New: essential-reading teaching for Chapter 6. The prescribed textbook topics are explained in original plain English, with a statutory issue map, an applied problem, FAQs and reasoned MCQs.
Open the source-integrated guideNew: beginner-first companion for Chapter 6. A plain-English lecturer-style explanation, statutory map, worked IRAC example, FAQs and MCQs with explanations.
Start the easy-to-read guideChapter 6 — Deep teaching expansion: promoters, company contracts and outsiders
Reader's orientation (Week 6, LAWS75-310). The Bond reading screenshot specifies Chapple et al, Company Law (3rd ed, 2023), Chapter 4 in full, Chapter 5, pp 117–135, stopping when §5.7 begins, and close reading of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 125–130 and 131–133. Both of those textbook chapters have been supplied; the explanations here restate the concepts independently in original teaching language. The teaching follows the existing Chapter 6 and its Week 7 tutorial, preserving the legacy chapter and its original questions. The assigned excerpt stops before the textbook's separate discussion of corporate tort and criminal liability.
1. Start with a story — before the company, after the company, and the outsider
A graduate and a friend want to establish a chain of health-food cafés. They decide to create Reef Café Pty Ltd. Before it is registered, the graduate signs a lease “for Reef Café Pty Ltd”. After registration, the new business orders expensive coffee machines. A manager claims to have board approval, but no board meeting took place. The supplier delivers everything and asks to be paid. The company then argues that neither contract binds it.
This is not one legal problem. It is three layers. First, before registration the future company did not exist and could not simply act as a normal contractual principal. Second, once registered, the company has legal capacity but acts through real people. Third, the law needs to decide when an outsider may rely upon a director, officer, agent, signature or company procedure. Student answers earn marks by identifying which layer exists at which time, rather than applying a single vague rule about “authority”.
Three-route visual map
Before registration? → Part 2B.3: ss 131–133. After registration, acting through a person? → ss 124–127 + actual/apparent authority. Outsider challenges an internal defect? → ss 128–130 + the company’s representations and the outsider's knowledge or suspicion. Different questions require different legal tests and potentially different defendants.
2. Promoters: who are they and why does the law impose fiduciary responsibility?
A promoter is someone who takes a significant role in forming and setting a company going, rather than merely lending a neutral professional service. The concept arises from general law; the Corporations Act does not supply a comprehensive definition. Active promoters organise the venture, secure finance, negotiate contracts and encourage investors. People may also fall within the doctrine where their involvement and expected benefit show they participated in promotion despite leaving much activity to others. A solicitor who merely advises on incorporation under ordinary instructions is not automatically a promoter; a professional who instead drives the venture or takes a concealed interest might become one. Ask what the person actually did, not just what business card they held.
The central danger is that the promoter may control both sides of a transaction at the moment the new company lacks an experienced, independent decision-maker. A promoter might acquire land for $300,000, then cause the new company to purchase it for $500,000, without disclosing the promoter's earlier purchase and profit. The extra $200,000 is not automatically lawful just because the promoter took commercial risk. The legal issue is informed disclosure, conflict and independent authorisation. Equity imposes fiduciary obligations because the promoter's position creates an opportunity to act for personal gain at the emerging company's expense. A fiduciary must avoid unauthorised conflicts and unauthorised secret profit; whether a transaction can be retained depends on full disclosure and valid, independent approval in the circumstances.
Key cases explained in usable examination language
Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218. The promoters sold an asset into a company formed under their influence at a profit, with disclosure and independence of approval at issue. The House of Lords treated the absence of an independent and properly informed corporate decision as critical and recognised rescission in the circumstances. Why use it? It shows why a promoter cannot protect an interested transaction merely by arranging approval from people under the promoter's control. In an answer, identify the conflicted transaction, who knew what, whether the company had a genuinely independent decision-maker and whether restoration remains possible.
Gluckstein v Barnes [1900] AC 240. Promoters used arrangements surrounding a property acquisition to obtain an undisclosed gain beyond what was openly revealed to the company. The case illustrates the strict approach to secret profits and the need for effective disclosure. Why use it? Do not limit your enquiry to whether the gross transaction price was commercially plausible. Trace every payment, rebate, commission, connected entity and beneficiary; ask whether the company or truly independent shareholders were told the material facts. The practical remedy may include an account of profits, even where proving an exact matching corporate loss is difficult.
