applicable corporate rules (including s 201G and the constitution). Section 203D(2) imposes a specific notice-of-intention procedure for removal and safeguards the affected director's rights. Section 201E can require separate appointment resolutions for multiple candidates in public companies, subject to its qualifications. Application. Proposal 1 attempts to order the directors to retain particular staffing levels in every store and implement the policy within six months. Operating decisions of that nature ordinarily rest with the board and the proposed mandatory wording exceeds ordinary shareholder competence; it should not be advanced as a binding ordinary resolution merely because it is popular. HBC may raise the issue through lawful engagement and a s 249P statement, and might consider a different constitutionally authorised strategy, but must not misstate a non-binding expression of views as a valid direction to management. Proposal 2 uses a genuinely shareholder-held power: individually worded resolutions to remove Priya, Marcus and Daniel under s 203D and, where properly proposed and allowed, to elect the three named replacement candidates. However, counsel must check candidacy eligibility, consents, board composition and constitutional requirements; comply with s 203D's director-specific notice and right to respond; obey s 249HA and s 249L meeting notice requirements; and consider s 201E's prohibition on bundled public-company director appointments unless relevant conditions are met. Removing the whole board without valid replacement CORPORATE LAW 50 | CORPORATE LAW

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arrangements may create governance risks; the transition should be sequenced carefully. Counterargument. HBC might argue that shareholders are ultimate owners and may direct any policy. This confuses ownership of shares with the board's management mandate. But members have a lawful remedy to dissatisfaction: vote to change directors, who then exercise managerial discretion subject to their own duties; new directors are not puppets of the appointing group. Conclusion. Recommend properly specified individual removal and replacement resolutions if procedural and eligibility conditions are met; avoid Proposal 1 as a binding board instruction. QUESTION 1, PART 2 · EXISTING AGM AGENDA What changes when the AGM is on 18 November 2026? Issue. If the meeting already exists, can 110 tiny shareholders require their proposals to appear on its agenda by giving notice on 1 October? Rule. Section 249N(1) allows members to propose a resolution if they either hold at least 5% of votes on the resolution or there are at least 100 members entitled to vote. They must give signed written notice specifying the proposed resolution's exact wording (ss 249N(2)–(3)). Under s 249O(1), a notice under s 249N carries the right to consideration at the next general meeting occurring more than two months after notice is given. Section 249O addresses circulation and costs; defamatory or overlong material raises exceptions. Procedure does not make an invalid substantive resolution competent, as established by ACCR v CBA. Application. On the assumptions that all 110 HBC supporters are registered members with voting rights and no applicable regulation changes the headcount threshold, HBC can qualify under the 100-member limb even though its total shareholding is only 220 shares. But 1 October to 18 November 2026 is only 48 days, less than two months. Therefore s 249O does not compel inclusion at that November AGM. An existing AGM does not have to be moved forward or amended to meet the group's preferred timing. HBC could ask FreshFoods voluntarily to place properly valid resolutions on the agenda, or plan for the next qualifying general meeting. For director removals, the separate s 203D(2) notice and the CORPORATE LAW 51 | CORPORATE LAW

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exception where the company subsequently calls a meeting also need assessment; no attempt should be made to evade them. Distinction from Question 1. Sections 249D–F concern causing a new meeting to be called; ss 249N–O concern putting a proposed resolution before an appropriate meeting. Sections 249N–O are useful to relatively numerous small shareholders, but do not give automatic agenda access at short notice. Proposal 1. The mandatory human-staffing direction remains substantively defective under the division-of-powers rule regardless of the filing date and threshold. HBC should prefer valid director-removal or appointment proposals, subject to the statutory constraints already discussed. Conclusion. The 110-member numerical route is potentially open, but the 18 November timing is too soon to compel inclusion under s 249O. QUESTION 1, PART 3 · CONVINCING OTHER SHAREHOLDERS May HBC require circulation of an advocacy statement? Issue. How can a numerically large but low-vote activist coalition persuade other shareholders before voting? Law. Section 249P(1) permits a statement about a proposed resolution or any other matter properly considered at a general meeting. It is available to members holding at least 5% of the votes on the resolution or at least 100 members entitled to vote (s 249P(2), subject to any valid prescribed variation). The request must be signed, written and delivered under s 249P(3). The company distributes it with or as soon as practicable after the meeting notice under s 249P(6). The company bears distribution costs if received in time to accompany the meeting notice; otherwise the requestors are jointly and individually liable for reasonable expenses unless members resolve otherwise (ss 249P(7)–(8)). Statements exceeding 1,000 words, or defamatory, need not be distributed (s 249P(9)); if the requesting members bear the costs, advance funds reasonably sufficient may be required. Application. The 110 qualifying HBC members meet the 100-member route even though their aggregate shareholding is small. They should submit a careful, civil, evidence-based statement of no more than 1,000 words explaining the commercial case for changing directors: customer preferences, service quality, brand trust and estimated financial consequences. They should submit it sufficiently early to CORPORATE LAW 52 | CORPORATE LAW

