CORPORATE LAW · BY DR ADRIAN ADAMS

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ORIGINAL PUBLISHED INTERIOR · 26 OCTOBER 2026

Chapter 6 — Promoters and Outsiders

Preservation note. The material below is a readable text extraction from the existing original book, kept in the same page order without editorial rewriting. Its complete, original approved page layout and link annotations are preserved in the PDFs. Open the complete reading edition.

Original book page 365

CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION CHAPTER SIX PROMOTERS AND OUTSIDERS Week 6 Forum | Week 7 Tutorial FROM THE FIRST BUSINESS IDEA TO A BINDING CONTRACT Promoters, fiduciary obligations and secret commissions Contracts signed before registration: ss 131–133 Company capacity, execution and authority: ss 124–130 Actual authority, apparent authority and outsider protections Cases, tutorials, FAQs, MCQs and High Distinction IRAC answers A detailed Australian Corporate Law study and teaching chapter with original tutorial problems and practical client-advice models. CORPORATE LAW | BY DR ADRIAN ADAMS

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 1 CHAPTER 6 — PROMOTERS AND OUTSIDERS Promoters and Outsiders Week 7 Tutorial · Full original questions followed immediately by High Distinction answers · 15 ranked questions for your lecturer · 26 October 2026 HOW TO READ THIS EDITION This learning supplement integrates the supplied 31-slide forum, the verbatim 2-page Tutorial 6, the live recording transcript supplied in Pasted text.txt, and the author’s current course summary. This is an expansion of—not a deletion or replacement for— the earlier 30-page teaching guide. Read the narrative, cases and legislation before attempting the original tutorial. The 15 lecturer questions deliberately extend beyond the slides. SOURCE LIMITATION. The live transcript supplied ends while the lecturer is discussing Freeman & Lockyer. Later topics are confirmed by the 31-slide deck and the screenshots, not attributed to unseen spoken words. The prescribed textbook Chapter 4, Chapter 5 pages 117–135 and optional Redmond extracts were identified by the reading screenshot but not supplied as full text; this supplement does not claim to have reproduced them. 1. The story behind this week’s law Imagine buying a business property through a company you have not yet incorporated. You sign a lease, obtain equipment quotes and seek outside investment. Before registration, who can contract for the company? The company does not yet legally exist. Once registered, it can contract—but it acts only through people. This module joins these two stages in a single lawyer’s question: when is the company bound, and who pays if the arrangement goes wrong? The lecturer’s memorable analogy is that incorporation is a company’s birthday. The period before registration is its formation or promotion period. Promoters arrange capital, business

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 2 plans, premises, investor interests and contracts. Courts focus on what people actually did, not their business titles. A person may be a promoter by actively organising formation or, exceptionally, by knowingly standing behind the transaction expecting profits from the promotion. EXAM STARTING POINT Write the chronology first: (1) Was the agreement made before registration? → ss 131– 133. (2) Was it made after registration? → capacity under s 124, authority under s 126 or execution under s 127, then assumptions under ss 128–129. (3) Did a promoter profit secretly? → fiduciary duty and equitable remedies. 2. The law you must be able to explain aloud s 119 Company exists from the start of registration. Before that point there is no corporate principal able to appoint an agent or contract. s 122 Permits expenses of promoting and establishing a company to be paid from company assets; it does not itself ratify pre-registration contracts or immunise promoters. s 124(1)–(3) Companies generally have individual-like and corporate legal capacity. Section 124(2) distinguishes capacity from whether an act benefits the company; s 124(3) preserves external legal prohibitions. s 125(1)–(2)

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 3 A restriction on powers or corporate objects in the constitution does not automatically invalidate an act merely because it exceeds that restriction/object. s 126(1) An individual can make, vary, ratify or discharge contracts for a company with express or implied authority. Modern text also covers execution of documents and deeds; the key question is actual authorisation. s 126(2) and related execution provisions Other laws requiring specific contractual procedures still apply. Do not assume that s 126 dispenses with separate legal formality. s 127(1)(a)–(c) Execution WITHOUT a seal: two directors; director and secretary; or a sole director of a proprietary company who is also sole secretary or where there is no secretary. Chloe alone cannot satisfy this when Sunshine Surf has two directors. s 127(2)–(4), s 110A Execution with a seal requires statutory witnessing; deeds and technology-neutral signing have additional rules. Section 127 does not exhaust all ways a company may execute documents. s 128(1) Outsider may rely on listed s 129 assumptions and company cannot assert against the outsider in proceedings that they were wrong.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 4 s 128(2) Protects certain dealings involving persons acquiring or purporting to acquire title to property from a company. s 128(3) Assumptions may remain available even where an officer/agent is fraudulent or forges a document—read with s 128(4), not as unlimited protection. s 128(4) Protection is not available if outsider KNEW or SUSPECTED the specific assumption was false at the time of dealing. Mere failure to check is not automatically equivalent. s 129(1) Company constitution and replaceable rules assumed followed: internal regularity. s 129(2)(a)–(b) Person shown as director/secretary in company-provided public ASIC information is assumed appointed and to have customary powers of a similar office—not unlimited standalone director power. s 129(3)(a)–(b) Person HELD OUT BY THE COMPANY as an officer or agent is assumed duly appointed and to possess customary powers of that office. Crucial in Chloe’s case if Ethan/company permitted the title or role.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 5 s 129(4) Outsider may assume officers and agents properly perform their duties to the company, including required internal processes where otherwise relevant. s 129(5)(a)–(d) Apparent signatures complying with s 127(1) can be assumed due execution; specified claims about signatory capacities may be assumed true. s 129(6)(a)–(f) Equivalent presumptions where a seal appears affixed/witnessed under s 127(2) and 127(2A). s 129(7)–(8) Person authorised to issue documents/certified copies may be assumed authorised to warrant authenticity; subsection (8) is a clarification, not an additional general power. s 130 An outsider is not deemed to know company information merely because ASIC makes it publicly available. This limits constructive notice. s 131(1)(a)–(b) A company registered after someone purported to contract for it becomes bound only if it ratifies in the agreed period or otherwise within a reasonable time. s 131(2)(a)–(b)