Tracy v Mandalay Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 215; [1953] HCA 9. In a property-development promotion, persons benefiting from the scheme could be treated as promoters even where they were not the most active organisers. Why use it? A participant does not necessarily escape responsibility by saying that someone else conducted the meetings and paperwork. Identify each person's stake, agreement, role and anticipated gain; the label “passive investor” is not conclusive. Official High Court judgment.
Disclosure and remedies. A company may pursue remedies depending on the facts, including rescission where available, an account of profits, equitable compensation or other orders; the remedy must be fitted to the wrong and the possibility of restoration. For public fundraising involving a prospectus, s 711(2)–(4) imposes specific disclosure rules for interests and benefits of the prescribed people, including promoters. That does not mean every private proprietary-company formation triggers a prospectus. First establish whether the statutory disclosure regime actually applies.
3. Pre-registration contracts: the company did not exist yet
A company legally comes into existence when registered: s 119. Before that, a person cannot simply claim the future company was their principal in the ordinary agency sense. The present statutory starting point is s 131, not the superseded common-law rules. Under s 131(1), a company subsequently registered (or a reasonably identifiable company) becomes bound by and entitled to benefit from the pre-registration contract if it ratifies within the time the parties agreed or, if none is agreed, within a reasonable time. Ratification here means adopting that earlier contract through legally sufficient corporate action; merely receiving an invoice, incorporating, or using a similar name should not be treated as automatic proof of ratification.
Section 131(2) exposes the person who purported to contract to statutory damages if the company is not registered, or if registration occurs but neither ratification nor a substitute contract occurs within the relevant time. The statutory measure looks to what the company would have owed for complete non-performance had it ratified. Section 131(3) allows a court, in the prescribed registered-but-unratified circumstances, to make suitable orders against the company. Section 131(4) permits an order against the pre-registration contracting person in certain cases where the company ratifies but subsequently fails to perform. The risk therefore does not disappear merely because the company ultimately exists.
Section 132(1) permits a contractual counterparty to sign a release of the person's statutory liability. Under s 132(2) the person has no automatic right of indemnity against the company under this Part even where purporting to act as trustee. Section 133 displaces other rights and liabilities on the pre-registration contract itself. In practice, advise the client to decide who should sign, create clear conditions, set a realistic ratification date, record post-registration adoption properly, and obtain any necessary release or substitute contract expressly.
Worked timing example — the $30,000 lease deposit
Maya signs an equipment lease for $30,000 on 1 August on behalf of a company she intends to register. The lease says the new company must ratify it by 1 September. It registers on 15 August but the board never ratifies by 1 September. On these stated facts the key question is whether the company ratified or entered a substitute within the agreed period. If neither occurred, the company is not automatically made liable by registration alone. Maya faces potential damages under s 131(2). The counterparty's remedy needs proof of the relevant breach and statutory measure. Maya should not simply debit the new company's account and presume an indemnity, given s 132(2). If the board later validly adopts a new contract, analyse whether it is a substitute and what liabilities remain; do not conflate a new agreement with timely statutory ratification.
4. A company has capacity, but capacity is not authority
Under s 124(1) a registered company generally has a natural person's legal capacity and the powers of a body corporate. Section 125(1) allows the constitution to restrict the exercise of a corporate power but provides that a purported exercise is not invalid merely because it violates that restriction. Section 125(2) similarly addresses constitutional objects. This is the contemporary answer to much of the old ultra vires problem: the company may have general legal capacity despite internally restricting how it should act. But the directors or agents may still breach internal duties, and an outsider's ability to bind the company requires a separate authority analysis. A constitution is therefore not irrelevant; it is just not a universal weapon for voiding inconvenient third-party contracts.
A company may contract through an individual agent with express or implied authority under s 126(1). Express actual authority is communicated in words, board resolutions, role documents or a power of attorney. Implied actual authority may arise from the person's role, established course of dealing, necessary incidents of delegated responsibilities or company acquiescence. A warehouse manager ordinarily authorised to buy routine supplies is not therefore obviously authorised to mortgage the company's headquarters. Always ask what was actually authorised, by whom, on what terms, and at what time?