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accompany the official notice and avoid avoidable circulation costs. The requestors do not have to be precisely the same people who signed the s 249N proposal; s 249P creates a separate statutory right. Counterargument and caution. A critic may say HBC is using corporate machinery to advance labour policy unrelated to returns. HBC should therefore frame its case in credible corporate-governance terms and avoid defamatory assertions. It cannot use the register for unrelated contacts without considering s 177. Conclusion. Yes, s 249P is HBC's most immediately useful campaigning procedure; satisfying a communication right must not be confused with holding enough votes to win a director election. CORPORATE LAW 53 | CORPORATE LAW

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WEEK 6 TUTORIAL · ORIGINAL UNIVERSITY QUESTION WORDING Tutorial Question 2 — FreshFoods’ Dividend The following reproduces the exact text of the supplied tutorial handout. It is separate from the original author’s independently written explanatory model answer, which starts on the following page. ORIGINAL QUESTIONS — NOT SIMPLIFIED OR OMITTED Question 2: FreshFoods' dividend FreshFoods has enjoyed several highly profitable years. Its constitution adopts the replaceable rules concerning dividends. On 15 August 2026, the FreshFoods board determines that shareholders will receive a cash dividend of $0.40 per share, payable on 30 November 2026. At the time the decision is made, FreshFoods is in a strong financial position. The situation then changes dramatically. On 10 November 2026, FreshFoods unexpectedly becomes liable to repay $900 million under a major debt facility. The board had expected to refinance the debt, but negotiations with the proposed lender suddenly collapse. FreshFoods owns substantial assets, including stores, warehouses and other property, but now faces a serious shortage of immediately available cash. The board is reconsidering whether the dividend should be paid. Advise FreshFoods on the following. 1. May FreshFoods legally pay the dividend? What statutory requirements must be satisfied before FreshFoods can pay a dividend? Apply each element of the relevant statutory test to the facts. Does the fact that FreshFoods owns substantial assets necessarily mean that it can lawfully proceed with the dividend despite its liquidity problem? 2. May the board cancel the dividend? Assume that paying the dividend would satisfy the minimum statutory requirements for a lawful dividend. That does not necessarily answer the next question: Is FreshFoods required to pay the dividend because the board has already determined its amount and payment date, or may the board revoke it before 30 November? Identify the relevant statutory provision and explain: CORPORATE LAW 54 | CORPORATE LAW

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when the dividend becomes a debt owed by FreshFoods to its shareholders; and whether the board can revoke its earlier decision before the payment date. What is the last date on which the board could revoke the dividend? 3. Consequences of proceeding with the dividend Assume instead that the board allows FreshFoods to proceed with the dividend despite serious concerns about the company's ability to meet its debts. Identify at least one potential legal consequence for the directors personally. You do not need to analyse in detail doctrines that have not yet been covered in the course. It is sufficient to identify the potential issue and explain briefly why paying the dividend might create it. 4. Can the shareholders force payment? Assume that the FreshFoods board revokes the dividend before it becomes a debt. A group of shareholders is furious. They argue: 'FreshFoods is our company. It has made large profits for years, and the board already promised us this dividend. The shareholders should be able to vote to reinstate it.' Can the shareholders pass an ordinary resolution requiring the board to reinstate the dividend? Identify the relevant provision concerning who determines that a dividend is payable, and relate your answer to the division-of-powers principles from last week's tutorial. 5. Would an older constitution change the result? Finally, assume instead that FreshFoods was incorporated before 1998 and still has an old constitutional provision requiring dividends to be declared by shareholders in general meeting. Assume the shareholders validly declared this dividend before FreshFoods' financial problems arose. Would this change: when the dividend became a debt; and whether the dividend could subsequently be revoked? Explain by reference to the relevant statutory provision. CORPORATE LAW 55 | CORPORATE LAW

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WEEK 6 TUTORIAL · HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWERS Question 2 — Full written answers QUESTION 2(1) · MAY FRESHFOODS LAWFULLY PAY? Issue. May a large, apparently profitable, asset-rich listed company lawfully distribute the $0.40-per-share dividend when a refinancing collapses and $900 million suddenly falls due? Law. Section 254T(1)(a) requires assets to exceed liabilities by at least the amount of the dividend immediately before the dividend is declared, with figures determined under applicable accounting standards by s 254T(2). Section 254T(1)(b) requires fair and reasonable treatment of shareholders as a whole. Section 254T(1)(c) prohibits payment that materially prejudices the company's ability to pay creditors. A resulting inability to pay debts as due is a statutory example of material prejudice. Solvency is defined by s 95A and director risk may arise under s 588G. Determining a dividend under s 254U is not itself proof of lawful payment. Application — limb (a). FreshFoods was financially strong in August, but the amounts of current assets, current liabilities, the total proposed dividend and its debt maturity profile are not provided. The board must obtain current accounts and forecast the relevant liability accurately. A $900 million repayment obligation changes the liability and cash-flow picture; the existence of real estate is not equivalent to a calculated accounting surplus adequate for the dividend. An exact arithmetic conclusion cannot honestly be reached from this problem alone. Limb (b). A consistent cash dividend of $0.40 per ordinary share would often satisfy equality within the ordinary class under s 254W(1), but the board should verify different classes, constitutional entitlements and whether the dividend arrangement is fair to shareholders collectively. There is no fact suggesting discriminatory allocation, though that element must be articulated in the answer. Limb (c). This is the decisive risk. With $900 million due and the replacement lender unavailable, FreshFoods may have insufficient liquid resources despite owning stores and warehouses. If it cannot raise funds, dispose of assets or lawfully refinance in time, paying the dividend could materially impair its ability to pay the debt facility and other creditors. It must not treat accounting wealth as proof of CORPORATE LAW 56 | CORPORATE LAW