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 6 If company is never registered or fails in time to ratify or enter a substitute contract, person who contracted may owe damages measured as if company ratified then failed entirely to perform. s 131(3)(a)–(c) On specified unratified-contract proceedings, court may order registered company to contribute to damages, return property received or pay money; discretionary. s 131(4) Even if company ratifies, where it does not perform, court can order original contracting person to pay some/all damages awarded against company; NOT automatic personal liability. s 132(1)–(2) Other contract party can sign release of promoter from s 131 liability; promoter is otherwise not entitled to indemnity from company for liability under this Part. s 133 This statutory Part replaces other rights/liabilities ON the pre-registration contract, while separate promoter fiduciary wrongs remain analytically distinct. ss 198A, 198C, 201J Where applicable: board collectively manages; directors can delegate powers to an MD; directors may appoint an MD. Examine constitution and valid board action.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 7 s 711(2)–(4), Ch 6D Where a prospectus is required, particular promoter/officer interests, benefits and amounts must be disclosed; check the operative text and fundraising exclusions before applying to a proprietary company. 3. Explain the difficult distinctions as if teaching a beginner A. Promoters and secret commissions A promoter may properly sell property to a new company, but if the promoter benefits on both sides of the bargain there is a risk of conflict. Equity demands full and frank disclosure to people capable of giving meaningful, independent consent. A board made up of the promoter’s friends or fellow beneficiaries may not provide effective consent. The company, not each investor personally, ordinarily owns the claim to unwind an infected deal or recover a secret profit. A promised commission raises an additional evidence issue: has the money actually been received, is it due, and what relief can prevent payment? The correct remedy depends on what was wrong. If the company purchased an asset because of a concealed conflict, rescission might restore the parties if possible. If the promoter made a secret profit, an account of profits targets that benefit. If the company suffered demonstrable loss, equitable compensation may address the loss. Proprietary remedies may sometimes be available over identifiable proceeds; do not assume automatic constructive trust in every case. B. Ratification of contracts signed for an unborn company Ratification is the new company adopting a particular pre-registration contract after registration. The word means approval, not simply incorporation. Properly authorised adoption can be express, and commercial conduct may require close analysis as potential evidence; investigate board minutes, payments, occupation and dealings, rather than assuming acceptance. If Coastal Fitness simply rejects the equipment, s 131(2) is the

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 8 starting risk for Lucas. But a court will not automatically award the supplier the full $30,000: contract damages must be proved. A carefully structured contract can deal with this risk: an agreed incorporation date, express ratification deadline, substitute contract/novation, signed release and clear conditions before delivery. Section 132(2) means a promoter should not simply assume the company will reimburse statutory personal liability. C. Actual authority, apparent authority and execution Actual authority asks whether the company genuinely authorised the signer. It may be expressly stated in company decisions or implied from valid delegation and business practice. Apparent authority asks what the company (rather than the individual alone) caused the outsider to believe and what the outsider relied upon. Proper execution under s 127 is a separate evidentiary route: getting statutory signatures can give stronger certainty. For Sunshine Surf, Chloe’s own business card does not prove company holding-out on its own. However, Ethan’s knowledge, company email signatures, supplier introductions, previous accepted orders and the fact he allowed Chloe to run the surf shop could together support the necessary representation. A private limit, especially one not properly resolved by the two-director board, must be analysed cautiously. The company may be bound even if Chloe acted contrary to a genuine private instruction. LEGAL ROUTE QUESTION EXAMPLE s 126 Did company actually authorise? Validly approved purchasing delegation Apparent authority Did company hold signer out? Allowed her to act publicly as MD ss 128–129 Can outsider assume listed facts? Held-out MD has customary duties s 127 Did company itself execute correctly? Two directors sign; or secretary route

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 9 Figure: four separate routes to analyse. None should be confused with an automatic guarantee of every contract. 4. The cases: story → ruling → why lawyers use it Tracy v Mandalay Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 9; (1953) 88 CLR 215 WHAT HAPPENED? The Salons controlled an existing trading company and promoted Mandalay to undertake a Sydney Potts Point flat development. Land and share transactions involved promoter profits and insufficient independent disclosure. Other participants, including people who stood behind the scheme in expectation of profit, were not all active organisers. DECISION AND REASONING. The High Court treated passive participants knowingly standing behind the promotional transaction as capable of being promoters. It upheld the setting aside of the interested transactions, but qualified the lower court’s broad orders for joint and several repayment; repayment required careful allocation to relevant recipients. WHY IT MATTERS. Promoter identity rests on substantive participation and beneficial interest rather than labels. Rescission is possible where adequate independent consent is absent. WHEN TO USE IT. Use to characterise a non-director, financier or passive participant as promoter and to analyse the proper scope of rescission/repayment. Do NOT assert all innocent outside investors automatically owe fiduciary duties. Open case source: Tracy v Mandalay Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 9; (1953) 88 CLR 215 Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 WHAT HAPPENED? Promoters acquired the lease of an island for about £55,000 and resold it to a newly promoted phosphate company for £110,000. The company’s board was not genuinely

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 10 independent; promoters’ interests and profit were not fully disclosed to an independent decision-maker. Investors later discovered problems with the venture. DECISION AND REASONING. The House of Lords permitted rescission, emphasising promoters’ fiduciary obligations and genuine disclosure to an independent board or fully informed members. WHY IT MATTERS. Secret profit and self-approval are unacceptable even if a property sale could otherwise be legitimate. Independence and informed consent are critical. WHEN TO USE IT. Mia’s $12,000 referral payment: ask who knew, whether board was independent and whether approval followed full disclosure. Open case source: Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 Gluckstein v Barnes [1900] AC 240 WHAT HAPPENED? Promoters purchased the Olympia premises for £140,000 and resold them to the company for £180,000. The prospectus disclosed the £40,000 trading profit, but the promoters had also benefited by buying secured debts at a discount, concealing roughly £20,000 additional profit. DECISION AND REASONING. The House of Lords required an account of the concealed profit. Disclosure of one component did not sanitise another hidden benefit. WHY IT MATTERS. A half-truth is not sufficient disclosure and a company may recover secret profit notwithstanding other disclosed elements. WHEN TO USE IT. Mia should not claim transparency simply because the lease terms were known: the side commission must also be disclosed. Open case source: Gluckstein v Barnes [1900] AC 240