The separate concept of apparent (ostensible) authority protects a counterparty in some situations where the company, by an authorised representation or consistent conduct, holds a person out as having a particular power and the counterparty deals on that basis. Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 illustrates the company's acquiescence in someone acting as managing director and the reliance of outside contractors on that outward position. The key is a representation attributable to the company, not simply an agent saying “I can sign”. Evaluate the scope of the claimed authority, the source of the representation, reliance and the company's actual capacity.
Crabtree-Vickers Pty Ltd v Australian Direct Mail Advertising & Addressing Co Pty Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 72; [1975] HCA 49 is a limiting example. A person without actual authority to make the necessary representation cannot manufacture the apparent authority of another person by a chain of unsupported assurances. Why use it? When a junior employee says “my manager authorised me”, do not leap immediately to a binding company contract. Find a representation by the company or someone properly authorised to make it, not merely the alleged agent's self-certification.
5. Document execution: s 127 is valuable but not the only path
A company may directly execute a document without a common seal in the configurations set out in s 127(1), including two directors under (a), a director and company secretary under (b), or in the qualifying sole-director proprietary-company situations under (c)(i)–(ii). Section 127(2) addresses execution using a common seal and the required witnessing; s 127(2A) addresses observing a seal by physical or electronic means. Section 127(3)–(3B) covers execution as a deed and relevant modern formalities. Electronic signing is also supported by the technology-neutral rules in Part 1.2AA. Section 127(4) preserves other available ways of executing documents; failure to use the s 127 method is not invariably the end of the authority question.
Explain to a client why this matters. A lender confronted with a properly executed s 127 document has a stronger statutory assumption under s 129(5) (or s 129(6) with a seal) than one relying only upon an employee's emailed promise. Conversely, an adviser should never assume two signatures are conclusive without checking whether the signature appearances and the outsider's knowledge or suspicion bring the particular statutory assumption into play.
6. The indoor management rule and modern statutory assumptions
The historical indoor management rule, associated with Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327, responds to a commercial problem: outsiders cannot realistically attend each internal corporate meeting to check every approval. The law historically allowed outsiders, in appropriate circumstances, to assume that internal procedures were performed. That principle must now be read alongside the statutory assumptions. Section 130 prevents public availability of ASIC information, by itself, from creating constructive notice. In plain language, a counterparty is not deemed to know every fact in a public ASIC record merely because it could have searched for it.
Section 128(1) generally entitles someone dealing with a company to make the s 129 assumptions, and limits the company's capacity to assert the contrary in proceedings. Section 128(2) extends protection in certain property-title dealings. Crucially s 128(3) permits assumptions even in dealings involving fraud or forgery; however s 128(4) denies the assumptions where the outsider knew or suspected at the time of dealings that the relevant assumption was incorrect. Thus, “fraud occurred” alone is not a complete conclusion. The outsider's knowledge and suspicion must be separately analysed.
The s 129 assumption map: (1) the constitution and replaceable rules have been complied with; (2) an ASIC-identified director or secretary is duly appointed and can exercise the powers customary for comparable officers; (3) a company-held-out officer or agent is properly appointed and has customary authority; (4) officers and agents properly perform duties; (5) s 127(1)-style signing supports due execution; (6) appropriately witnessed seal execution supports due execution; and (7) particular document-issuance officers or agents have authority to warrant authenticity. The exact text and factual preconditions matter; an outsider should plead the particular subsection rather than saying merely “the indoor management rule applies”.
Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146 is particularly valuable for testing suspicious transactions and the limits of reliance. A mortgage over company assets used for purposes that appeared to benefit connected interests calls for scrutiny of the facts available to the outsider, the company's authority and the surrounding warning signs. The case is not a slogan that every forged document is ineffective or that lenders may never rely on corporate signatures. Read it together with ss 128(3)–(4) in the modern statutory regime and distinguish the then-applicable law from the current Act.