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ability to discharge near-term debts. The board should suspend payment pending detailed cash-flow testing and financial/legal advice. Counterargument. FreshFoods may eventually realise value from property, obtain new funding or repay the debt by other means. Thus insolvency is not established merely by the words 'serious shortage of cash'; further evidence is needed. But the directors must not pay a dividend by assuming unfounded liquidity will materialise. Conclusion. Payment cannot presently be certified as lawful. In particular, s 254T(1)(c) may prevent it. Reassess all three limbs on verified up-to-date evidence and keep the directors' duties distinct from the dividend test. QUESTION 2(2) · REVOCATION AND EXACT TIMING Issue. Having determined a dividend on 15 August, must the board honour it even after the November crisis? Law. FreshFoods adopts the replaceable rules concerning dividends. Under s 254U(1), directors may determine that a dividend is payable and fix its amount, time and method. Under s 254V(1), fixing the amount or payment date does not yet create a debt. The debt arises when the fixed date arrives, and directors may revoke their decision at any time before that point. This statutory result is different from a constitutional declaration governed by s 254V(2). Application. The August board decision fixed a dividend of $0.40 per share payable on 30 November 2026. Since the due date has not yet arrived on 10 November and the company follows the modern s 254U arrangement, FreshFoods may revoke the determination before payment time. The board can protect creditors and shareholders from further harm by promptly recording a properly constituted resolution revoking the dividend, giving appropriate shareholder/market disclosure and maintaining evidence of its financial assessment. What is the last date? Because the debt arises when the time fixed for payment arrives, the safest exam answer on an instrument specifying only a payment date is: before 30 November 2026 — ordinarily by 29 November, unless an objectively established later time was lawfully fixed. The statutory rule does not license cancellation after the payment obligation has arisen on 30 November; avoid assuming a clock time absent from the facts. CORPORATE LAW 57 | CORPORATE LAW

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Counterargument. Shareholders may point to the August announcement as a promise. But the statute deliberately distinguishes announcement/determination from debt formation. Their expectation is real, but is not the same as an enforceable debt before the due time under s 254V(1). Conclusion. Yes, the board may revoke the dividend before its fixed payment time. It should act before the due date on the facts supplied and communicate the decision properly. QUESTION 2(3) · DIRECTORS' PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES Issue. What could happen if directors knowingly allow the dividend to proceed when FreshFoods may be unable to meet debts? Law and application. Contravening s 254T(1)(c) may involve a prohibited dividend if it materially prejudices the ability to pay creditors. Section 588G may impose liability where the company incurs a relevant debt while insolvent, or becomes insolvent by incurring it, and the additional statutory requirements are met. Paying or permitting an imprudent distribution may also raise breaches of duties under ss 180–183, depending on evidence and the directors' conduct. Other relief might arise under s 1324 (injunction) or s 232 (oppression), or capital maintenance provisions in an appropriate case. The lecturer correctly identifies these as overlapping potential consequences for future weeks, but they are not all established by merely showing non-payment of a dividend. Conclusion. The strongest immediate answer is potential director exposure concerning insolvent trading and duties, with liability contingent on proof of each element and any applicable defences. Directors should seek immediate legal and solvency advice, document deliberations and avoid unlawful distributions. QUESTION 2(4) · CAN SHAREHOLDERS COMPEL PAYMENT? Issue. Can angry shareholders vote by ordinary resolution to reimpose the dividend after the board revokes it? Law. Under the assumed replaceable rule in s 254U(1), the directors determine dividends. Section 198A generally gives the directors the company's management powers. The Full Federal Court decision in ACCR v CBA [2016] FCAFC 80 confirms that the fact that shareholders own shares does not empower an ordinary general- CORPORATE LAW 58 | CORPORATE LAW