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 11 Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 WHAT HAPPENED? Kapoor ran a property company as if managing director without being formally appointed. The board knew of and tolerated his management. He engaged architects who completed work; the company later disputed its liability to pay. DECISION AND REASONING. The company was bound because the board’s conduct amounted to a company holding-out of Kapoor as having managing-director authority, relied on by architects. WHY IT MATTERS. Apparent authority requires representation attributable to the principal, outsider reliance, and the right type of transaction. WHEN TO USE IT. Sunshine Surf: compare Ethan permitting Chloe to operate as MD with the business card, prior dealings and ordinary surfboard purchasing. Open case source: Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 Crabtree-Vickers Pty Ltd v Australian Direct Mail Advertising & Addressing Co Pty Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 72; [1975] HCA 49 WHAT HAPPENED? An employee signed a substantial order for printing machinery, supposedly under the authority of a managing director, whose own powers on this major purchase were limited. The supplier sued when the company would not complete. DECISION AND REASONING. The High Court rejected the claim on the relevant facts: one cannot use merely ostensible authority of an intermediary to generate further ostensible authority where no one with actual company authority made the representation. WHY IT MATTERS. A would-be agent cannot manufacture authority solely through their own claims or a chain of unauthorised agents.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 12 WHEN TO USE IT. Sunshine Surf: test whether the representation about Chloe came from Ethan/the authorised management, not merely from Chloe herself. Open case source: Crabtree-Vickers Pty Ltd v Australian Direct Mail Advertising & Addressing Co Pty Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 72; [1975] HCA 49 Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327; 119 ER 886 WHAT HAPPENED? A company issued a £2,000 bond under a constitutional power to borrow provided specified member approval was obtained. The company later argued that the necessary internal approval had not occurred. DECISION AND REASONING. The court permitted the bank to assume internal procedural requirements had been observed when dealing on an apparently regular external transaction. WHY IT MATTERS. This is the indoor management rule, a historical basis for the modern s 129(1) statutory assumption. WHEN TO USE IT. When company points to a missing internal resolution, do not assume outsider must have seen it. Open case source: Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327; 119 ER 886 Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146; [1990] HCA 32 WHAT HAPPENED? A company-owned property was mortgaged to secure indebtedness associated with a director rather than company business. The mortgage documentation and corporate authority were defective, and the bank faced obvious questions about the transaction. DECISION AND REASONING. The High Court concluded the transaction could not safely be treated as authorised merely on general indoor-management reasoning; inquiry

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 13 concerns were significant. The case preceded current statutory formulations and must be read alongside ss 128–129. WHY IT MATTERS. Commercial convenience protects legitimate outsiders, not unrestricted reliance where authority is missing and irregularities are apparent. WHEN TO USE IT. Use to identify suspicious/non-ordinary company transactions; keep the present s 128(4) actual-knowledge-or-suspicion test distinct from old common law put-on- inquiry language. Open case source: Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146; [1990] HCA 32 Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 711 WHAT HAPPENED? A company secretary hired prestige vehicles under the company’s name and misused them personally. The car hire business sought payment from the company. DECISION AND REASONING. The Court of Appeal held company bound for administrative- type contracts within the customary authority of a company secretary. WHY IT MATTERS. Authority depends on the office and normal business functions, not the job label alone. A secretary has administrative authority, not unrestricted trading power. WHEN TO USE IT. Distinguish routine car arrangements from a major asset sale or unusual corporate mortgage. Open case source: Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 711 In re Tummon Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 1139 WHAT HAPPENED? The lecturer cites this authority when distinguishing ordinary managing-director powers from financing transactions outside the ordinary scope of company management. The

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 14 specific transaction chronology is not independently established in supplied files. DECISION AND REASONING. The source-derived proposition is that customary MD power does not extend automatically to unusual non-ordinary-course loan transactions; verify the primary judgment before quoting detailed findings. WHY IT MATTERS. Senior-sounding titles do not confer unlimited borrowing or security powers. WHEN TO USE IT. Use cautiously as illustration of scope of customary authority, not for unsupported facts or invented procedural history. Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co Ltd v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653 WHAT HAPPENED? A historic English company entered business outside objects stated in its memorandum and the ultra vires doctrine led to disputes about validity. DECISION AND REASONING. Under the historical rule, corporate capacity was restricted by objects. Australian law now instead uses ss 124–125 and does not ordinarily invalidate acts merely for being beyond constitution objects. WHY IT MATTERS. Shows why modern statutory corporate capacity is different from historic English law. WHEN TO USE IT. Explain historical backdrop only; answer a 2026 Australian capacity question from ss 124–125. 5. ORIGINAL WEEK 7 TUTORIAL — QUESTION THEN ANSWER The following questions reproduce the supplied course document’s substantive wording. Answers immediately follow their matching questions. Important missing facts are stated as contingencies, not invented facts.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 15 ORIGINAL TUTORIAL QUESTION — verbatim QUESTION 1 — Coastal Fitness Pty Ltd Mia and Lucas decide to open a small fitness studio, which they plan to operate through a new company called Coastal Fitness Pty Ltd (‘Coastal Fitness’). They also plan to invite several outside investors to become shareholders in the company. Before Coastal Fitness is registered, Mia begins looking for suitable premises. She finds a studio in Burleigh Heads owned by her uncle, Robert. Robert tells Mia that if Coastal Fitness leases his property, he will pay Mia a $12,000 commission. Mia agrees and signs a lease for the premises on behalf of Coastal Fitness. Mia does not tell Lucas or the proposed outside investors about the commission. Three investors, Priya, Noah and Grace, agree to invest in Coastal Fitness. As part of their investment, they require seats on the board. It is agreed that, once the company is registered, its board will consist of Mia, Lucas, Priya, Noah and Grace. Meanwhile, Lucas is arranging equipment for the new studio. One week before Coastal Fitness is registered, he signs a contract with Budget Gym Equipment Ltd (‘Budget Gym’) for the purchase of $30,000 worth of exercise equipment. Lucas signs the contract “for and on behalf of Coastal Fitness Pty Ltd”. After the company is registered, the directors inspect Budget Gym’s equipment and decide that it is unsuitable. The board instead purchases equipment from another supplier. Coastal Fitness does not make any payment to Budget Gym and does not take delivery of its equipment. Shortly afterwards, Grace discovers an email between Mia and Robert concerning the $12,000 commission. The other directors had not previously known about the arrangement.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 16 Advise Coastal Fitness: 1. Does Coastal Fitness have any recourse against Mia in relation to the $12,000 commission? HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWER ISSUE. Has Mia, as promoter, breached a fiduciary obligation by procuring a lease in exchange for an undisclosed private commission, and what relief belongs to Coastal Fitness? RULE. A promoter owes equitable fiduciary obligations in promotion arrangements. Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co demands full disclosure and valid informed approval where a promoter sells or arranges property on a conflicted basis. Gluckstein v Barnes requires complete disclosure of all profits; Tracy v Mandalay confirms courts look to substance of the promotion and the true independent decision-maker. The usual duties are not extinguished merely because the promoter subsequently becomes a director. Available remedies depend on facts and include account of secret profits, equitable compensation, rescission and possibly proprietary relief. APPLICATION. Mia initiated formation of Coastal Fitness and signed a lease before registration; she is plainly acting as promoter. Robert’s promise of $12,000 if the company leases his studio creates a direct financial conflict: Mia benefits from recommending premises irrespective of whether the studio’s rent or location is best for the company. The commission was concealed from Lucas and outside investors and not disclosed to the post-registration five-person board. Her familial relationship with Robert adds a conflict indicator. No informed company consent is evidenced. Unlike an independent board reviewing all facts, her unilateral arrangement cannot authorise her own gain. If the commission has been paid, account of profits is a powerful remedy; if only promised, seek evidence of the agreement and consider a declaration/injunction or appropriate equitable relief. Rescission of the lease may be considered, but first establish whether Coastal Fitness itself ratified the pre-registration lease under s