A corporate contracting decision tree
Was the company registered when the deal was made? If no, use ss 131–133. If yes, what actual corporate power and constitutional restriction apply under ss 124–125? Then ask who purported to act and did they have actual authority under s 126? Next consider apparent authority attributable to the company. If a document is signed, check s 127. For outsiders, test each relevant s 129 assumption through s 128, including the outsider's actual knowledge or suspicion under s 128(4). Finally identify who owes what to whom and what remedy. Never assume that demonstrating an internal breach necessarily defeats the outsider's claim.
7. Apply the law to a realistic commercial transaction
Original worked problem. Bayshore Kitchens Pty Ltd has one director, Talia, and no company secretary. Its constitution says that borrowing above $100,000 needs board and member approval. Talia tells the company's purchasing manager Leo, “You can order the necessary new ovens within the usual operating budget.” Leo signs a $180,000 equipment purchase agreement after telling the supplier, “I have authority to bind Bayshore on any deal.” The supplier knows only that Leo regularly places orders around $8,000. Talia also signs a separate $180,000 loan for the equipment in her own capacity as sole director; the finance company receives an email from Talia saying that company approvals have been obtained, although no formal member approval occurred.
For the equipment supply, determine whether Leo had express actual authority (his instruction appears limited), implied actual authority (past $8,000 orders are not comparable), or apparent authority (what did Bayshore or an authorised officer represent about $180,000 deals?). Leo's own statement is insufficient by itself: compare Crabtree-Vickers. Section 129(3) may matter if Bayshore held Leo out as an agent with customary authority for transactions of this kind, but not every purchasing-manager title extends to a six-figure exceptional order. Check s 128(4) for information the supplier actually knew or suspected.
For the loan, identify that the company is a sole-director proprietary company without a secretary and consider s 127(1)(c)(ii) and the matching s 129(5) execution assumption if the relevant formalities appear to be met. The constitutional borrowing limitation engages s 125 (not automatically invalidating the external act) and s 129(1), but the supplier or lender's actual knowledge or suspicion remains material under s 128(4). Talia's inaccurate email raises internal duties and evidence issues. The finance company has stronger arguments if execution looks compliant and no red flags arise, but no sound lawyer guarantees enforceability without reading the signed documents, company register and communications. Internal governance and outsider protection are separate inquiries.
8. The textbook's own teaching objectives translated into client questions
Chapter 4, §4.1 — Identify the promoter: Who initiated the business, negotiated asset transfers, attracted investors and expected a benefit? §4.2 — Duties: Did that person place self-interest ahead of the emerging company, or conceal a profit? §4.3 — Remedies: Could the company rescind, recover a profit or obtain equitable relief, and what would restoration require? §4.4 — Pre-registration contracts: Was the company registered and did it ratify on time under s 131, or is the signer exposed to damages?
Chapter 5, §§5.1–5.2 — Company power and contracting: Differentiate the legal capacity of the company from the authority of the natural person signing. §5.3 — Agency: Is actual or apparent authority established by evidence? §5.4 — Execution: Was the s 127 pathway followed and, if not, was another lawful pathway available? §5.5 — Indoor management: What internal irregularity does the outsider claim not to know? §5.6 — Statutory assumptions: Identify the exact assumption and test s 128(4). The lecturer's prescribed excerpt ends before §5.7; the latter subject is not represented as part of the Week 6 assigned reading here.
9. FAQs — simple answers grounded in the precise rules
FAQ 1 — Is everyone who helped start a company automatically a promoter?
No. The law looks at the person's substantive role and influence. Active organisers and persons participating for gain may qualify; routine independent professional advisers generally do not become promoters merely by registering the entity. The promoter inquiry matters because fiduciary duties and disclosure obligations may follow from the role.
FAQ 2 — The company is registered now; does that mean the contract signed last week binds it?
No. Section 131(1) requires registration of the relevant company and timely ratification. If there is no timely ratification or substitute and the conditions apply, the signer may be liable under s 131(2). Registration is a necessary chronology point, not a substitute for legal analysis.
FAQ 3 — Can a promoter keep a profit after selling their land to the new company?
A profit is not categorically prohibited, but undisclosed conflicts and secret profits are a serious fiduciary problem. Analyse who made the profit, what was disclosed, to whom, whether the approval was independent and informed, and what equitable remedy may be available. Erlanger and Gluckstein provide leading illustrations.