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meeting resolution to command the board in areas the constitution assigns to directors. Application. A large accumulated profit does not itself create a shareholder debt, and the August announcement was not irrevocable before the due date under s 254V(1). A general meeting's ordinary resolution to reverse the board's lawful revocation would therefore exceed its ordinary powers. Shareholders may lobby directors, lawfully elect or remove directors as the rules permit, and consider other remedies if there is actionable wrongdoing; they cannot automatically mandate this dividend by a simple vote. Conclusion. No. Under these facts and governance rules, the ordinary resolution cannot bind the directors to restore the revoked dividend. QUESTION 2(5)–(7) · THE OLDER CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION Issue. Would an older constitution requiring shareholders to declare dividends change debt formation and revocation? Law. Section 254V(2) expressly states that, where a company's constitution provides for declaration of dividends, a debt is incurred when the dividend is declared. This displaces the otherwise more flexible timing in s 254V(1) for that constitutional arrangement. Application. On the modified facts, shareholders have validly declared the dividend before the $900 million financing crisis. The debt therefore arises upon declaration, rather than on 30 November, although the obligation might become payable later according to its terms. Directors cannot simply revoke it in reliance on s 254V(1). They must address the resulting debt and financial exposure through lawful means, rather than pretending the debt never arose. The phrase 'incurs a debt' does not by itself prove immediate insolvency: counsel must examine when payment falls due, actual resources and the separate elements of applicable liabilities. Counterargument. Company age alone is not the statutory test; the operative constitutional clause is. A newly incorporated company could also adopt a declaration provision, and an older company could amend its constitution to use a determination model. CORPORATE LAW 59 | CORPORATE LAW

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Conclusion. Yes, the old-style constitution materially changes both the timing of debt formation and the ability to revoke after declaration. This is the lecturer's critical comparison between ss 254V(1) and (2). CORPORATE LAW 60 | CORPORATE LAW

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ACTIVE LEARNING · PASTEL BLUE Frequently Asked Questions Each answer teaches a distinction that a student should be able to explain orally and apply to new facts. FAQ 1. Can a profitable company refuse dividends? Generally yes. A profit does not automatically give a shareholder power to compel directors to determine dividends. Check s 254U, the constitution and class rights. Do not confuse corporate profit with an existing debt under s 254V. FAQ 2. What is the difference between a shareholder and a director? The shareholder owns the rights attached to shares; the director participates in managing the company subject to duties. Under s 198A and ACCR v CBA, shareholders do not automatically control routine operations. FAQ 3. Can 110 members force an EGM? Not by headcount alone. Section 249D requires at least 5% of votes; 110 qualifying members could satisfy the alternative numerical route under s 249N for proposing resolutions and under s 249P for distributing a statement. FAQ 4. How does s 249E differ from s 249F? Section 249E is a consequence of directors failing to respond to a valid s 249D requisition; a majority of requisitionists by their votes can take over and the company ordinarily meets reasonable costs. Section 249F enables holders of 5% to convene directly, at their own expense. CORPORATE LAW 61 | CORPORATE LAW

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FAQ 5. What if a shareholder wants to tell members why directors should be removed? Section 249P can require distribution of a statement if the 5% or 100-member threshold and written formalities are satisfied. The statement must observe the 1,000-word and defamation restrictions and cost rules. FAQ 6. Does a board announcement turn dividends into debts? Not ordinarily under s 254V(1) if the board merely determines payment. The debt arises when the fixed payment time arrives, unless a valid constitutional declaration rule triggers s 254V(2). FAQ 7. Does owning buildings prove solvency? No. Accounting assets can exceed liabilities while the company lacks liquid funds to pay creditors when due. Section 254T(1)(c) and s 95A require a practical, evidence- led consideration of creditors and cash flow. FAQ 8. Is every improper dividend automatically insolvent trading? No. It can create insolvency and liability risks, but s 588G has its own requirements, and statutory defences or relief may be relevant. Explain possibilities without assuming liability. CORPORATE LAW 62 | CORPORATE LAW

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ACTIVE LEARNING · SOFT LAVENDER Multiple-Choice Questions Answer all ten before reading the key. In the electronic edition, use each answer expander; in the print edition, the full answers follow the questions on the next page. MCQ 1. HBC members hold only 220 votes. Which threshold governs requisitioning a new meeting under s 249D? A. At least 100 members B. At least 5% of the votes that may be cast C. At least 50% of members by headcount D. Any three members MCQ 2. HBC has 110 registered voting members. The route most clearly open for a lawful members’ resolution is: A. s 249N B. s 249F C. s 249D regardless of votes D. s 588G MCQ 3. The board receives a valid s 249D request. By when must it call the meeting? A. 7 days B. 14 days C. 21 days D. 2 months MCQ 4. A valid s 249N notice is given on 1 October 2026 for an AGM on 18 November 2026. Is inclusion mandatory under s 249O? A. Yes, 100-member rule overrides timing B. No; the meeting is not more than two months after notice C. Yes, if a director agrees orally D. Yes, but only with 5% votes CORPORATE LAW 63 | CORPORATE LAW