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 17 131(1), whether possession/rent were accepted, and whether rescission remains practically available without unfairness or affirmation. If over-market rent or loss is proved, assess equitable compensation separately—do not equate a $12,000 payment with $12,000 proven company loss. CONCLUSION/ADVICE. Coastal Fitness has a strong basis to pursue Mia for undisclosed benefit and to scrutinise whether the lease can be rescinded, subject to facts and equitable defences. Obtain the lease, corporate resolutions, commission emails, independent valuation and payment records. Ensure Mia does not vote on the company’s response and seek independent decision-making. Any contract claim by Robert and Mia’s promoter liability under s 131 must be analysed separately from Mia’s fiduciary wrongdoing. ORIGINAL TUTORIAL QUESTION — verbatim QUESTION 1 — continued 2. What is the legal position regarding the contract with Budget Gym? In particular: • Is Coastal Fitness bound by the contract? • Could Lucas be personally liable under the contract? HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWER ISSUE. Lucas purported to sign for an entity that did not yet exist. Did Coastal Fitness adopt the contract after incorporation? If not, what is Lucas’s statutory exposure? RULE. Section 119 fixes corporate existence upon registration. Under s 131(1)(a)–(b), a pre-registration contract binds the later-formed company only if it ratifies within the agreed or reasonable period. Section 131(2) makes the pre-registration contracting person liable in damages if the company is not formed, or is formed but does not in time ratify or enter a substitute. Section 131(3) permits specified discretionary court orders affecting a registered but non-ratifying company. Under s 131(4), court-ordered promoter liability may still arise if a ratifying company defaults. Section 132(1) permits

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 18 signed release by the outsider; s 132(2) denies the promoter an automatic right of indemnity from the company. Section 133 replaces other rights and liabilities on the pre-registration contract. APPLICATION. Lucas signed one week before registration, expressly on behalf of Coastal Fitness. That fits the gateway of s 131. The board, after seeing the equipment, chose another supplier; no payment or delivery occurred. These facts strongly indicate that it did not ratify Budget Gym’s contract. There is no evidence of an express acceptance, use or substitute contract with Budget Gym. The precise contract terms and timing must be reviewed because s 131(1) refers to an agreed time or otherwise a reasonable time. Lucas is therefore exposed under s 131(2) after that period. Budget Gym’s damages are calculated by the loss it could have recovered from Coastal Fitness had the contract been ratified and entirely breached: this may involve lost net profit, wasted costs or resale mitigation—not automatically the entire $30,000 contract price. The company has apparently received no equipment or benefit, weighing against (but not conclusively excluding) any discretionary s 131(3) contribution. If board action somehow amounted to ratification, the company would be bound; on later breach Budget Gym could pursue the company and ask for a discretionary s 131(4) order against Lucas. CONCLUSION/ADVICE. On the supplied facts Coastal Fitness is probably not bound to Budget Gym because it appears not to have ratified, while Lucas faces a strong risk of personal damages under s 131(2). Notify Lucas, preserve the contract and board documents, ascertain deadline and measure of supplier loss, and negotiate a written resolution/release if commercially desirable. Also investigate Mia’s lease separately: that is another pre-registration contract with its own possible s 131 issues. ORIGINAL TUTORIAL QUESTION — verbatim QUESTION 2 — Sunshine Surf Pty Ltd Ethan is the sole shareholder and a director of Sunshine Surf Pty Ltd (‘Sunshine Surf’), which operates a surf shop on the Gold Coast.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 19 Ethan appoints his friend Chloe as a second director of the company. Chloe begins managing the shop on a day-to-day basis and describes herself as the Managing Director of Sunshine Surf. She has never been formally appointed as Managing Director. Ethan is happy for Chloe to run the ordinary business of the surf shop. However, he tells Chloe privately: “You can deal with suppliers yourself, but you must get my approval before entering into any contract worth more than $20,000.” One day Chloe negotiates with Ocean Boards Ltd (‘Ocean Boards’) to purchase $28,000 worth of surfboards for Sunshine Surf. During the negotiations, Chloe gives Ocean Boards’ sales manager her business card, which describes her as: Chloe Martin Managing Director Sunshine Surf Pty Ltd The sales manager does not ask Chloe whether there are any restrictions on her authority. Chloe signs the contract on behalf of Sunshine Surf. Ethan is furious when he discovers the contract. He contacts Ocean Boards and says: “Chloe had no authority to make this purchase. Sunshine Surf will not honour the contract.” Advise Sunshine Surf whether it is bound by the contract with Ocean Boards.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 20 In your answer, consider: 1. Did Chloe have actual authority to enter into the contract? 2. Could Chloe have apparent (ostensible) authority? 3. Are there any relevant statutory assumptions under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that Ocean Boards might be entitled to rely upon? 4. Are there any facts that could prevent Ocean Boards from relying on those assumptions? HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWER ISSUE. Was the $28,000 surfboard purchase authorised by Sunshine Surf, or can Ocean Boards enforce it despite Ethan’s private purchasing limit? This is a company- formation-complete (post-registration) authority problem, NOT a s 131 case. RULE AND ACTUAL AUTHORITY. Section 124 gives capacity. Section 126(1) recognises contracts made by agents with express or implied actual authority. Under the ordinary replaceable-rule framework, s 198A places management with the directors, s 201J concerns formal MD appointment and s 198C concerns board delegation (subject to constitution). A director is not automatically empowered alone to bind the company in every matter; an ordinary managing director or shop manager may possess express or implied authority for routine purchases. A company could also be bound by later ratification. APPLICATION—ACTUAL AUTHORITY. Chloe was genuinely a director and was permitted to run day-to-day trading and engage with suppliers. That supports an implied or expressly delegated purchasing authority. However, Ethan expressly told her approval was required above $20,000, and $28,000 exceeds that sum. If the restriction was a valid company direction binding Chloe, she lacked actual authority for this order. There is an important extra problem: Ethan was sole shareholder but, after appointing Chloe, no longer the only director. His personal direction may not equal a valid board resolution. Check company constitution, board process, pattern of transactions, and whether Ethan controlled/was authorised to set the limit. The answer on actual