FAQ 4 — Does a clause in the constitution make an outsider's contract void?
Not merely because corporate exercise contravened that restriction: see s 125(1). The person's authority, the terms of the contract and any available outsider assumptions require separate examination. Directors may still face internal consequences for breaching valid restrictions.
FAQ 5 — Does the company need two directors to sign every contract?
No. Section 127 offers specified formal execution methods, including certain sole-director proprietary-company arrangements, but s 127(4) leaves other lawful methods possible. Under s 126, an appropriately authorised agent may bind a company. Ask which mechanism is actually being relied on.
FAQ 6 — If a signature was forged, can a lender ever rely on it?
Potentially s 128(3) allows assumptions even where fraud or forgery occurred, but s 128(4) prevents reliance if the outsider knew or suspected the assumption was wrong. The particular s 129 assumption must be available on the facts. Read the document, identities, surrounding circumstances and warning signs closely rather than making a blanket statement.
FAQ 7 — What is the practical difference between actual and apparent authority?
Actual authority concerns power truly given to the agent by the company (expressly or by implication). Apparent authority concerns authority the company represented to the outsider as existing, coupled with the necessary legal requirements. An employee's unsupported boast proves neither. This distinction often decides whether the company or the individual must face the counterparty's claim.
10. Multiple-choice questions — reasoning with each answer
MCQ 1. Which fact alone binds a registered company to a pre-registration lease? A. Its later registration; B. A promoter's hope; C. Timely statutory ratification under s 131(1); D. Its new letterhead. Answer: C. The Act requires the registered relevant company to ratify in the agreed or reasonable period.
MCQ 2. A promoter receives an undisclosed rebate while selling property to the new company. Which authority is especially relevant? A. Gluckstein v Barnes; B. Salomon only; C. s 249D; D. s 254T. Answer: A. Gluckstein concerns secret promoter profit and the strict duty of disclosure.
MCQ 3. A company constitution prohibits loans above $100,000 without member approval. Under s 125(1), an exercise that breaches the clause is: A. necessarily invalid solely for that reason; B. not invalid merely for that reason; C. always criminal; D. a dividend. Answer: B. External validity, authority, outsider assumptions and internal accountability must be analysed separately.
MCQ 4. A junior employee tells a supplier that a different employee has unlimited authority. The company has said nothing. Which issue is central? A. Can apparent authority be created by an agent's unsupported claim? B. Are cash dividends payable? C. Has an AGM occurred? D. Is a company a trust? Answer: A. The company-attributable representation requirement is central; Crabtree-Vickers provides a warning.
MCQ 5. Which rule generally disqualifies an outsider from relying on s 129 assumptions? A. Section 128(4), if the outsider knew or suspected the assumption was incorrect; B. Any breach of the constitution; C. Mere public availability of ASIC records; D. Every case of employee fraud. Answer: A. The statute separates fraud/forgery in s 128(3) from the knowledge/suspicion restriction in s 128(4).
MCQ 6. A qualifying sole-director proprietary company with no secretary executes a contract by that director signing. Which is the most directly relevant pathway? A. s 127(1)(c)(ii); B. s 249A; C. s 254W; D. s 711. Answer: A. Always check precise officer status and how execution appears before claiming the s 129(5) assumption.
11. Short-answer questions — High Distinction-style responses
SAQ 1 — Why must a promoter disclose conflicts even when the company agrees to buy the asset?
Because the agreement may have been engineered at a time when the promoter controls who speaks for the new company. Fiduciary regulation addresses the process and loyalty of decision-making, not only whether a price can be justified retrospectively. Erlanger demonstrates why an independent decision-maker and effective disclosure matter; Gluckstein demonstrates why concealed promoter gains can be recoverable. Ask whether approval was sufficiently informed and independent and whether the company retains an available equitable remedy.
SAQ 2 — State the correct chronology for a pre-registration contract problem.