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MCQ 5. Which is an appropriate binding shareholder resolution in an Australian listed public company? A. Order the board to open stores at 9 am B. Order directors to employ 50% checkout staff C. Remove a director under s 203D, properly complying with procedure D. Command directors to pay a dividend by ordinary resolution MCQ 6. A company is asset-rich but cannot meet a large debt next week. Which dividend limb is most obviously at risk? A. s 254T(1)(c) B. s 254T(2) alone C. s 249P D. s 254V(2) automatically MCQ 7. Under s 254V(1), a board-determined dividend payable on 30 November generally becomes a debt: A. On announcement B. When profitability is recorded C. When the fixed time for payment arrives D. When the next AGM opens MCQ 8. Under a constitution that validly provides for shareholder declaration, s 254V(2) creates a debt: A. When the dividend is declared B. Only when the board prepares cash C. On company registration D. Never MCQ 9. Which statement about member-proposed resolutions is accurate? A. Any 100 members can requisition an EGM B. Section 249N makes every management order enforceable C. Meeting procedure cannot give the general meeting a management power it lacks D. All listed-company meetings can occur on seven days’ notice MCQ 10. Who ordinarily pays for an s 249F meeting? A. ASIC CORPORATE LAW 64 | CORPORATE LAW

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B. The company automatically C. The members calling and holding the meeting D. The directors personally by definition CORPORATE LAW 65 | CORPORATE LAW

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MCQ Answers and Explanations MCQ 1: B Section 249D uses a voting-power threshold of 5%. The 100-member alternative belongs to ss 249N and 249P, not s 249D. MCQ 2: A Section 249N allows at least 100 qualifying members to propose a competent resolution for an eligible meeting, subject to the detailed formalities and timing. MCQ 3: C Section 249D(5) separates calling within 21 days from holding not later than 2 months after the request. MCQ 4: B Section 249O(1) refers to the next general meeting occurring more than two months after notice is given. MCQ 5: C The board controls general management. Section 203D grants public-company members a separate statutory director-removal power. MCQ 6: A The payment cannot materially prejudice the company’s ability to pay creditors; having property assets does not guarantee liquidity. MCQ 7: C Fixing amount or payment time alone does not create the debt. The decision may be revoked before the fixed payment time. CORPORATE LAW 66 | CORPORATE LAW

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MCQ 8: A This is the critical exception to the otherwise later debt timing of s 254V(1). MCQ 9: C Procedural inclusion and substantive competence are separate questions; see the Full Federal Court in ACCR v CBA. MCQ 10: C Section 249F(1) allocates expenses to the convening members, unlike the distinct s 249E recovery mechanism. CORPORATE LAW 67 | CORPORATE LAW

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ACTIVE LEARNING · PALE PEACH Short-Answer Questions Short-answer 1. Describe what a member owns when they hold company shares. Write a reasoned answer identifying exact sections, their meaning and application. Short-answer 2. Identify the difference between ss 249D, 249N and 249P. Write a reasoned answer identifying exact sections, their meaning and application. Short-answer 3. Why can a 2026 AGM be too early for a s 249N notice? Write a reasoned answer identifying exact sections, their meaning and application. Short-answer 4. Distinguish a director-determined dividend from a constitutionally declared dividend. Write a reasoned answer identifying exact sections, their meaning and application. Short-answer 5. Write every limb of s 254T(1) and explain an asset-rich/cash- poor example. Write a reasoned answer identifying exact sections, their meaning and application. Short-answer 6. How should HBC prepare individual director-removal and appointment resolutions? Write a reasoned answer identifying exact sections, their meaning and application. CORPORATE LAW 68 | CORPORATE LAW

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Short-Answer Model Answers Short-answer 1 The member owns shares, which are personal property carrying defined rights. The member does not own a divisible piece of corporate land or cash. Corporate personality, the constitution, s 140, s 1070A and the division of board/member powers explain why. Short-answer 2 Section 249D requires 5% votes and compels directors to call a new meeting. Section 249N uses 5% votes or 100 members for proposing a competent resolution at a meeting. Section 249P uses a similar 5% or 100-member threshold for circulating a relevant written statement, subject to restrictions and costs. Short-answer 3 Section 249O(1) attaches the mandatory consideration mechanism to the next general meeting occurring more than two months after the notice. If notice is given 1 October and the AGM is 18 November, the required statutory interval has not elapsed. Short-answer 4 Under ss 254U(1) and 254V(1), the board may determine a dividend and normally revoke before the time fixed for payment; debt arises at that time. Under s 254V(2), if the constitution provides for declaration, debt arises when the dividend is declared, making unilateral revocation much harder. CORPORATE LAW 69 | CORPORATE LAW

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Short-answer 5 Assets must exceed liabilities by at least the proposed dividend immediately before declaration; payment must be fair and reasonable to shareholders as a whole; and payment must not materially prejudice the ability to pay creditors. A company with valuable but unsaleable warehouses may fail the creditor-protection limb if obligations fall due immediately. Short-answer 6 Its lawyer must identify shareholder powers under s 203D and s 201G, satisfy s 203D(2) notice and relevant directors’ procedural rights, prepare properly worded separate resolutions where s 201E applies, comply with listed-company meeting notice including s 249HA, establish candidate consent/eligibility and plan for a functioning compliant board. A management policy instruction under s 198A is not an equivalent shareholder power. CORPORATE LAW 70 | CORPORATE LAW