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 21 authority therefore has a strong argument against Chloe but is not mechanically conclusive. RULE AND APPARENT AUTHORITY. Under Freeman & Lockyer, a company can be bound where a representation originating from the principal or someone with real management authority holds the agent out as able to transact, the outsider relies on that representation, and the contract lies within the represented role. Crabtree-Vickers warns that an agent cannot create unlimited authority by unilateral self-description; Northside cautions on unusual and suspicious corporate transactions. APPLICATION—APPARENT AUTHORITY. Surfboards are core trading stock for a Gold Coast surf retailer. If Ethan knowingly allowed Chloe to manage the store as though MD, negotiate routine supplier contracts, sign corporate emails as MD or accept prior similar orders, the company’s conduct could amount to a holding-out. Ocean Boards has a strong claim it relied on Chloe’s apparently managerial position to agree the order. But the business card alone was created/presented by Chloe; without a representation attributable to Sunshine Surf or its authorised decision-maker, that single fact is insufficient. Verify company acquiescence. STATUTORY ASSUMPTIONS. Under s 128(1), Ocean Boards may rely upon any applicable s 129 assumption. Section 129(3)(a)–(b) is particularly relevant where the company held Chloe out as managing director/officer: it covers appointment and customary powers of that position in a similar company. Section 129(4) supports an assumption that internal duties and processes are complied with, and s 129(1) addresses constitution/replaceable-rule regularity. Section 129(2) can show Chloe is properly appointed director on company-provided public ASIC information, but customary powers of a mere director are more limited than those of an MD. Section 129(5) is NOT the usual answer: Sunshine Surf had two directors and Chloe signed alone, so this is not apparently a s 127(1) two-director execution. Section 130 prevents deeming Ocean Boards to know an ASIC-available private limitation. LIMITATION / COUNTERARGUMENT. Section 128(4) bars reliance on an assumed

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 22 fact if Ocean Boards KNEW OR SUSPECTED it was incorrect at the time. No such knowledge is stated. Failure to ask about internal authorisation is not itself proof of suspicion. However, if $28,000 is extraordinarily large for Sunshine Surf or Ocean Boards had been told approval was needed, suspicion may become factually arguable. Distinguish the precise current statutory test from older Northside common-law inquiry language. CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL ADVICE. Sunshine Surf is likely bound if Ethan/company knowingly permitted Chloe to function publicly as MD and $28,000 is an ordinary commercial stock order, even if Chloe exceeded a genuine undisclosed limit. On the stated facts, a bare self-issued card leaves some uncertainty; the most important fact is the company’s holding-out, not just Chloe’s assertion. Ethan should not summarily refuse performance until board records, emails, prior purchasing history and supplier knowledge are reviewed. If bound, the company should manage the commercial contract and separately consider internal action against Chloe for breaching an effective instruction; remedies depend on duties, loss and contract. If not bound, notify supplier with evidence rather than unsupported assertion. ORIGINAL TUTORIAL QUESTION — verbatim PREPARATION FOR CLIENT INTERVIEW EXERCISE Imagine that Ethan is your client and that you have only been given the facts above. Before advising him, identify three additional questions you would ask Ethan. For each question, briefly explain: • why you want that information; and • how his answer could affect your legal advice. HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWER

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 23 1. “What exactly did the board decide when Chloe became a director, and what does the constitution say about management, MD appointment and purchasing limits?” WHY: The legal source of Chloe’s actual authority and the validity of Ethan’s private $20,000 restriction must be identified. EFFECT: A formal limit supports the argument she exceeded actual authority; an informal personal instruction may not. 2. “Before this transaction, had you introduced Chloe as managing director, authorised company material with that title, allowed her to sign contracts, or paid invoices on purchases above $20,000?” WHY: Apparent authority requires a company-attributable holding-out. EFFECT: Accepted past conduct strengthens Ocean Boards’ s 129(3) and Freeman & Lockyer arguments; isolated self-issued cards weaken them. 3. “How large is a typical Sunshine Surf inventory order, and what did Ocean Boards know about Chloe’s role or the $20,000 limit?” WHY: A $28,000 purchase may be ordinary stock replenishment or a dramatic outlier; s 128(4) turns on knowledge or suspicion. EFFECT: Normal stock purchase without red flags favours enforceability; proof of actual suspicion/relevant knowledge could undermine statutory assumptions. 6. Fifteen ranked questions to ask your lecturer 1. When can ratification occur by conduct? If a newly registered company starts using premises or equipment obtained by a promoter without a formal board resolution, what facts prove ratification under s 131(1), and how do we determine the time limit? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Adds evidence and board decision-making to the lecture’s basic ratification rule. 2. Independent consent in family-owned companies