First identify the contract date and whether the proposed company existed under s 119. Second identify the human signer and whether the contract purported to benefit the future company. Third establish registration and whether it is the company reasonably identifiable with the original arrangement. Fourth determine the agreed or reasonable time for ratification under s 131(1). Fifth decide whether ratification or a substitute contract was made in time. Sixth analyse personal damages under s 131(2) and discretionary orders under s 131(3)–(4), plus release and indemnity under s 132. Finally give a documented risk-management recommendation, not just a conclusion of liability.
SAQ 3 — Explain the relationship between the indoor management rule and ss 128–130.
The historical rule seeks to prevent outsiders from having to audit internal company procedures before ordinary dealings. Contemporary statutory protection is more precise: s 128 confers entitlement to the particular assumptions listed in s 129, while s 128(4) excludes someone who knew or suspected the assumption was wrong. Section 130 rejects constructive notice merely from public ASIC information. A careful answer uses the common-law rule as context but applies statutory elements to the evidence rather than treating it as an all-purpose exemption from due diligence.
12. Original full tutorial-style IRAC model answers
Problem A — promoter's secret profit
Question. Elena buys a warehouse for $520,000 with the plan to form Studio West Pty Ltd. Before the company has an independent board, she arranges for it to buy the same warehouse for $760,000. She discloses that she is the seller but does not disclose her earlier purchase price or a separate $35,000 facilitation commission she receives from a connected entity. Investors ask whether she breached a duty and what can be done.
Issue. Whether Elena was a promoter, whether she owed fiduciary obligations, whether the transaction involved an inadequately disclosed conflict or unauthorised profit and what remedy is possible.
Rule. Equity imposes fiduciary duties upon qualifying promoters. Erlanger scrutinises the independent and informed nature of corporate approval where a promoter sells property into the company. Gluckstein illustrates liability for undisclosed promoter gains. Remedial possibilities can include rescission, account of profits and other equitable relief, depending on proof, election and practical circumstances.
Application. Elena planned formation and engineered the transaction, so she is likely an active promoter. Her financial interest as vendor is an obvious conflict; the resale margin is $760,000 − $520,000 = $240,000. The connected commission of $35,000 raises a further potential hidden benefit. The fact the company knew she was the seller may not constitute full disclosure if material facts about the transaction and separate benefits were withheld, especially where independent corporate judgment was absent. However neither the entire $240,000 price difference nor the $35,000 should be automatically treated as the measure of judgment without examining legitimate costs, consideration, disclosure, authorisation and available remedies. Evidence will include titles, conveyancing records, invoices, investor materials and minutes.
Counterarguments. Elena may argue that the independent shareholders approved with sufficient information; that she bore commercial risk; that a fair purchase price was obtained; or that rescission is impossible because the asset has been changed or third-party rights intervened. Those facts affect legal assessment and available relief but do not automatically authorise concealed profit.
Conclusion. There is a substantial promoter-duty and disclosure issue. Advise the company to preserve all transaction documents, commission trails and approvals; obtain an independent valuation and governance advice; and assess rescission or an account of profits only after determining what was known and whether those remedies are available.
Problem B — pre-registration lease and a disputed signatory
Question. Before incorporation, Sam signs a five-year office lease “on behalf of FutureMap Pty Ltd”. The parties agree that FutureMap must ratify within 30 days. The company registers 14 days later but its directors decline to ratify. The landlord claims the company must pay because it now exists, and Sam claims that if personally liable, the company must reimburse him. Advise each party.
Issue. Does registration alone bind the company? Is Sam exposed to statutory damages? Can Sam insist upon corporate indemnity?
Rule. Section 131(1) requires timely ratification by the registered or reasonably identifiable company. Section 131(2) provides for the signer's damages liability in the defined non-registration or non-ratification circumstances. The court has possible orders under s 131(3) where the registered company has not ratified or entered a substitute, and s 131(4) where it ratified but failed to perform. Section 132(1) permits a written release and s 132(2) denies an automatic indemnity. Section 133 defines the pre-registration contract regime's replacement of other rights and liabilities on that contract.