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CHAPTER 5 • HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL-ANSWER WORKSHOP Two Complete IRAC Problems and Model Answers These are newly written exercises designed to build professional legal reasoning. They supplement rather than replace your original University Tutorial 5 questions. Read the complete problem before turning to the model answer. Each answer separates the legal issue, exact statutory rule, authorities, applied reasoning, counterargument, remedies and practical conclusion. PROBLEM QUESTION 1 — SHAREHOLDER CAMPAIGN The FreshFoods requisition dispute FreshFoods Ltd is a listed public company with 20 million ordinary voting shares. The board has announced that 70% of stores will replace staffed checkouts with self-service stations. Humans Behind the Counter (HBC) consists of 110 registered shareholders holding two ordinary shares each. HBC sends a letter signed by all 110 members on 1 October 2026, demanding a new general meeting and proposing: (A) “The company must permanently retain 70% staffed checkouts”; and (B) “Director Williams be removed from office”. The directors refuse. HBC learns that the company's AGM is scheduled for 18 November 2026. On 24 October, HBC proposes calling its own meeting, distributing other shareholders' addresses to campaign volunteers, and recovering costs from the directors. Advise HBC and FreshFoods comprehensively on meeting requisitions, directors' powers, existing AGM procedures, expenses and the practical alternatives. Identify all relevant statutory thresholds and competing arguments. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 1 | CORPORATE LAW

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MODEL ANSWER 1 — ISSUE The central issue is whether HBC can lawfully require an extraordinary general meeting, cause the company to place its resolutions before the already scheduled AGM, or convene a meeting itself. Closely connected questions are whether the proposed resolutions lie within shareholders' powers, whether the directors are in default, how costs are allocated, and what lawful corporate strategy a solicitor should recommend. Rule: the meeting routes are distinct Section 249D(1) requires members holding at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at a general meeting. Under s 249D(2)(a)–(d), the request must be written, set out the proposed resolutions, be signed by the requesters and be given to the company; s 249D(3) allows identical separately signed documents, and s 249D(4) fixes the voting-power calculation at midnight before delivery. If a legally valid request has been made, s 249D(5) requires directors to call the meeting within 21 days and hold it within two months. Under s 249E(1), if directors fail to act, members holding more than 50% of the original requisitionists' votes may arrange the meeting; ss 249E(2)–(5) govern timing, register access, reasonable expenses and potential recovery from liable directors. Alternatively, s 249F permits members with at least 5% voting power to convene and pay for their own meeting. For an existing meeting, s 249N(1)(a)–(b) provides a different threshold: 5% of relevant voting power or 100 voting members, subject to s 249N(1A). Under s 249N(2), the proposed resolution must be in writing, set out in its exact terms and signed; s 249O(1) relates to a next general meeting occurring more than two months after the notice, and s 249P governs qualifying member statements. Meeting notices and timing are also subject to ss 249H, 249HA and 249L. A listed- company general meeting ordinarily needs at least 28 days' notice. For removing a public-company director, s 203D sets out an additional, distinct procedure, including notice of intention to move the resolution and the director's right to make representations. Under s 249Q, a meeting must be called for a proper purpose. Members cannot automatically direct management that is constitutionally entrusted to the board: Automatic Self-Cleansing v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; NRMA v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517; and ACCR v CBA [2016] FCAFC 80. The s 198A replaceable rule and the actual constitution therefore matter. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 2 | CORPORATE LAW

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Application: 220 shares do not establish 5% HBC holds 110 × 2 = 220 voting shares out of 20,000,000: 0.0011% of the total. The company would need 1,000,000 relevant votes to satisfy 5%. Even assuming each HBC share carries one ordinary vote, its own holding falls far short. Consequently, HBC has no enforceable s 249D requisition entitlement on the stated facts. The directors cannot presently be characterised as having breached s 249D(5) by refusing this demand. That also prevents HBC relying on s 249E for company-funded self-help or directors' personal reimbursement liability. The request's form is nevertheless important. It was signed and delivered, and contains the wording of the resolutions, but the statute's requirements are cumulative. Substantial compliance with writing and signatures cannot compensate for a missing 5% vote. Nor does s 249F assist: it repeats the 5% requirement and places the meeting expenses on the convening members. HBC should not assume it can shift those costs to the company. If HBC recruits one or more shareholders possessing sufficient additional votes and makes a new properly documented request, the result may change. A coalition's actual voting entitlement, precise signatures, share classes and timing must be verified. Application: proposed resolutions must be lawful Resolution (A), purporting to compel the board to keep 70% of staffed checkouts, is substantively vulnerable. A checkout policy ordinarily involves commercial management under s 198A and the constitution. Cuninghame shows that ownership does not transfer management powers to shareholders; NRMA v Parker limits the obligation to call meetings for incompetent business; and ACCR v CBA reinforces that a procedural right to propose a resolution does not itself make an operational instruction binding. HBC can advocate the policy politically, but it should not present it as a compulsory operational direction without identifying a substantive power. Resolution (B) concerns the statutory shareholder power to remove a director of a public company under s 203D. It is fundamentally different from resolution (A). However, it must be properly framed and comply with the director-removal procedure, including applicable notice and representation rights, as well as the listed-company meeting rules and any other applicable statutory requirements. The solicitor should not treat a validly framed s 203D resolution as doomed merely because the board opposes it. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 3 | CORPORATE LAW