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 24 Where the promoter is majority shareholder and controls the board, who can give genuinely independent approval for a related-party lease, and what should the solicitor record? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Tests Erlanger beyond its classic facts and how real closely held companies function. 3. The precise trigger for suspicion under s 128(4) When does an unusual transaction become actual suspicion preventing reliance on s 129, and what due-diligence questions should an outsider ask? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Tests Northside against the modern statutory subjective knowledge/suspicion threshold. 4. Designing an effective purchasing-authority control system What combination of board delegation, constitution, external supplier communications and contract signatures best enforces a dollar limit without jeopardising routine trading? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Connects company governance to s 126, s 129(3), Freeman & Lockyer and Crabtree-Vickers. 5. Promoter liability after ratification and later insolvency How is s 131(4) discretion actually exercised, and what contractual drafting or risk allocation can reduce a promoter’s exposure? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Goes beyond the basic text and asks how to advise a founder commercially.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 25 6. Can a private instruction by one director bind another director? When a sole shareholder appoints a second director, can the former sole director still unilaterally impose binding purchasing limits or must the board validly resolve them? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Surfaces the critical Sunshine Surf issue around s 198A and constitution. 7. Promoter’s receipt versus promise of a secret commission Where a promoter has been promised a private benefit but has not received it yet, which remedy should the company seek first and why? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Distinguishes an account of profit from injunction, declarations and compensation. 8. Drafting the best substitute contract and release When a proposed company will not ratify a promoter contract, how do s 131(2), s 132(1) and a new novation or substitute agreement interact in a well-drafted settlement? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: A practical negotiation exercise for Lucas/Budget Gym. 9. Electronic signatures and delegated agents What evidence should a business obtain to ensure an electronically signed document satisfies ss 110A, 126 and 127, especially where the signer is not a director? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Moves beyond lecture slide 20 into digital contract risk.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 26 10. Ordinary-course authority versus extraordinary debt Does a managing director’s customary authority change with a company’s size, history and business model, particularly for overdrafts, leases, guarantees and security? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Develops Tummon / Northside customary authority context. 11. Does a company remain bound where the outsider acted negligently? If a supplier failed to check ASIC filings or board minutes, is mere carelessness sufficient to defeat reliance under s 128(4), or must knowledge/suspicion actually be shown? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Clarifies statutory wording versus historical constructive inquiry doctrine. 12. When does a professional adviser become a promoter? At what point could a solicitor, accountant or business consultant move from ordinary professional services to promoter status and fiduciary exposure? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Tests the lecturer’s substance-over-form approach. 13. Proprietary-company fundraising and secret benefits How would a business lawyer reconcile the promoter’s equitable disclosure obligations with the actual operation and exceptions of Chapter 6D for private investors in a Pty Ltd? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Extends the brief s 711 discussion into practical capital raising.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 27 14. Which remedy should be pleaded and by whom? How does the company choose between rescission, account of profits and equitable compensation, and when would a shareholder need a derivative action to enforce the corporate right? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: Bridges Equity, Corporate Law and litigation strategy. 15. What is the complete outsider-protection protocol? If advising a company about a $5 million purchase involving a self-described MD, what documentary protections would you ask for beyond the minimum rights conferred by ss 128–129? WHY IT ADDS VALUE: A practical senior-partner style checklist question. 7. Oral-exam attack sheet: teach it back in under two minutes PROMOTER “Before registration the person is promoting a company that does not yet exist. Promoter fiduciary obligations arise from equity. Identify any undisclosed benefit and whether genuinely independent consent was obtained.” PRE-REGISTRATION CONTRACT “Apply s 131: was the company registered and did it ratify in time? If not, the signer faces s 131(2) damages. Check s 131(3) discretion, s 131(4) if ratified but defaulted, s 132 release/no indemnity and s 133.” OUTSIDER CONTRACT

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 28 “After registration, separate company capacity under ss 124–125 from actual agency under s 126, company execution under s 127, and outsider reliance on ss 128–129.” APPARENT AUTHORITY “Ask what the COMPANY represented or permitted, what the outsider relied upon, and whether that kind of contract was customary. The agent’s own business card cannot create authority by itself.” RED FLAGS “Section 128(4) asks whether the outsider actually knew or suspected the relevant assumption was wrong. Apply the facts, not general criticism that the outsider failed to investigate.” 8. Sources and accuracy notes STATUTORY CONTROL TEXT: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Federal Register of Legislation compilation C149, effective 19 September 2026. The current federal compilation is the source for the numbered subsections used here. The links below open the public Act or identified judgments; a general Act link is not represented as independently tested pinpoint navigation for each paragraph. Official Corporations Act 2001 — current text PRIMARY MATERIALS: Week 6 “Promoters and outsiders” PowerPoint (31 slides), the Week 7 Tutorial 6 Word document (2 pages), the user-provided live transcript in Pasted text.txt, the user’s JUNI summary and lecture screenshots. Earlier 30-page study guide also reviewed for continuity.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 29 SOURCE DISTINCTIONS: (1) Live transcript stops during Freeman & Lockyer; not a complete 2-hour verbatim record. (2) Erlanger reported as 3 App Cas 1218, not 2 App Cas; (3) Tracy (not “Tracey”) v Mandalay is [1953] HCA 9; (4) s 711(3) relates to stated fees/benefits paid or agreed to be paid to specified people, not automatically amounts “promoter must pay”; (5) s 131(4) is discretionary; (6) s 128(4) says “knew or suspected”. Professional advice note: These are educational model answers. Real clients require full documents, instructions, current-law verification, evidence, litigation strategy and local solicitor review before action. 9. Four visual explanations to remember These diagrams are teaching tools. Use the text of the Corporations Act and the cases for the exact governing rule. Figure 6.1 — Chronology: before and after incorporation

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 30 Figure 6.2 — Promoter duties: identify, disclose, obtain independent approval Figure 6.3 — Statutory problem solving: capacity, authority, execution, reliance

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 31 Figure 6.4 — Cases and principles: when to use each authority 10. Frequently asked questions and full answers FAQ 1 — Is anyone who pays money to form a company automatically a promoter? No. A promoter is identified by involvement in procuring formation and the relevant transaction. Tracy v Mandalay shows why a knowing passive participant in a scheme may still be treated as a promoter. Mere ordinary arm’s-length subscription or professional advice is not automatically enough. FAQ 2 — Why does a promoter owe fiduciary duties before the company exists? Equity restrains people who place themselves in a position to act for a contemplated company and its investors, particularly where they exploit the formation process for undisclosed personal benefit. The governing duty is sourced in case law, not a blanket statutory “promoter” definition.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 32 FAQ 3 — Is profit on a sale to a company automatically prohibited? No. The decisive issue is a disclosable conflict and whether the promoter obtained properly informed consent from independent decision-makers. Erlanger explains why a controlled board is not a substitute for independent approval. FAQ 4 — Who may sue for Mia’s commission? Ordinarily the company asserts its own rights once incorporated; the board should independently assess the transaction and remedies. Investors are not automatically personally entitled to the $12,000 simply because they subscribed for shares. FAQ 5 — If Lucas signed “for and on behalf of” an unborn company, is it a company contract? Not automatically. Section 131 expressly deals with the non-existent principal: the later company must be registered and ratify the agreement within the agreed period or a reasonable time. FAQ 6 — Does “ratification” mean the company must say the word “ratify”? Not necessarily. What matters is whether the company validly adopted the particular agreement within the statutory time. Objective conduct and board decisions can be evidence, but mere registration alone is not adoption. FAQ 7 — Does an agent’s business card establish apparent authority? No. A person cannot normally bootstrap authority through their own representations. Freeman & Lockyer and Crabtree-Vickers require a company-attributable holding out; in Chloe’s case examine Ethan’s conduct, company materials, and past accepted