Application. Sam made the lease before FutureMap existed and therefore cannot assume it was an ordinary company contract. Registration after 14 days did not of itself ratify it. The 30-day agreed period governs. If there was no qualifying ratification or substitute contract within it, the company is not bound under s 131(1) merely because it was registered, and Sam may face the statutory damages claim under s 131(2). The landlord should document actual loss and the measure stipulated by the Act. Sam cannot assume a right of reimbursement under s 132(2). A discretionary order involving the company is possible only if its own statutory conditions and the court's judgment warrant it.
Counterarguments. Evidence of a valid board resolution or other sufficient corporate adoption within 30 days might change the result. A later new contract might be relevant as a substitute if made within the specified period. The precise lease terms, corporate dealings, dates and remedies must be scrutinised.
Conclusion. Sam's personal exposure is real and registration alone is inadequate. A properly documented timely ratification or substitute agreement, or a signed release from the counterparty where appropriate, would be the risk-management solution. Each party should preserve the lease, registration data, communications and board records.
Problem C — outsider, authority and the suspicious mortgage
Question. A manager at Timberline Pty Ltd signs a bank mortgage using the company's assets to secure repayment of a debt of the manager's personally owned business. The manager says “the directors approved it”, but the bank has received a company email indicating that the board raised concerns about use of company property for the personal debt. There are no board minutes approving the arrangement. The bank argues that it may assume everything was regular.
Issue. Did the manager have actual or apparent authority and can the bank rely on specific statutory outsider assumptions despite the warning signs?
Rule. Sections 124–125 govern corporate capacity and constitutional restrictions, while s 126 addresses contracting by authorised agents; s 127 governs prescribed execution methods. Section 128(1) supplies entitlement to s 129 assumptions, including internal compliance under s 129(1) and held-out agents under s 129(3) where available. Section 128(4) bars reliance where the counterparty knew or suspected the assumption was incorrect. The practical concern in Northside Developments is that unusual security arrangements may carry warning signs that defeat a casual reliance argument, though the modern statutory language controls.
Application. The company's legal capacity is not the decisive issue. There is no evidence the manager had actual authority to encumber corporate property for their unrelated business; the benefit flowing to the manager's business is commercially unusual. The bank must identify what the company itself represented about the manager's power and whether a relevant s 129 assumption is properly invoked. The email describing board concerns is particularly important evidence that the bank may have suspected the asserted internal approval was false. Even if company procedures were typically assumed to be regular, s 128(4) requires direct attention. If the mortgage was not signed as s 127 specifies, its execution-based assumptions may not be available, though other avenues can be investigated.
Counterarguments. The bank could rely on evidence of prior similar authorised mortgages, later valid corporate approval, a different genuine corporate benefit, or documentation satisfying a particular statutory assumption. The company must prove its case concerning the knowledge or suspicion restriction, and the precise evidence may be disputed.
Conclusion. The bank's blanket “indoor management” assertion is insufficient. Request the mortgage, signature records, ASIC officer data, board minutes, relevant emails and details of the underlying debt. Analyse each assumption separately and advise on the enforceability claim, possible internal duty breaches and options to protect company assets.
13. Final issue-spotting and suggested reading plan
Read in this order: The Week 6 Bond instructions; Chapple et al, Company Law (3rd ed, 2023), Chapter 4 pp 97–114, in full; then Chapter 5 pp 117–135, stopping at §5.7, concentrating on actual authority, apparent authority, document execution and the statutory assumptions. Read the current ss 125–130 and 131–133 word for word. Use Tracy, Erlanger, Gluckstein, Freeman & Lockyer, Crabtree-Vickers and Northside to explain not merely a slogan but facts, issue, reason, result and application. Review the lecturer-recommended Redmond extract pp 147–156 and its case extracts at pp 318–335 if licensed through the Bond library; that extract was not part of the uploaded PDFs. Then answer the existing original Week 7 tutorial and compare the saved model answers. Do not confuse the textbook chapter number with the Corporate Law teaching-book chapter number.
Primary law, verified version: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), compilation 19 September 2026. Historical case directly verified: Tracy v Mandalay, High Court. Other case citations are derived from the uploaded prescribed textbook and current case-source cross-checks; a court/official judgment hyperlink should be substituted only after positive destination verification. Original educational commentary only; not a substitute for the textbook or legal advice.
ORIGINAL PUBLISHED INTERIOR · 26 OCTOBER 2026