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Application: the existing AGM HBC's 110 members may satisfy the 100-member alternative in s 249N(1)(b) to propose a resolution, assuming all are registered voting members and no different prescribed threshold applies. Yet 1 October to 18 November is approximately seven weeks, which is not more than two months. HBC therefore cannot compel inclusion in that AGM merely through the timing rule in s 249O(1). FreshFoods may choose to cooperate where lawful, but it must not promise that the statute requires circulation at that date. A later compliant meeting, carefully timed notice, and an appropriately drafted member statement under s 249P should be considered. Counterarguments, remedies and advice HBC may argue that shareholders should be able to debate policy in a democratic company. That is a legitimate advocacy consideration but does not eliminate the legal allocation of management power. FreshFoods may argue every activist proposal is an improper purpose; that is too broad. Removing a public-company director under s 203D is a recognised member power, so the actual wording and formalities must be examined. In litigation, an injunction or declaratory relief may be relevant if an invalid meeting is threatened, but costs, urgency and the availability of cooperative solutions should be assessed. Conclusion: HBC cannot presently compel an EGM because 220 of 20 million votes is only 0.0011%. It should pursue lawfully permitted shareholder contact, build a coalition, check whether a major voting holder will support a fresh requisition, and separate non-binding advocacy about checkouts from a competent s 203D director- removal resolution. FreshFoods should document its threshold assessment, treat lawful director-removal procedures seriously and avoid obstructing properly qualified shareholder action. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 4 | CORPORATE LAW

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PROBLEM QUESTION 2 — DIVIDEND CRISIS A dividend the company may no longer afford Oceanside Retail Ltd, a public company, has 10 million ordinary shares. Its directors resolved on 15 August 2026 to pay a dividend of 40 cents per share, payable on 30 November 2026. The constitution applies modern replaceable rules concerning directors' dividend determinations. On 10 November, a finance provider suddenly demands repayment of $9 million after refinancing negotiations fail. Oceanside's recent balance sheet reports total assets of $18 million and liabilities of $11 million, but only $1 million of its assets is cash. Most remaining assets are specialised retail premises and stock that cannot realistically be sold before the creditor's deadline. The board insists that because reported net assets exceed the intended $4 million dividend, it must pay. Shareholders threaten to sue if directors cancel it. Advise the board whether payment is lawful, whether the dividend may be revoked, what insolvency and director-duty concerns arise, and whether the result differs if the constitution instead requires a dividend to be declared by members. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 5 | CORPORATE LAW

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MODEL ANSWER 2 — ISSUE The issues are (i) whether Oceanside satisfies the statutory conditions for payment; (ii) whether the previously determined dividend has matured into a debt; (iii) whether the board may revoke it before the specified payment date; and (iv) what creditor- protection and directors' duties arise from the imminent $9 million obligation. Rule: statutory preconditions and financial reality Section 254T(1)(a)–(c) establishes three cumulative preconditions: the company's assets must exceed its liabilities immediately before the dividend is declared, with the excess sufficient for payment; payment must be fair and reasonable to the shareholders as a whole; and payment must not materially prejudice the company's ability to pay creditors. Under s 254T(2), the assets and liabilities calculation must be made by reference to prescribed accounting standards. Other parts of the Act, including restrictions on capital maintenance and insolvent trading, may also matter. The older approach requiring distributions only from profits should not be substituted for the current s 254T formulation. Under the replaceable rule in s 254U, directors may determine that a dividend is payable and fix its amount, time and method, subject to the constitution and law. Section 254V distinguishes a dividend determined under the modern rule (generally not a company debt until payable) from a dividend declared under a constitutional regime requiring declaration (which may create an earlier debt). Consequently, a directors' determination made in August is not necessarily an irrevocable debt merely because a shareholder expects payment in November. Application: apparent net assets do not answer the creditor question Oceanside's reported asset surplus is $18m − $11m = $7 million, and the proposed dividend is 10m × $0.40 = $4 million. On those figures alone, the surplus exceeds the dividend amount. But s 254T requires satisfaction of all three conditions, not simply a favourable difference between total assets and liabilities. A company may own property it cannot sell quickly while still being unable to pay debts falling due. The due $9 million and the mere $1 million in cash make the creditor-prejudice analysis under s 254T(1)(c) particularly serious. The board must establish realistic alternative funding, maturity dates, debt enforceability, the scope of any refinancing, the balance-sheet valuation date, share- CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 6 | CORPORATE LAW