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 33 transactions. FAQ 8 — Can an outsider always rely on s 129 even when a transaction looks unusual? No. Under s 128(4), actual knowledge or suspicion that the relevant assumption was incorrect prevents reliance. Northside provides a useful historical illustration of warning signs, but do not replace the words of s 128(4) with an invented general negligence test. FAQ 9 — Is a director always able to bind a company alone? No. There may be a valid actual delegation, a company-attributable appearance of authority, or effective execution. Section 127 formal execution for a company with two directors is not generally satisfied by one director signing alone. FAQ 10 — What practical documents should a lawyer ask to inspect? ASIC details, the constitution, shareholder agreements, board minutes, delegated authority policies, emails, contract execution records, past supplier invoices, prospectus/disclosure materials, and evidence of every person’s knowledge at the time. 11. Multiple-choice examination questions MCQ 1 — When does a company become a legal person? A. When promoters approve the business plan B. On registration under s 119 C. When the first bank account opens

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 34 D. When the first invoice is issued MCQ 2 — Which case illustrates inadequate disclosure to a non-independent board? A. Erlanger v Sombrero B. Freeman & Lockyer C. Northside Developments D. Crabtree-Vickers MCQ 3 — What is the primary concern where a promoter secretly takes a commission? A. Company capacity B. Personal profit and conflict C. Constitutional objects D. Electronic signatures MCQ 4 — Lucas signs before registration and the company never ratifies. Starting point? A. s 131(2) B. s 129(2) C. s 125(2) D. s 127(3) MCQ 5 — Section 124 primarily concerns: A. Corporate capacity B. Proxy voting

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 35 C. Registered charges D. Liquidation MCQ 6 — A private spending cap necessarily defeats an outsider claim? A. Yes always B. Only if registered at ASIC C. No; analyse company authority and outsider protections D. Only where the director is a shareholder MCQ 7 — The s 128(4) disqualification applies if the outsider: A. Failed to read ASIC B. Knew or suspected the assumption was wrong C. Was not a company director D. Used electronic signatures MCQ 8 — The strongest evidence of apparent authority is: A. The agent calling themselves MD B. A self-created business card alone C. A company-authorised holding out and reliance D. A private conversation unknown to the supplier MCQ 9 — Which case is central to holding-out authority? A. Freeman & Lockyer B. Erlanger C. Gluckstein

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 36 D. Tracy MCQ 10 — Why is an independent board significant? A. It always eliminates liability B. It may be competent to consent after full disclosure C. It can waive every statute D. It replaces company registration 12. MCQ model answers and explanations Answer 1: B — On registration under s 119 Section 119 fixes legal existence at registration, not the commencement of preparations. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection. Answer 2: A — Erlanger v Sombrero Erlanger applies independent informed disclosure and consent. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection. Answer 3: B — Personal profit and conflict The fiduciary conflict and no-secret-profit principles engage. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 37 Answer 4: A — s 131(2) Section 131(2) imposes damages exposure on the individual signer, subject to its terms. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection. Answer 5: A — Corporate capacity It gives registered companies broad legal capacity. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection. Answer 6: C — No; analyse company authority and outsider protections Actual authority, representations, relevant assumptions, and knowledge/suspicion must be examined separately. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection. Answer 7: B — Knew or suspected the assumption was wrong The statute uses knowledge or suspicion, not automatically constructive notice. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection. Answer 8: C — A company-authorised holding out and reliance The principal must be responsible for the appearance. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 38 Answer 9: A — Freeman & Lockyer Freeman & Lockyer sets out the principal-made representation rationale. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection. Answer 10: B — It may be competent to consent after full disclosure Consent must be real, independent, and adequately informed. The other options fail because they confuse corporate formation, promoter duties, execution mechanics or outsider protection. 13. Short-answer questions Short answer 1 — Explain the differences between actual express, actual implied and apparent authority. Short answer 2 — What must be established to impose damages under s 131(2)? Short answer 3 — Explain the difference between ss 126 and 127. Short answer 4 — What is the significance of Northside for a third party?

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 39 Short answer 5 — Why may rescission differ from an account of profits? Short answer 6 — Identify five documents a solicitor should seek before advising Sunshine Surf. 14. Short-answer model answers Model answer 1 Express actual authority comes from authorisation stated expressly; implied actual authority may flow from a role, course of dealings or necessary incidents of the task, attributable to the company. Apparent authority is different: the company represents to an outsider that an agent has authority, and the outsider contracts in reliance on that representation. Do not conflate a secret internal limit with an externally effective representation. Apply s 126, s 129 and Freeman & Lockyer. Model answer 2 Identify the pre-registration contract, the individual who purported to contract, whether registration occurred, whether the later company ratified within the agreed or reasonable time or entered a substitute, and the other party’s demonstrated contractual loss. Consider s 131(3) discretionary court orders, s 131(4) if ratification happened but later default followed, and s 132.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 40 Model answer 3 Section 126 is company contracting through an agent acting with actual express or implied authority. Section 127 supplies formal statutory company-execution methods, commonly giving outsiders stronger s 129 assumptions when requirements appear satisfied. A single director in a two-director company signing without the second director does not automatically amount to due s 127 execution. Model answer 4 Northside weighs commercial convenience against the need to protect the company against irregular unauthorised acts. A transaction securing the debts of another person or company raises warning signs. In a 2026 statutory problem, begin with ss 128–129 and specifically s 128(4), identifying actual knowledge or suspicion rather than merely assuming every suspicious-looking document is unenforceable. Model answer 5 Rescission seeks to unwind a transaction, ordinarily requiring attention to restoring benefits and third-party consequences. An account of profits strips the fiduciary’s unauthorised profit, rather than calculating company loss. An injunction may be appropriate where an undisclosed commission is promised but unpaid; equitable compensation may instead remedy attributable loss. Model answer 6 Company constitution; board meeting and delegation records; ASIC officer records; Chloe’s email correspondence and business cards used by the company; supplier invoices and previous company-approved orders. Also obtain Ocean Boards’ communications to identify company-attributable representations and possible