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class rights and the company's actual cash-flow capacity. It is insufficient to say “the warehouses are worth millions” without explaining how their value can be realised lawfully in time. Directors must test the financial position immediately before the proposed payment and not rely mechanically on August's approval. Application: determination, revocation and creditor protection On the stated modern-rule facts, the dividend was determined by directors on 15 August for payment on 30 November. Under s 254V(1), it ordinarily does not become a debt until the payment date. Subject to the constitution and the full text of the section, revocation before that date is a real legal possibility. The company should consider a formal board resolution reversing or suspending the earlier determination, accurate recording in minutes, prompt communication to shareholders and independent financial advice. Directors should also consider their duties of care and diligence under s 180 and the statutory insolvent-trading framework under s 588G in light of the actual debts and insolvency risks. Oceanside's shareholders will contend that a public announcement induces justified reliance and that withholding payment is unfair. Yet shareholder expectations do not override a statutory prohibition on an unaffordable distribution. No shareholder has an unconditional right to force a fresh dividend decision merely because the company was once profitable. A declared dividend under an older constitution requiring shareholder declaration presents a different debt-timing analysis under s 254V(2). Even then, the company may not simply ignore creditor-protection duties or assume that an existing debt guarantees cash availability. Counterargument, professional advice and conclusion An asset-rich borrower might lawfully pay if, for example, genuinely committed bridging finance arrives before the debt falls due, or the alleged $9 million liability is disputed or validly deferred. Conversely, if payment would materially prejudice creditors, directors risk serious statutory and fiduciary consequences. The burden of responsible advice is to obtain evidence, not make dramatic declarations about insolvency from incomplete figures. Conclusion: The net-asset limb may appear satisfied, but the impending creditor payment creates a substantial issue under s 254T(1)(c). Oceanside should not pay the dividend while unable to establish compliance. Its directors should promptly reassess solvency, consider revocation before the 30 November date, obtain cash- CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 7 | CORPORATE LAW

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flow and legal advice, and document their reasoning. If the constitution instead requires a shareholder declaration, the legal debt may have arisen earlier and the remedies and options require separate specialist analysis. Sources and quality control. These model answers are newly drafted pedagogical examples based on the Week 5 lecture's legal issues and related statutory framework. The specific fact patterns here are teaching hypotheticals and not replacements for the two original FreshFoods tutorial questions reproduced elsewhere in Chapter 5. For filing legal advice in a real matter, verify every relevant subsection and all applicable company- constitution terms against the current consolidated statute and actual company documents. CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION 8 | CORPORATE LAW

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CONSOLIDATION · LECTURER’S PRIORITIES Cases, provisions, revision route & publication notes Cases and why they are here Case Principle / exam use ACCR v CBA [2016] FCAFC 80 Division of powers; distinguishes incompetent management directions from resolutions members can lawfully move — key to HBC Proposal 1. Automatic Self-Cleansing [1906] 2 Ch 34 Historic board/member division and the inability of a bare general- meeting majority to override allocated managerial powers. John Shaw & Sons v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 Who exercises a power allocated by the constitution; relevant to board authority and limits on shareholder instruction. NRMA v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 517 Meeting requisition and proper purpose; a shareholder resolution requires a legitimate legal subject matter. IMF (Australia) v Sons of Gwalia [2005] FCAFC 75 Restrictions on using members’ register information under s 177; relevant to lawful shareholder campaigning. Re Clifton Springs Hotel [1939] VLR 27 Evidentiary significance of the register for establishing shareholding and contribution obligations. Re Bahia and San Francisco Rail Co (1868) LR 3 QB 584 Company representations in certificates and estoppel/damages for mistaken share ownership. Roberts v Coussens (1991) 25 NSWLR 171 Share transfer refusal and the scope of discretion; use with ss 1071E–1071F. Read the exact statutory provisions Start with the official current version of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), compilation No 149 (19 September 2026). The hyperlinks below open the relevant pages in the legislation: CORPORATE LAW 71 | CORPORATE LAW

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Legal topic Official law Requisition and default ss 249D–249E Members calling meeting s 249F Member-proposed resolution ss 249N–249O Member statements s 249P Dividends: permission ss 254SA–254T Determination and debt ss 254U–254V Share dividend rights ss 254W–254WA Three critical warnings for publication 1. Original textbook: The Wiley Company Law chapter is a research and study source only. Its figures, chapters and prose are not licensed for wholesale republishing on JUNIQ. The educational proxy and certificate examples here are newly authored illustrations, not scans of the publisher's content. 2. Source conflicts: The narrated transcript occasionally paraphrases the legislation loosely: s 254T(1)(c) is the creditor material-prejudice rule, s 124(1)(d) is the relevant general power, and personal liability is not automatic. The model answers preserve the lecturer’s substantive focus while using the current Act as the governing text. 3. Completion: This edition integrates the supplied Week 5 lecture PPTX, Week 5 narrated dividend transcript and Chapter 6 textbook content, and the full Week 6 tutorial handout. A later live transcript, the separate Intrepid Mines document packet, and any additional source materials can be separately incorporated upon supply. Existing Chapters 1–4 have not been modified. Original student-oriented legal study exposition, October 2026. This document is not endorsed by the university or textbook publisher. Source descriptions are teaching summaries rather than authorised reproductions. The full tutorial question language is preserved from the supplied handout for the user's private study/book-editing project; public reuse permissions require review. CORPORATE LAW 72 | CORPORATE LAW