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 41 knowledge or suspicion. 15. Two original High Distinction IRAC problems IRAC PROBLEM 1 — QUESTION A newly formed Brisbane technology company is promoted by two founders. Before registration, founder Ava arranges a $100,000 software licence and negotiates a personal undisclosed rebate of $14,000 from the supplier, contingent on the company executing the contract. Founder Ben signs the licence “for FutureTech Pty Ltd” while the company does not exist. FutureTech registers two weeks later. Its independent directors are shown the contract but not the rebate. They pay a $20,000 deposit before later deciding the software is unsuitable and refusing further performance. Advise FutureTech and the supplier.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 42 IRAC PROBLEM 1 — HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWER ISSUES. Identify promoter status and secret benefit, the extent of valid informed consent, the nature of the pre-registration contract, whether FutureTech ratified, and available remedies for each party. RULE. Before incorporation, promoters owe fiduciary duties to the proposed company in respect of promotion transactions: Erlanger v Sombrero (non-independent or incomplete disclosure insufficient); Gluckstein v Barnes (secret profits accountable); Tracy v Mandalay (rescind infected transaction and consequences for promoter participants). Registration occurs under s 119. Under s 131(1), FutureTech becomes bound if it registers and ratifies within the agreed or a reasonable time. Section 131(2) addresses damages payable by signer Ben if there is no registration, ratification or substitute contract. Section 131(3) permits specified discretionary relief, s 131(4) addresses the individual signer where company ratifies but fails to perform, and s 132 concerns release and indemnification limitations. The case turns on the evidence of ratification, not assumption. APPLICATION. Ava arranged the benefit during promotion and hid it from directors despite their formal independence. The payment offer represents at least a conflict and potential secret profit. Proper disclosure of the transaction without the rebate is deficient. FutureTech should inspect the written arrangements and consider an injunction to prevent payment of the contingent rebate, an account if paid, rescission where restoration remains practically possible, and equitable compensation for proven loss. Ben contracted before the company existed. Post-registration payment of a deposit may objectively evidence ratification; board review and rejection alone would not. Determine whether directors knew the key terms, whether the payment was authorised as adoption, and whether the agreed time was met. If ratified, FutureTech may be liable on the contract and the supplier may pursue contractual relief. If not ratified, Ben faces exposure under s 131(2) subject to proved loss; the supplier cannot simply demand the whole licence price without damages analysis. If ratified but breached, s 131(4) allows (not automatically requires) a damages order against Ben, considering statutory conditions.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 43 COUNTERARGUMENTS. Ava may contend that her rebate was prospective and no profit arose or that the licence was good value; neither eliminates the duty to disclose an interest. Ben may assert payment was provisional and not a corporate ratification; the supplier will rely on acceptance of benefits and the deposit. Rescission may be unavailable if benefits cannot be restored or third-party rights intervene. REMEDIES AND CONCLUSION. Preserve the written evidence, cease payment of rebate pending advice, appoint disinterested directors to assess the promoter breach, notify supplier of the ratification dispute and consider negotiation or formal adoption/substitution. The stronger claim against Ava is non-disclosure; liability on the software contract depends on the documents and conduct after registration. Do not assume automatic liability or automatic rescission. IRAC PROBLEM 2 — QUESTION Sunrise Foods Pty Ltd has two directors, Tara and Kelvin, and a board-approved delegation allowing Tara, the operations director, to order routine stock up to $35,000. Kelvin alone privately tells Tara not to spend above $15,000. The company’s website and stationery describe Tara as “General Manager”. After three prior purchases of $32,000 that the company paid without objection, Tara orders $31,000 of ordinary stock from Pacific Foods. Pacific Foods has no knowledge of Kelvin’s warning but notices that this order will be shipped to a new warehouse. Tara signs the purchase agreement alone. Advise Sunrise Foods and Pacific Foods.

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 44 IRAC PROBLEM 2 — HIGH DISTINCTION MODEL ANSWER ISSUES. Identify genuine actual delegation, legal effect of Kelvin’s later private warning, any company-attributable holding out, whether formal execution is necessary, statutory assumptions and the effect of possible suspicion. RULE. Registered companies generally have capacity under s 124 notwithstanding any mere constitutional objects restriction under s 125. Under s 126, a company may contract by an agent with express or implied actual authority. Actual authority is assessed against corporate governance and delegations, not simply a shareholder’s personal preference. Company execution under s 127 is an alternative formal route and is not established merely by a single director signing in a company with two directors. Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties explains principal-attributable holding out and reliance; Crabtree-Vickers highlights limits on self-authorisation; Northside warns against irregular transactions. Under ss 128(1), 129(1)–(4) outsiders may rely on relevant internal-compliance and held-out-officer authority assumptions, subject to s 128(4): they cannot rely on an assumption they knew or suspected was wrong. Section 130 eliminates constructive notice merely from ASIC availability. APPLICATION. The board-approved $35,000 delegation is powerful evidence Tara had actual express authority to purchase ordinary inventory for $31,000, making Kelvin’s unilateral and undisclosed $15,000 instruction unlikely to cancel that valid delegation absent power to do so. Even if the board validly modified the delegation, the company’s General Manager identification and three accepted $32,000 orders amount to company- attributable representations of authority within the normal scale of business. Pacific Foods acted in reliance on the established purchasing relationship. A new warehouse delivery address may justify logistical checking but, standing alone, does not establish actual knowledge or suspicion of the relevant authority assumption. Section 129(3) may assist given the company-held-out role, while s 129(1) or (4) may help on internal regularity; s 129(2) should not be over-read as giving an ordinary director unlimited power. Tara’s solo signature does not meet the standard two-director s 127(1) execution route; that does not defeat an otherwise authorised s 126 contract. COUNTERARGUMENTS. Sunrise may show a formal later board resolution genuinely

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CORPORATE LAW — NEXT EDITION | PROMOTERS & OUTSIDERS CORPORATE LAW — WEEK 6 | 45 revoking authority communicated to Pacific Foods; then the authority analysis would change. Pacific Foods’ knowledge of a prior delegated limit or an extraordinary purchase could generate s 128(4) questions. A mere new warehouse address is not necessarily a red flag of authority; investigate who controlled it and previous practices. REMEDIES AND CONCLUSION. Sunrise is likely bound by the $31,000 stock agreement. It should review the company resolution and ordinary course purchase history before denying liability, consider performance or commercial settlement, and adopt a documented external-authority protocol. Any internal breach by Tara is a separate potential directors’ duty or employment/governance matter requiring proof of a valid limit and loss. Pacific Foods should preserve company letterhead, emails, invoices and delivery instructions supporting its reliance. 16. Chapter 6 examination and professional advice checklist ISSUE → SOURCE → APPLICATION → REMEDY 1. Fix chronology and identify company status. 2. Name each affected client and contracting party. 3. Find the precise current statutory subsection. 4. Explain the authority case with material facts and reasoning. 5. Apply the exact documents and powers. 6. Analyse rival constructions and counterarguments. 7. Identify available relief and litigation/commercial risks. 8. Conclude with an action plan and evidence checklist.